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## NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FUTURE

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# FOCUS







# HYBRID WARFARE CASE STUDIES – CROATIA AND UKRAINE

Dr. Gordan Akrap<sup>1</sup>, Col. Viacheslav Semenienko, PhD<sup>2</sup>

**ABSTRACT:** Croatia's Homeland war and aggression to Ukraine are clear examples that can be described with term Hybrid warfare. Different phases during conflict and war (every conflict is not a war; every war is a conflict) has a lot of similarities,

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but also has a difference. It is important to make deeper analysis to provide better and efficient lessons-learned preventive and active measures for future conflicts.

This article starts with a short overview of Croatia's Homeland war and continues with short overview of Ukrainian experience. It contains lessons-learned tools and suggestions for future activities.

**KEYWORDS:** Hybrid warfare, Homeland war, Croatia, Ukraine, Russia, Crimea, Lessons learned

## Introduction

The end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century in Europe were marked by two wars: the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia and the aggression against Ukraine. Although they took place in different historical contexts, they have several common topics. The most important link between these two wars is that they represent a prime example of the type of war that, in recent years, has been called a hybrid war. Attacks on basement of all societies during the first phases of conflict (values, beliefs and principles) to divide society was visible. Importance of defending those pillars of any society was recognized and efficient countermeasures were adopted to win the war (in case of Croatia) and to stop the aggression (in case of Ukraine).

## Croatia's Homeland war

One of the wars that took place during and after the political disintegration of Yugoslavia was the Croatia's Homeland War (1990-1996). Considering the activities of the aggressors against Croatia, and the subsequent activities of

liberating the occupied parts of Croatia, the Homeland War can be divided into several phases according to its hybrid characteristics:

- (1) Phase dominated by information warfare and psychological operations by which the then political and military leadership of Yugoslavia, and primarily Serbia and Montenegro, tried to prevent the beginning of political democratization and possible political changes (organization and implementation of the first multi-party, democratic and free elections in Yugoslavia) in Croatia (1988-1990)
- (2) In the second phase (1990- mid 1991), after the democratic elections and the complete change of the political paradigm in Croatia and Slovenia, information and psychological operations were further intensified by Yugoslavian and Serbian side with stronger and more visible use of armed paramilitary formations and the involvement of armed forces on the rebel side under the motto "prevents further escalation of conflict and stopping violence". This phase was marked by significant activities in the field of spreading anti-Croatian propaganda in foreign media by distributing numerous disinformation with the aim of imposing the view that Croatia is a neo-fascist state in order to prevent the internationalization of aggression against Croatia and to prevent expected international

recognition of Croatia. At the same time, there was an intensification and threats of stronger engagement of the armed forces of Yugoslavia and Serbia if the democratically elected government in Croatia is not overthrown. This is a phase that can still be called a conflict of a hybrid nature because influence operations dominated in a spectrum of conflicts. The decision to make full use of the kinetic force on the aggressor side has not yet been made.

- (3) Third phase (mid 1991 - early 1992) was characterized by an armed aggression against Croatia when the Yugoslav and Serbian armed forces, together with the rebel Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, occupied almost 1/3 of the territory of the Republic of Croatia. This is the phase when the hybrid conflict passes into the phase of a hybrid war in which the dominant role is taken by using kinetic force while the influence operations were conducted as a support tool in the background.
- (4) After the Republic of Croatia was recognized by the international community in January 1992, the armed aggression was calmed down and stopped. However, influence operations continued with the same goal as before the beginning of the armed aggression. During 1992 and 1993, Croatia actively worked on creating conditions and developing its abilities and power to liberate the

occupied parts of its territory. The Croatian state leadership makes decisions that go in the direction of creating and developing military-civilian capabilities, based on positive experiences from the history of conflicts and wars, and following the example of Western democracies, the organization of its armed forces and the intelligence community. The developed capabilities were integrated into a functional unit in order to achieve the expected results by working together and acting, provided that the number of possible/expected victims (on both sides) were reduced to the lowest possible level, just as destruction of property as low as it is possible, and kinetic operations needs to be conducted as short as possible. This time, until mid-1994, was marked by the continuation of influence operations conducted by the aggressors. However, Croatia has developed its own defense capabilities that have reached the level of early recognition, identification and disclosure of distributed disinformation infiltrated into the Croatian and international public media space. The capabilities of the intelligence community were developed, which effectively competed with the aggressor, because the basis of all serious influence operations are the operations of the aggressor's intelligence community. In this way, the defenses abilities were

increased, as well as the capabilities for preparing the liberation of the occupied parts of the territory of the Republic of Croatia.

- (5) In mid-1994, Croatia started using integrated military-civilian crisis management capabilities and, with considerable preparation and use of influence operations, started using kinetic force. From the end of 1994 and during 1995, several military-police operations were carried out, liberating most of the occupied territory of the Republic of Croatia. Influential operations, planned and conducted by the Croatian side, also played a significant role in these operations. This is a phase dominated by the use of kinetic force which is why we can talk about hybrid warfare again.
- (6) With the completion of the military-police operation "Storm" (in Croatia) in August 1995 and the "Maestral" and "Southern Move" (in Bosnia and Herzegovina) in September/October 1995, conditions were created for ending the war in general. Peace talks have begun, which have also been marked by intensive influence operations planned and conducted by all stakeholders. The Dayton Peace Accords were signed, and the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube region began, which was completed in January 1998 as an administrative process. This time, as well as the one after that, was marked by numerous placed

disinformation, which is why we can talk about a conflict of a hybrid nature.

### **Croatia: Lessons learned - integration of capabilities**

Therefore, we can say that the Croatia's Homeland War is a prime example of a modern war of a hybrid nature. During its duration, the aggressor tried to achieve goals of different levels of importance in different areas of interest through numerous activities at the tactical and strategic level. It integrated the capabilities of the civilian and military spectrum. However, the coordination of their system and the integration into a manageable organizational form at the level of strategic planning and decision-making was not effective. The Croatian side has achieved just that: it has integrated its capabilities from both the civilian and military sectors, coordinated their activities and linked them into a meaningful organizational framework, clearly defined strategic goals that it efficiently communicated to its own population and the international community by developing strategic communication skills. It is this, clear vision of Croatia's future, which was communicating with the public, that has led the Croatian public to give full support to its institutions in the process of reintegrating the occupied parts of Croatia into the constitutional and legal order. In the case that we were not so strongly supported by our people, all efforts by Croatian civilian and military defense capabilities to develop and address the challenges they faced, would have been very difficult to implement.

By joining NATO and the EU, Croatia has fulfilled its goals, which have become a means of

achieving strategic goals: creating a modern, democratic, secure and stable Croatia as a responsible member of these integrations that can share its experiences with others to help them in times when they too are/were faced with the same or similar problems. In this context, the exchange of knowledge and experiences between Croatia and Ukraine should be considered in the context of dealing with modern forms of conflicts and wars of a hybrid nature.

### **Aggression to Ukraine**

Considering the aggression to which Ukraine was exposed during 2014, given the situation in which it found itself, and the similarity with the Croatian Homeland War, there was a need to exchange knowledge and experiences at the international level.

At the geopolitical level, the conflict and war in Ukraine was caused by Russian foreign policy reversal towards competitive confrontation with the West and restoration of Russia's imperial essence. At the regional and military-strategic level, the causes of the conflict and war were Russia's restoration of its dominance within the USSR's territorial boundaries and further expansion of its influence on the territory of the former Warsaw Pact, as well as the threat to Russia and access to the Middle East. Each conflict has its own features and peculiarities. But the conflict which took part on the Ukrainian territory has demonstrated a qualitative leap in forms, methods, and procedures of using state resources to achieve political objectives.

The current goals of the Russian Federation in relation to Ukraine can be considered by the weakening of the central government and



ensuring the neutral status of Ukraine, greater economic and political independence of its regions. The main long-term interest of the Russian Federation can be considered to ensure the favorable political and economic course of Ukraine. In general, it can be noted that the actions of the Russian Federation have become much tougher on Ukraine since the beginning of the conflict.

### **Hybrid war's Expert Analysis**

Expert team of the National Defense University of Ukraine during 2019-2020 wrote an analysis that addresses various aspects of a hybrid aggression concept, summarizes current views on counteracting scenarios and the use of military and non-military tools in the integrated Joint Forces Operation, provides appropriate methodological and practical guidelines for countering hybrid threats. Most of authors of this monograph took part in countering Russian aggression in the East of Ukraine.

Ukrainian experience has showed that the Russian Federation preferred the use of military, informational and psychological, as well as economic and political resources to achieve their strategic goals. Also, they are aware of the importance of integration of paramilitary organizations and conducting influence operations in any conflict.

Actions that can be classified as the armed aggression were carried out only by the Russian Federation. Such actions were:

- (1) Occupation of the AR of Crimea;

- (2) Sending armed groups of regular and irregular forces to Ukrainian territory;
- (3) Fire support of combat actions of illegal armed groups in eastern Ukraine from units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;
- (4) Blocking Ukrainian ships travelling to ports on the Azov coast.

According to Ukrainian legislation, the actions of the Russian Federation fall under the definition of the armed aggression. From the perspective of the large-scale use of military force, Ukraine's accession to NATO, coercive return of the AR of Crimea and coercive restoration of control over the occupied territories in the East of Ukraine are unacceptable to Russia. Russian leaders have formed a "second echelon" of intervention. On the eastern border with Russia and in the annexed Crimea, the Russian military command has already deployed a nearly 100,000-strong group of career servicemen which outnumbers the occupying forces in terms of combat readiness.

**Ukraine: Lessons learned – recommendations and integration of capabilities**

Threats of a military (and hybrid) nature formed not by purely military but rather non-military factors require equally comprehensive response. Military threat hybridity is evidenced by hidden, purposeful, destructive, and comprehensive influence on the national security system, i.e. in a set of both military and non-military factors (intentions and actions) integrated by a single aim.

It should be noted that countering hybrid threats is a complex process due to many different factors shaping these threats and difficulties in predicting changes in the intensity of their impact. To practically implement the determined forms and methods of integration of military and non-military forces and means of counteraction, it is advisable to have a concept of their comprehensive use. It is necessary to have a Conceptual model of managing the integrated countermeasures potential. It gives an opportunity to substantiate a rational composition of forces and means for de-escalation of the identified (predicted) threats and assess real possibilities for neutralization of specific military threats and threats with signs of "hybridity". It also evaluates the effectiveness of the use of forces and means of individual Ukrainian security and Defence sector components integrated to counter the threat.

The need of joint and mutually agreed use of military and non-military forces and means in countering the hybrid aggression is do not only desire to avoid duplication of tasks for individual security and defence sector components and efficient use of resources, but also to change the role and place of purely military means in countering the hybrid aggression.

One of the main conclusions from Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine is that the role of its information component has multiplied. In resource-limited setting, the state should use all possible forms of attracting non-government actors through public-private partnerships and liaison with civil society structures and individual citizens to effectively support cyber defence. One of the state's main tasks on ensuring information security of the MoD and the UAF is to arrange and perform counteraction to the

adverse information and psychological impacts on the UAF personnel. This necessitates establishment of an appropriate system. It is especially relevant for Ukraine after the beginning of the hybrid aggression of the Russian Federation, when the consequences of such an external influence became acute and tangible.

Strategic communication mechanism is the most important element of ensuring state information security and counteracting the hybrid aggression against Ukraine. Strategic communications should be considered as activity which is coordinated at the strategic (military-political) governance level and aimed at managing decision-making processes both within the country (group of countries) and abroad to defeat the enemy.

The organization of interaction between the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the civilian environment (governmental and non-governmental) in the areas of deployment of military units or in the areas of deployment to perform assigned tasks is an urgent task that relies on civil-military cooperation. The creation of the CIMIC organizations was based on the study of international experience of coordination between military units and the civilian population, during peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN and other international security organizations. CIMIC servicemen work both in the "gray zone" and along the line of contact. In addition, CIMIC groups are making considerable efforts to release Ukrainian servicemen from captivity. The CIMIC released 13 servicemen of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.

The groups of the Central Command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are tasked with coordinating the activities of public authorities, international humanitarian organizations in the field of mine safety, delivery of humanitarian goods, restoration of critical infrastructure (electricity, gas, water supply systems), housing repair. There is a need to deepen the dialogue on the use of existing methods of providing UN military assistance, based on acts of international law, due to the threat of a full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine. The choice by the military-political leadership of the state of an appropriate strategy for settling the conflict is impossible without considering the behavior of the other side of the conflict and the nature of the assistance provided to it. Such assistance can be provided simultaneously in many areas of existing conflict (political, economic, and financial support, supply of weapons and equipment, training, etc.).

## Conclusion

Croatian experience in facing hybrid aggression can be very valuable for future conflicts prediction and as basement for establishing efficient early-warning integrated all-society-system. Croatia was able, even though it was faced with more powerful aggressor then Croatia at that time, to defend its strategy. To win the battle for minds, hearts and soul, to win the war for information, against the information with the information.

The experience of conflict resolution in eastern Ukraine has shown that Russia's support to the self-proclaimed republics is comprehensive and increases or decreases in areas that correspond to the overall strategy of creating a certain

environment of influence on Ukraine's leadership.

Russia's policy on the world stage is systematic and coordinated. The Kremlin uses a wide arsenal of means of "hybrid" aggression to implement tactical tasks, among which we can single out the massive offensive propaganda of powerful Russian foreign broadcasting (Russia Today, Sputnik etc.), which is an effective information weapon, a powerful unit of rail information products and a means of targeted promotion of Russian ideology and the concept of "Russian world". The events of 2014–2020 for Ukraine became a vital test of resistance to "hybrid" aggression. The effectiveness of counteracting "hybrid" threats can be achieved first by introducing adequate and mutually agreed actions (measures) not only in the military sphere, but also in other spheres of national security.

# HYBRID AND CYBER WARFARE – INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AND JOINT SOLUTIONS

Dr Darko Trifunovic\*

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**Abstract:** Hybrid warfare is a significant threat to National Security and Countries in last 10 years. Hybrid activities are not new, but environment of cyberspace is completely different than before. We are witnessing a great expansion of the aforementioned fifth combat space, which knows no borders, fences, social or cultural barriers. Hybrid war as a form of endangering the security of sovereign states is primarily based on subversive activities in order to paralyze the state apparatus with the ultimate goal of changing the political leadership. This change of political leadership in the earlier period of history was far simpler and most often began and ended with armed aggression, the use of armed rebellion, or a coup. As modern societies increasingly turn to reliable alliances, mechanisms of collective security, conventional methods have become for quite some time less effective and outdated. The use of disinformation as an integral method of Hybrid Warfare has its roots in the concept of "ideological subversion". Ideological subversion is a term firstly defined by KGB in 1970th. KGB invented "Ideological subversion" as a tool of special warfare against civilians and administrative employees. To make it easier to follow the case study, the



authors of the Hybrid War operation divide it into four phases: Demoralization, Destabilization, Crisis, and Stabilization. For Russia, the Balkans hold significant historic, cultural, and religious connections—shared ties that are actively propagated, and at times exaggerated, by Russian public diplomacy efforts and media narratives.

**Key words:** Hybrid Warfare, Cyber Warfare, Security, Intelligence, Counterintelligence

## Introduction

Hybrid warfare is not class warfare that signifies armed conflict. Hybrid warfare is waged by unconventional means, primarily through the application of information technologies in, so to speak, the newly created space which we define as cybernetic. This area has become very important for the work of security services in terms of defining possible threats coming from such area, but also in terms of conducting special psychological operations according to the marked goals, which might be a state, community, people, vital infrastructure or even important individuals. Hybrid warfare is part of special war, but the term refers to a specific action backed by a foreign intelligence service or services using modern means such as the Internet, social networks, portals and specially designed sites in the cybersphere. In military theories, cyberspace is marked as the fifth combat space next to water, air, land and

space.<sup>1</sup> We are witnessing a great expansion of the aforementioned fifth combat space, which knows no borders, fences, social or cultural barriers. This space directly enters the privacy of each individual and with powerful techniques as well as analytical programs "learns" all the habits of the user. Hybrid actions concentrate on several phases. The first phase is the goal selection phase. The second phase is the phase of preparation of actions. This phase involves gathering all the useful information from history, culture, politics, economics, energy, etc. - in fact, all the information that can greatly affect the interest and awareness of the goal. The third phase is the phase of performing the action. Platforms for transmission of information, misinformation and other contents that are actually launched by the security service are most often used as operational instrument. The fourth phase is the phase of verification of the achieved results and the phase in which, after the achieved goals, one shifts focus from the attack to the defense of the achieved. The era of hybrid operations begins with Russian hybrid activities in Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008. The website of the President of Georgia has been a constant target of Russian hackers. Despite the fact that DDoS attacks passed through US-based IP addresses, experts have detected malware hackers who used to generalize as a "MachBot" DDoS controller. MachBot was written in Russia and is known as a tool of Russian criminal groups<sup>2</sup>. In 2013, the Chief of

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1. Laurence Ifrah, "States face new challenges from cyberwarfare and cybercrime", *Revue Défense Nationale*, Vol. 714, 2008.

2. Stephen W. Korns and Joshua E. Kastenber, "Georgia's Cyber Left Hook," *Parameters*, Winter

the Russian General Staff, General Valery Wasiljewitch Gerasimov, presented a new doctrine that was immediately called hybrid warfare<sup>3</sup>.

## **Hybrid warfare as a transnational form of endangering the security of sovereign states**

Hybrid war as a form of endangering the security of sovereign states is primarily based on subversive activities in order to paralyze the state apparatus with the ultimate goal of changing the political leadership. This change of political leadership in the earlier period of history was far simpler and most often began and ended with armed aggression, the use of armed rebellion, or a coup. As modern societies increasingly turn to reliable alliances, mechanisms of collective security, conventional methods have become for quite some time less effective and outdated. In this regard, hybrid threats appear as a type of response that is not overly demanding from the point of view of manpower and resources, but also not transparent from the point of view of detecting aggressors.

Hybrid war according to the Cambridge Dictionary: "the use of a range of different methods to attack an enemy, for example, the spreading of false information, or attacking important computer systems, as well as, or

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2008, p. 65,  
<http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/08winter/korns.pdf>.

3. Leslie Hamilton, Philip Webster, *The International Business Environment*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 2016. p.290.

instead of, traditional military action"<sup>4</sup> According to some authors hybrid threats include a full range of methods of warfare, including conventional capabilities, improper tactics and formations, terrorist acts involving indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal offenses<sup>5</sup>, including the comprehensive and combined use of special forces, intelligence services, think tanks, NGOs, rebel groups, associations of citizens, the media and intellectuals. What predominantly characterizes hybrid warfare is the use of unconventional forces and means with the use of military principles and tactics. The hybrid war replaced trenches and front lines with social divisions and antagonisms, grenades and bombs were replaced by disinformation, and battalions and infantry were replaced by think tanks, citizens' associations and individuals. What is characteristic of the forces involved in hybrid actions are probably elements deployed and managed by military principles and tactics, forces and means are calculatedly directed to pre-selected targets, diversions are performed and social contradictions are encouraged. Even though the phenomenon is hardly new, what is new and surprising is the "scale of use and exploitation of old tools in new ways"<sup>6</sup>.

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4. Cambridge Dictionary , <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/hybrid-warfare>
  5. Frank G. Hoffman, "Hybrid warfare and challenges" , JFQ, 1<sup>st</sup> quarter 2009, P 36, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jfqhoffman.pdf>
  6. *JACOBS, Andreas a Guillame LASCONRAJIAS. NATO's Hybrid Flanks, Handling Unconventional*

Some authors often bring hybrid actions into the context of soft and hard power<sup>7</sup>, where they present soft power as the basic characteristic of hybrid actions, which in general does not have to be the case. Thus, a party waging a hybrid war does not have to use its values as a necessary container. While the characteristic of soft power is precisely the existence of values as superior to alternatives, soft power is a cultural and social pattern. On the other hand, the use of soft power does not necessarily mean influencing the policy of a sovereign country and decision-makers, while the use of hybrid actions necessarily implies interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state with the aim of influencing political decisions and top decision-makers.

Since we have defined hybrid warfare, our intention is to focus in this paper on methods of hybrid action by processing a case study - Hybrid warfare in the Western Balkans, the case of Montenegro. By studying hybrid effects in the Western Balkan space, it shows that what dominates them is the abundant use of disinformation and misinformation, which will be the topic of this paper.

Disinformation and misinformation<sup>8</sup> are a key characteristic of the hybrid actions that the

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*Warfare in the South and the East. NATO Defence College [online]. [cit. 2015-08-01]*

7. *Wither, James K. "Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare." Connections 15, no. 2 (2016): 73-87. Accessed December 2, 2020. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26326441>.*

8. *Council of the European Union, Complementary efforts to enhance resilience and counter hybrid*

Russian Federation performs against NATO members and areas of geopolitical interest. As part of the placement of disinformation, we have a weaponization of history, culture and traditions, often accompanied by hate speech. In NATO Secretary-General annual report 2019<sup>9</sup>, in the section for Hybrid threats is stated: they (Russian Federation) can make political and strategic gains in other ways, such as spreading disinformation, launching cyber attacks, and using deception and sabotage. These hybrid or gray zone activities blur the line between peace and war and are used to destabilize and undermine affected countries. Countering hybrid threats against Allies is a priority for NATO. Allies stand ready to defend each other against hybrid attacks as part of collective defense while recognizing that the primary responsibility for responding to hybrid attacks rests with the targeted nation.

The use of disinformation as an integral method of Hybrid Warfare has its roots in the concept of "ideological subversion". Ideological subversion is a term firstly defined by KGB in 1970th. KGB invented "Ideological subversion" as a tool of special warfare against civilians and administrative employees. "Ideological subversion" is a part of the doctrinal approach and propaganda tool. As a special warfare tool, they intended to use it dominantly against

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*threats - Council Conclusions (10 December 2019)*

9. [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/03/pdf\\_publications/sgar19-en.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/03/pdf_publications/sgar19-en.pdf)

Yugoslavia in the period after 1958. At that time we had the so-called "fifth column" in secret service, military, universities and among journalists. In that period it was defined as ideological propaganda and subversive activities with the goal to overthrow Tito and Yugoslavia regime and integrate it into USSR and Eastern Block. Yuri Bezmenov: "Ideological subversion means always a distractive aggressive activity aimed at destroying the country, nation or geographical area of your enemy".<sup>10</sup>

What experts call disinformation operations today is deeply rooted in the concept of ideological subversion. Russian dissident, count, and defector Vladimir Volkov also deal with the topic of disinformation in his book *Disinformation*<sup>11</sup> - The media have been transformed from a means of spreading knowledge, enlightenment and information into a means of governing the soul and consciousness of man and people.

Therefore the information, instead of conveying the facts as the truth, regardless weather behind the selection of facts is the choice of the one who conveys them, is transformed into the context in which such facts are placed. Instead of the truth, context is given. Unfortunately, this is not only the case in wartime conditions, but has become a universal practice everywhere in the modern world. Instead of serving the truth, the media are serving the government and power.

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10. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wSKr2q9zukQ>

11. Vladimir Volkov, "Disinformation", *Nas Dom*, Beograd, 2013, p 4

To make it easier to follow the case study, the authors of the Hybrid War operation divide it into four phases: Demoralization, Destabilization, Crisis, and Stabilization. The demoralization phase is the initial phase but does not end there. Demoralization activities often represent a continuous activity in all other phases, with the possibility that the demoralization phase can last for years and represent a continuous activity that overlaps with the other three activities. Targets are continuously exposed to the placement of strategic and tactical disinformation. What characterizes the phase of demoralization in terms of the Western Balkan region is that this phase in this area lasts for a hundred years in a row. During that time, the bearers and narratives changed, but the ultimate goals did not change. Influential agency networks have changed narratives and priorities, but never the ultimate purpose. The demoralization phase includes a strong organized activity of placing and multiplying misinformation that seeks to be inserted as an integral part of social discourse and generally accepted truth. Disinformation and misinformation are aimed at weaponizing history, culture, and tradition and deepening the identified social gap, mobilizing public opinion, extorting foreign policy and internal decisions of the sovereign state, creating an environment of open polarization of society<sup>12</sup> and motivation for other forms of action such as unrest, riots, civil disobedience, sabotage and removal of legally elected authorities. In accordance with the methods and tactics of the disinformation operation, they reach their full momentum when

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12. *Some examples are Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia*



the media begins to spread misinformation out of their own convictions and ignorance, and when they sincerely believe in them. Through cyberspace, it has never been easier to place disinformation and misinformation from the point of view of selecting the target population, performance control, and analytical cross-section of achieved goals. In this phase, pre-prepared materials are placed, the complexity and difficulty of the defense in this phase represents the potential of social networks with all their specifics. The destabilization phase continues to rely on the demoralization phase, with a conceptual change involving stably formed and active pressure groups and agents of interest. Pressure groups embodied in think tanks, citizens' associations, political parties and individuals are resolutely engaged in shaping political goals and polarizing society through formalizing action, organizing demonstrations, civil disobedience, abuse of power, creating scandals, openly demanding political demands and causing riots and unrest. Depending on the state's response, this phase can last from a few days to several months. Instead of a large-scale military invasion, the attacker<sup>13</sup> aims to target and undermine the subject by other methods, often involving the use of disinformation campaigns, subversive intelligence, cyber-attacks, sabotage, or (not only) political support of separatist or other groups advantageous for the attacker. Whether this phase can gain additional dynamics embodied in the next phase of the Crisis depends on the readiness of the state and its

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13. Richterová, Jitka, *NATO & Hybrid Threats, Asociace pro mezinárodní otázky, Prague, 2015, p. 5.*

response, and especially on strategic communication.

The Crisis phase takes place successfully when the listed subjects gain the potential to paralyze society, to impose their activities in public discourse and maintain the ability to maintain continuous riots, demonstrations, riots, fierce conflicts with law enforcement agencies, formal or informal occupation of institutions and change of government and foreign policy, as well as country orientation. In this phase, it is characteristic that other forces for hybrid actions are included in the Hybrid operations, such as special units and rebel groups, for example Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, Transnistria. This phase can last continuously for years. Crimea began as a covert military operation, combining ambiguity, disinformation, and the element of surprise at the operational level with more traditional aids such as electronic warfare. The annexation was completed by a traditional military invasion and occupation of the peninsula, using Russia's airborne, naval infantry and motor rifle brigades. This operation was unique, because Russia's Sevastopol naval base, status of forces arrangements in Crimea, and additional agreements on transit of troops in Ukraine enabled deployments and tactics that would not otherwise have been possible.<sup>14</sup>

The Stabilization phase represents the crown of success of all previous phases, after which the bearers of hybrid actions achieve their geopolitical goals, which become a reality on

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14. *Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, A Closer look at Russia's "Hybrid War", No. 7 | April 2015, Wilson Center*

the ground. For that, we have the most recent examples of the occupation of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, and the upcoming crisis in Moldova.

## **Hybrid warfare as an international problem on the Western Balkans**

For Russia, the Balkans hold significant historic, cultural, and religious connections—shared ties that are actively propagated, and at times exaggerated, by Russian public diplomacy efforts and media narratives.

The hybrid effects on Western Balkans as stated have their continuity for more than a hundred years. The main goals are to prevent the full integration of the Western Balkans into the EU and NATO with the abundant creation of social conflicts with the aim of creating a set of dysfunctional states and governments, as guarantees for permanent isolation integrated into a hybrid form of "alliance" through Eurasian Union and OACS membership.

The set of activities, measures and actions were skillfully prepared and organized by the intelligence services of the Russian Federation. Through proxies embodied in think tanks, citizens' associations and individuals, the dominant zone of influence are cyberspace-social networks, media and portals that create and exploit social contradictions, with the aim of antagonizing Western Balkan space towards EU-Atlantic integration.

Hybrid effects on Western Balkan represent a multidimensional activity whose carriers include:

1. State actors
2. Non-state actors

According to the areas of activity, it is indicative that all areas of social life are networked. According to this classification, we can divide them into the following zones of interest through social groups:

- Hooligan and team support groups
- Low census political parties
- Minor political movements
- Cultural movements/ Churches
- Individuals such as intellectuals, journalist and artists
- News portals and other media

Education is an area of activity that has become very pronounced in the last two years. Through the scholarship system, students are sent to study at Russian universities intended for civil servants.

By reviewing the events from the previous period, we can see that the activities of the listed pressure groups supported by state actors are able to prevent and paralyze political and foreign policy decisions. Examples are numerous about the potential for creating a huge social conflict over NATO and EU membership, to foreign policy pressures - Facebook Maria Zaharova "If you are invited in the White House and the chair is set as for interrogation, sit as presented in the photo no.2, whoever you are. Trust me".<sup>15</sup>

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15. <https://www.bbc.com/serbian/lat/srbija-54055450>

What is encouraging in present situation are the decisive moves that the leadership of the Western Balkan states take despite strong threats to their political survival. First of all, the membership of Montenegro and N. Macedonia in NATO and the Washington Agreement for Serbia. The Washington agreement in the case of Serbia immediately provoked a reaction from the Kremlin, but also attempts at a coup in Montenegro as well as threats of demonstrations and riots in Skopje.

That hybrid actions on the Western Balkans represent the potential for transnational endangerment can be seen through the case of the Russian factory of bots and trolls that operated from N. Macedonia throughout Europe. Mark Zuckerberg once stated - " Bots from Macedonia tried to influence the outcome of the elections in the American state of Alabama by using fake profiles and placing fake news. We neutralized those attempts. All this is not quantum physics, but it is just a lot, a lot of work for us that we have to do. "<sup>16</sup>

Russian Federation's hybrid actions on Western Balkans carry their foreign policy implications which we could see in the example of Montenegro. Montenegro faced an attempted coup and an assassination attempt on President Djukanovic to prevent NATO membership.<sup>17</sup>

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16. [https://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2018&mm=03&dd=22&nav\\_category=78&nav\\_id=1372325](https://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2018&mm=03&dd=22&nav_category=78&nav_id=1372325)

17. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48212435>

In all these cases, we see that through disinformation and misinformation, public opinion is strongly polarized and thus prevents the political integration of the Western Balkan into the EU and NATO. An example of this is a recent public opinion poll according to which citizens perceive the Russian Federation as the largest donor in relation to the EU.

Hybrid Warfare on Western Balkan methods and techniques are weaponization of historical interpretation, tradition, emotions, international relation, religion, nationalism, active measures, disinformation and fake news. Public advocacy subjects and individuals as channels for the weaponization of history are: Individuals – mostly intellectuals Internet and Social Networks Conventional channels- events, books, newspapers Exploitation of history are based on usage of fake history interpretation, usage of true fact in certain moments and contexts. The purpose is to deeply and continuously antagonize and present Russia as the savior of orthodox Christianity and the "New Rome". These activities are mostly in connection with hate speech. The weaponization of religion we sow on Montenegro example (more in the case study). War in Former Yugoslavia and Kosovo is the strong lever which Kremlin use to place narrative against western values and euro-Atlantic integration. Disinformation and fake news are the dominant activity mostly present on the internet and social network, in the last few years traditional channels as events are increasing (on Universities and para-political NGOs), but mainstream newspapers are also significantly involved.

### **Brief case study Montenegro vs Religion Freedom**

In the events of 2019 and 2020 in Montenegro, we can clearly see the pattern of application of hybrid operations through the phases of demoralization, destabilization, crisis and stabilization. In phase of demoralization was held a series of events on Universities mostly about „Position of Serbs and Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro“<sup>18</sup>. Presented narrative was imaginary endangerment of Serbian Orthodox Church, identity topic and dilemmas from 19th century. Russian Federation misused Serbia as hub for those operations simultaneously with activities in Montenegro. Russian strategists estimated that religious mater can be very well exploited and it will mobilize large public support and individuals. So they have started with preparation activities almost one year before election period in Montenegro. The activities started with the organization of a series of tribunes on the Serbian identity and position of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro by organizations connected to the official channels with the Embassy of the Russian Federation.

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18. <https://www.instagram.com/p/By8WIV8oyLb/>



*Student Organization – Student’s Club of Faculty of Law in one of numerous visits to Russian Federation in Belgrade, with diplomat Aleksandar Konanihin on picture*



On picture is archbishop of Serbian Ortodox Joanikije Church with the leader of one Student Organization – Student’s Club of Faculty of Law on



one on several events organized with topic about endangerment of Serbian Church and identity in Montenegro

The demoralization phase included a huge presence of false news, hate speech, misinformation and calls for defense against an imaginary enemy, all in connection with NATO membership in Montenegro as a form of threat by itself. In the campaign of spreading false news and disinformation, the portal [www.in4s.net](http://www.in4s.net) played a strong leading role in the cycle of creating misinformation.

The portal presents itself as a journalist, without an official registration in the media register, without an imprint deprived of any responsibility. The same portal was the creator of a lot of content designed to provoke an emotional reaction from readers, using the abuse of historical contexts and linking the President of Montenegro to the fascist regimes of World War II<sup>19</sup>. Side by side with the pro-Kremlin Sputnik, IN4S actively placed disinformation. The cases of misinformation by these two portals were largely documented by the Digital Forensic Center from Podgorica<sup>20</sup>.

From a phenomenological point of view, misinformation has been shown to be crucial in the demoralization phase in order to deepen social gaps, polarize society as a whole but also to mobilize actors in Montenegro and abroad in order to maintain false perceptions

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19. <https://www.in4s.net/jovanovic-milo-po-ugledu-na-ndh-zeli-da-rusi-i-otima-srpske-svetinje-u-crnoj-gori-video/>

20. <https://dfcme.me/>

and narratives in order to create an atmosphere of survival and false narratives.

The destabilization phase began with the organization of demonstrations called "Itije". At this point we have the classic abuse of religious rites and religion as a whole by church dignitaries. From a psychological and emotional point of view, the organizers called the demonstrations against the Law on Freedom of Religion liturgies based on religious rites that have nothing to do with civil disobedience and political demands. The slogan of the demonstration was

"We do not give the Holy."





During the destabilization phase, we gained new quality in terms of demands that were extended to political demands for overthrowing of the legitimate authorities of Montenegro. The placement of content ranged from hate speech to disinformation and misinformation. The main narratives were aimed at linking NATO membership to membership in a fascist coalition from World War II, anti-Serbian intentions, denial of democracy and civil society. As the election process progressed, the organizers slowly entered the phase of the Crisis, during which there were sporadic clashes with the police - quote, but also with the increasing intensity of spreading false news.

Pro-Russian para-political organization and media statements against Montenegro and Euro-Atlantic community:

EXAMPLE 1:

*Milo is building a NATO church on the foundations of the Serbian Orthodox Church.*

*Instead of baptismal glory, he will celebrate Javier Solana, instead of incense, he will use depleted uranium. Yesterday Dachau, today Montenegro. It is a concentration camp for Serbs in which they beat bishops, arrest MPs and persecute the people, "said Milica Đurđević from ultra-right pro Russian party-Zavetnici.<sup>21</sup>*

EXAMPLE 2:

*MILO ATTACKED THE Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) BECAUSE OF AMERICA - Hodges then said that the countries of our region "should be provided with support and protection from Russian pressure", and that "Serbia should be helped to resist the pressure of the SOC, which is tied to Russia".<sup>22</sup>*

EXAMPLE 3<sup>23</sup>:

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21. <https://www.alo.rs/vesti/politika/podrska-za-srbe-i-svetinje-u-crnoj-gori/276675/vest>

22. <https://www.intermagazin.rs/milo-je-zbog-amerike-udario-na-spc-a-ovo-je-razlog/>

23. [www.dfcme.me](http://www.dfcme.me)



On left side we can see tweet from opposition leader in Montenegro Marko Milacic, where is made statement that police crushed a baby, and on right side we see that picture is from medical advertisement.

From the presented examples we can see that as the phases of demoralization, destabilization and crisis are moving away, so the intensity of false news, disinformation and misinformation is increasing. The bearers of hybrid warfare act together as amplifiers along the lines of social life - culture, history, tradition, economy and security. With a clear characteristic of stimulating negative emotions and deepening antagonisms in order to divide society.

In the crisis phase, the hybrid war in the case study of Montenegro has the following characteristics:

1. Massive rallies ,

2. Possibility to impact mainstream media with fake news and disinformation,
3. Social unrest,
4. Radicalization of larger population groups,
5. Possibility to disseminate propaganda, fake news and disinformation by controlled media and news portals,
6. Mobilization of voters and psychological impact on their decisions,

The stabilization phase is still ongoing in the case of Montenegro, its characteristics are the successful completion of the hybrid operation with the following outcomes:

1. Change of pro-western government
2. Foreign policy turn of Montenegro's policy
3. Strengthening Russian influence in Montenegro
4. Re awaken old Joseph Stalin plan for creation of Balkan Union under Russian control.

As the events and outcomes in Montenegro are still current, it remains for us to monitor the outcomes

## Conclusion

Hybrid threats are definitely transnational security challenges, which abuse territories of several countries. Potential of hybrid attacks is very large. Countries should establish counter-hybrid teams and form international alliances as response to aggressive Russian activities within Europe. The case of Montenegro, as an example, should alert Western Balkans' countries. It also lectures countries in general on the need to impose multi-sectorial approach in response to such threats.

Covid19 consequences will further boost a potential for disinformation and hybrid activities as tools for destabilization of Western Balkans and EU as well. Early response mechanism should include international cooperation in suppressing organizations and individuals which are proven hybrid actors. EU and NATO mechanism of cooperation should include mapping of such organizations and individuals, with the result of sanctioning them and forbidding entrance to EU and NATO countries. That would be a required mechanism to prevent such organizations and individuals to operate, travel, establish connections and promote harmful content and activities. Social network operators should extend and improve mechanisms for preventing deliberate misuse of freedom of speech. Based on presented points we can conclude that serious efforts are needed to design proper response to Hybrid and Cyber Warfare with respect for human rights and freedom of speech.

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14. [www.bbc.com](http://www.bbc.com)
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# CASE STUDIES



# POLITIČKI ISLAM (ISLAMIZAM), TERORIZAM I UTJECAJ ISLAMSKIH ZEMALJA U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI

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## **Sažetak**

U tradiciji islama kao religije postoje ekspanzivne ideje i metode. Cilj islamistički orijentiranih muslimana u konačnici je živjeti u jednoj državi sa šerijatskim zakonom. Politički islam je krajna posljedica takve ideje, te se u političkom islamu islam instrumentalizira u političke svrhe želeći pokoriti sve nemuslimanske narode i države s kojim su u vječnom sukobu (*Dahr el Harb* - Kuća Rata). U Bosni i Hercegovini, islamizam je postojao tijekom 20.st., a intezivirao se nakon Drugog svjetskog rata djelovanjem Alije Izetbegovića i njegove grupe. Tijekom rata u BiH 1992.-1995.g., u toj su zemlji djelovale mnoge terorističke skupine, obavještajne službe islamskih zemalja, a i uspostavljena je i službena Muslimanska/Bošnjačka stranka SDA. Nakon rata, mnogi teroristi su ostali, a skupine koje ostaju prijetnja su vehabijska zajednica, terorističke organizacije (kao *Al Qai'da*), kao i skupine povezane s Muslimanskim bratstvom.

**Ključne riječi:** islamizam, šerijat, Alija Izetbegović, terorizam, vehabije, Al-Qai'da

## Islamizam, islam i islamistički terorizam

### Islam

Islamizam i islam postoje kao dvije odvojene kategorije i nikako nisu istoznačnice. Islam je religija čiji su vjernici muslimani, dok je islamizam politički oblik islama; točnije rečeno, to je politička ideologija i orijentacija oblikovana unutar složenog islamskog svijeta.<sup>1</sup> Bilo bi pogrešno tvrditi da je islam sam po sebi politički pokret; prije svega on jest vjerski i nastao je kao božanska objava proroku Muhamedu. Rođen oko 570.g. u gradu Meki u plodnijem pojasu Arapskog poluotoka, Muhamed je provodio život običnog trgovca do objave i poziva koje je iskusio 610.g. u brdima blizu Meke. Po njegovom uvjerenju, obratio mu se Bog a on je utemeljio vjeru koju je nazvao *islam*- što znači predanost jedinom Bogu (*Allah*) i priznavanje Njegove opstojnosti i svemoći.<sup>2</sup> Propovijedao je Božju Riječ, Kur'an, malobrojnim sljedbenicima u Meki i svojoj obitelji. Preokret se dogodio kad se je preselio u grad Jesribu (Medina) gdje je zavladao naseljem rastrzanim unutarplemanskim sukobima. Postupno je povećavao broj svojih sljedbenika- muslimana- te ujedinio brojna plemena Arabije i osvojio Meku. U Medini je ustanovio prvu islamsku državu gdje je on bio kalif- u sebi je ujedinio Božjeg poslanika, vojskovođu i vladara.<sup>3</sup> To se je odvijalo 622.g., te je sljedećih 10 godina, do svoje smrti, Muhamed ustanovio sve najvažnije odredbe- vjerske i svjetovne- nove vjere boreći se za ujedinjenje arapskih plemena i prevlast u Meki. Sam je vodio rat i bitke protiv Kurejšita, plemena koje je vladalo Mekom. Na kraju su muslimani- oni predani Allahu- pod vodstvom svog Proroka osvojili Meku, a Muhamed se vratio u Medinu i umro 632.g.<sup>4</sup> I već površnom analizom vidljivo je da je i sam Muhamed bio veoma politički aktivan te je uspješno kombinirao novu religiju koju je uspostavio te

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1 Bilandžić, Mirko. *Sjeme zla: Uvod u studije terorizma*. Zagreb: Despot Infinitus, 2014., str. 193, 195

2 Ochsenswald, William. " Muhammad: His Life and Leadership " u: Ochsenswald, William- Fisher, Sydney. *The Middle East: A History*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004., str. 25-26

3 Kulenović, Tarik. *Politički islam: Osnovni pojmovi, autori i skupine jednog modernog političkog pokreta*. Zagreb: V.B.Z., 2008., str. 26

4 Mantran, Robert. " Muhamed i islam " u: *Povijest 5- Kasno Rimsko Carstvo i rani srednji vijek* ( ur. Enrico Cravetto). Zagreb: Jutarnji list, 2007., str. 503-508

političku moć koju je nametnuo, skupa sa svim pravnim i drugim propisima donesenim za nove vjernike. Današnji rezultat Muhamedove vjerske a i političke revolucije je činjenica da je islam druga najzastupljenija religija sa oko milijardu i pol sljedbenika<sup>5</sup>, a u čak 27 država je službena državna vjera i to u zemljama sjeverne i subsaharske Afrike, Bliskog Istoka te u nekim državama u Aziji.<sup>6</sup>

O Muhamedovim političkim i osvajačkim potezima se još da i raspravljati<sup>7</sup>, no politika njegovih nasljednika ne ostavlja mjesta sumnji da su svoj islam kao religiju spojili s osvajanjima i utemeljenjem nove države. Nakon smrti Muhameda 632.g., ujedinjenim Arapskim poluotokom i novom svjetskom silom su upravljali kalifi (ar. *Khalifa*- nasljednik) od kojih je prvi bio Abu Bakr (632.-634.g.), zatim Umar, Utman te Ali koji su postali poznati kao *rašiduni* (pravedni kalifi). Umar i Utman su kao vladari osvojili golemo područja koja su obuhvaćala Egipat, Siriju, Palestinu te Srednji Istok- u njihovo se vrijeme islamska vjera etablirala a država proširila. Značajan je raskol uslijedio vladavinom četvrtog kalifa Alija (656.-661.g.). Ali je bio jedan od prvih obraćenika na islam, slijedio je Muhameda na njegovu putu i oženio njegovu kćer. Uslijedio je sukob između njega i upravitelja Sirije Muavije u kojem je potonji pobijedio, a Ali je ubijen. Prije svoje smrti Ali je utemeljio *sh'at Ali* - Alijinu stranku, te su po tome nazvani šiiti- grana muslimana koji štiju Aliju kao sveca osobito povezanog s Bogom i smatraju da Muhamedova obitelj ima pravo voditi islamski svijet. Oni posjeduju i ponešto drukčiju teologiju od većinski orijentiranih muslimana, sunita, no ipak se svi slažu u bitnom.<sup>8</sup> Nakon ovog raskola, Muavija je utemeljio dinastiju Umajida i prebacio sjedište svoje države u Damask, a osnivač dinastije Abasida (750.- 1258.g.) u Bagdad - time su islamsko carstvo i islam kao religija postali pokret svjetskih razmjera. U 10.st. muslimani vladaju područjem od Španjolske do Indije.<sup>9</sup>

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5 <https://berkeleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/demographics-of-islam>  
Pristup 23.5.2019.

6 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/03/more-than-20-percent-countries-have-official-state-religions-pew-survey>  
Pristup 23.5.2019.

7 Jedan ga je povjesničar zgodno opisao kao kombinaciju Isusa Krista u smislu vjerskog reformatora i Karla Velikog kao osvajača; Kulenović, Tarik. *Politički islam*, str. 26

8 Mantran, Robert. " Muhamed i islam ", str. 517-520; Kulenović, Tarik. *Politički islam*, str. 27-28

9 Kulenović, Tarik. *Politički islam*, str. 30, 36

## Islamizam

Već je istaknuto kako je islamizam zapravo politički islam; politička ideologija koja koristi islamsku religiju kao bazu svog političkog djelovanja. Korijeni modernog političkog islama se datiraju u 19.st. (uz pojavu vahabizma u 18.st. u današnjoj Saudijskoj Arabiji). Ideološki proto-učitelji islamizma su bili u biti vjerski reformatori koji su se opirali kolonijalizmu zapadnoeuropskih zemalja i smatrali da je religija islama javna stvar, a time i politika. U 19.st. i prvoj polovici 20.st. istaknuli su se vjerski učitelji poput Iranca Jamal Al- Dina Al-Afghanija, Egipćanina Muhammeda Abduhua te Sirijca Rašida Rida.<sup>10</sup>

Ipak, pravi temelj za ono što će postati islamizam je dao Egipćanin Hasan Al-Banna osnovavši organizaciju *Muslimanska braća (Društvo muslimanske braće, ar. Ikhwan al Muslimin)* 1928.g. u Egiptu, u Isma' iliyyi. Hasan Al-Banna je također htio reformirati svoju državu vraćajući muslimane na pravi put; originalni put proroka Muhameda i prihvaćanje Kur'ana kao vrhovnog zakona u državi. U početku je Muslimansko bratstvo djelovalo preko socijalne pomoći u Egiptu posebno naglašavajući obrazovanje, no kasnije se militariziralo.<sup>11</sup> Po njemu muslimani ne trebaju težiti europskim vrijednostima. Bratstvo je postalo uzor za sve islamističke organizacije nastale kasnije<sup>12</sup> i po tome je ova organizacija vrlo značajna. Isto se udruženje proširilo na brojne ogranke i slične organizacije po cijelom islamskom svijetu, a njene franšize uglavnom uključuju politiku nenasilja, no ne uvijek. Palestinski *Hamas*, kojeg SAD drži terorističkom organizacijom, je izrastao iz Bratstva; iz njegovog ogranka je šaik Ahmed Jassin osnovao neprofitnu organizaciju u Izraelu 1978.g. koja je postala Hamas.<sup>13</sup> Sadašnji emir i vođa Al-Qaide, dr. Ayman Zawahiri, je također bivši pripadnik egipatskog Muslimanskog bratstva.<sup>14</sup> Iako su započeli kao

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10 Kulenović, Tarik. *Politički islam*, str. 89-96

11 Fisher, Sydney Nettleton. " The Egyptian Republic and Independent Sudan " u : Ochsenswald, William- Fisher, Sydney. *The Middle East: A History*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004., str. 583-584

12 Bilandžić, Mirko. *Sjeme zla*, str. 192-193; Isti. " Islamske oružane organizacije i islamizam na primjeru Bliskog istoka ", *Revija za sociologiju*, XXXIX (4), str. 309

13 Bilandžić, Mirko. " Islamske oružane organizacije i islamizam na primjeru Bliskog istoka ", str. 319

14 <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/30/world/middleeast/is-the-muslim-brotherhood-terrorist.html>

organizacija više orijentirana na obrazovanje i karitativnu pomoć, Bratstvo je postalo i radikalni pokret koji želi uspostaviti teokratsku državu. Za regiju zapadnog Balkana i za sigurnost BiH i Hrvatske treba spomenuti (o čemu će još biti riječi) da je i organizacija *Mladi muslimani* iz BiH, osnovana 1941.g., izrasla po uzoru na Muslimansko bratstvo iz Egipta i s njima održavala intenzivne kontakte.<sup>15</sup>

U svjetskim okvirima, može se reći kako je islamizam doživio veliki zamah tijekom zadnje četvrtine 20.st. Nakon još jednog poraza Palestinaca i drugih arapskih zemalja od strane Izraela, fokus muslimanskog svijeta se okrenuo na druge države. Možda je presudna 1979. godina kada su započela dva događaja koja će imati dalekosežne posljedice. Prvi je Islamska revolucija u Iranu kojom je na vlast došao ajatolah Ruhollah Homeini, konzervativni šijitski vjerski vođa, zbacivši šaha Rezu Pahlavija s vlasti.<sup>16</sup> Masivne demonstracije, štrajkovi i loša ekonomska situacija je prisilila šaha da početkom siječnja 1979.g. napusti zemlju koju je preuzeo spomenuti klerik. U Iranu je tada uspostavljena republika s islamskim predznakom. Iran više nije bio monarhija (nakon dvije i pol tisuće godina), već je postao republika sa nekim teokratskim predznacima i čuvarima novog poretka, koju utjelovljuje Islamska Revolucionarna Garda (eng. *IRGC - Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps*).<sup>17</sup> Revolucionarna Garda je vojna, sigurnosna i obavještajna služba koja odgovara izravno ajatolahu i opisuje se kao prava pretorijanska garda-elita koja zapravo djeluje kao država unutar države. Skupa s MOIS-om (*Ministry of Intelligence and Security*)<sup>18</sup> formira glavnu obavještajnu snagu u zemlji i inozemstvu, a njene

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15 Mlivočić, Ivica. *Al Qaida se kalila u Bosni i Hercegovini*. Split- Mostar: Naša ognjišta- Tomislavgrad, 2007., str. 30-31

16 Kissinger, Henry. *Svjetski poredak*. Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2015., str. 136- 138

17 Fisher, Sydney Nettleton. " The Islamic Republic of Iran, the Collapse of the Soviet Union, and War in Afghanistan " u: Ochsenswald, William- Fisher, Sydney. *The Middle East: A History*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004., str. 514- 516; Kulenović, Tarik. *Politički islam*, str. 121- 123. Nakon što je predsjednik SAD-a Trump proglasio IRGC stranom terorističkom organizacijom, u travnju 2019.postala je i nedostupna službena stranica Revolucione garde sepahnews.com; <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/designates-iran-elite-irgc-terrorist-organisation-trump-190408141756166.html>

18 MOIS je nastao iz obavještajne službe SAVAMA koju je osnovao ajatolah Homeini 1984., te je zamijenila prijašnju službu SAVAK; još se naziva i VEVAK; <https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/vevak.htm>

specijalne snage (*Quds*) su djelovale tijekom rata u Bosni i Hercegovini.<sup>19</sup>

Drugi vrlo bitan događaj za islamski svijet, sa posljedicama koje su dovele do islamskog terorizma i nastanka Al- Qaide, je bila intervencija Sovjetskog Ssaveza u Afganistan također 1979.g. Sovjeti su, želeći sačuvati marksističku vladavinu u Afganistanu, intervenirali i vojskom ušli u tu zemlju gdje su Afganistanci gerilskim ratovanjem pružili žestok otpor. No, ono što je počelo kao manji sukob je preraslo u internacionalni zanos muslimana koji su odlazili u *džihad* (sveti rat) kao mudžahedini boreći se protiv nevjernika. Šeik Abdullah Azzam, Palestinac, je zadojen džihadističkom idejom otvorio *Makhtab-e-Khidamat Al-Mujahideen* tj. Ured za mudžahedinske usluge u pakistanskom Peshawaru, gdje su brojni muslimani iz raznih zemalja (Egipćani, Palestinci, Saudijci, Jemenci itd.) ulazili u Afganistan i postajali "sveti ratnici".<sup>20</sup> Azzam je bio član spomenutog Muslimanskog bratstva, a Ured je u Peshawaru služio kao središnja baza za propagandu, novačenje i prikupljanje sredstava za borbu protiv Sovjeta. On je i osnovao Al- Qaidu kao "čvrstu bazu" (ar. *Al-Qaeda al-Sulbah*) u vidu stvaranja temelja za daljne borbe protiv nevjernika. Tijekom 1980-ih, bogati Saudijac Osama bin Laden je pomalo preuzeo Al- Qaidu i pretvorio je u terorističku organizaciju svjetskih razmjera.<sup>21</sup>

Islamizam je pojava koju se može okarakterizirati kao instrumentalizaciju religije; dakle, to je pokret koji je u svojoj biti i politički i religijski budući da smatra da je islam religija, način života i država- po tom konceptu društvo mora biti uređeno po pravilima šerijatskog zakona.<sup>22</sup> Jedan je znanstvenik definirao islamizam kao "religijsku ideologiju koja sadrži holističku interpretaciju islama čiji je konačni cilj osvajanje svijeta svim sredstvima".<sup>23</sup> To je ideologija koja je religijski i vremenski regresivna - teži povratku u prošlost (*salaf*), u vrijeme Muhamedova upravljanja Medinom te vrijeme vladavine rašiduna - prva 4 kalifa. Holistička

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19 Wege, Carl Anthony. "Iran's Intelligence Establishment", *The Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies*, 21 (2), str. 64-65

20 Kohlmann, Evan. *Al- Qa'idin džihad u Europi: Afganistansko-bosanska mreža*. Zagreb: Naklada Ljevak, 2005., str. 18- 23

21 Bilandžić, Mirko. *Sjeme zla*, str. 199- 200.

22 Isto, str. 195

23 Mozaffari, Mehdi. "What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept", *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 8 (1), str. 21

interpretacija označava da islamisti svoju vjeru vide kao *din*, *dunya* i *dawla* - spomenuta religija, način života i država. Ono što islamisti uistinu teže jest osvajanje svijeta koje im je čak i Allah u Kur'anu obećao<sup>24</sup>, te tako smatraju da im svijet i pripada.<sup>25</sup>

## Islamistički terorizam

Terorizam je sam po sebi kompleksan i slojevit pojam. Povijest se modernog terorizma smješta u 19.st. s pojavom anarhističkih akcija, a različiti autori i institucije različito definiraju pojam terorizma. Tako autori *NATO Leksikona* opisuju terorizam kao "nezakonitu uporabu sile ili nasilja ili prijetnja uporabom iste protiv osoba ili imovine kako bi se zastrašilo ili na nešto prisililo vladu, civilno stanovništvo ili bilo koji dio društva te promaknulo vlastite političke, ideološke ili društvene ciljeve."<sup>26</sup> Neki drugi znanstvenici daju više deskriptivno objašnjenje bez čvrste definicije. Dominique Venner smatra kako je terorizam različit od ratnog čina ili običnog političkog nasilja; ono za cilj ima poniziti protivnika a ne ga potpuno poraziti jer mu nije dorastao. Terorizam je izazov slabijeg jačemu želeći posijati strah i nasilnu reakciju jačeg i tako ga defimirati.<sup>27</sup> O samom pojmu nema potrebe ovdje iznositi teorijske pretpostavke i razne zaključke, no treba istaknuti kako je terorizam veoma opasan politički, društveni i sigurnosni fenomen suvremenog doba te predstavlja napad na nacionalnu sigurnost neke države i njene stanovnike.<sup>28</sup> Može se pojednostavniti kazavši kako je terorizam uporaba terora radi ostvarenja političkih ciljeva; on je dualne prirode, sastoji se od nasilja i političkog djelovanja.<sup>29</sup> Postoje još neki elementi terorističkih akata; oni započinju kriminalnim djelovanjima, nasiljem ali zapravo imaju drugi cilj u vidu. To je ujedno i psihološka operacija koja želi zadati strah i paniku društvu kojeg napada.<sup>30</sup> Islamski terorizam ima

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<sup>24</sup> Sura 7, 128-129

<sup>25</sup> Mozaffari, Mehdi. "What is Islamism?...", str. 22-23

<sup>26</sup> *NATO Leksikon* ( ur. Laković, Aleksandar- Stojan, Kristina ). Zagreb: Topical, 2008., str. 180

<sup>27</sup> Venner, Dominique. *Povijest terorizma*. Zagreb: Alfa, 2005., str. 8-9

<sup>28</sup> Bilandžić, Mirko. *Sjeme zla*, str. 19; ekstenzivno o terorizmu u ovom istom radu.

<sup>29</sup> Isto, str. 126

<sup>30</sup> Anderson, Sean K.- Sloan, Stephen. *Historical Dictionary of Terrorism*. Lanham- Toronto- Plymouth: The Scarecrow Press, 2009., lii-liii



svoj korijen u političkom islamu. Islamizam je, kako je istaknuto, politička ideologija (više njih) koja smatra kako islam nije samo religija nego i politički sustav te da se muslimani trebaju vratiti korijenima svoje vjere.<sup>31</sup> Ipak, različite islamske oružane organizacije i terorističke grupe imaju različite ciljeve; neki radikalni islamisti žele rušiti sekularne poretke u svojim državama, kao egipatska *Islamska grupa* (ar. *Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya*), neki žele rušiti nemuslimanske vlasti kao grupe u Čečeniji a neki razmišljaju šire kao Al- Qaida koja teži poraziti SAD i Zapad.<sup>32</sup> Zanimanje i pozornost cijelog svijeta islamski je terorizam zadobio u drugoj polovici 20.st. i početkom 21.st., i to događajima koji uključuju arapsko-izraelski sukob (četiri sukoba od 1948.g. do 1973.g.), zatim iransko-irački rat u 1980-ima, prva i druga intifada te posebno udar Al-Qaide i njenog emira Osame bin Ladena 11. rujna 2001.g. na SAD.<sup>33</sup> Napadi 11.rujna su bili osobito okrutni i smrtonosni; život je izgubilo oko 3000 ljudi, a SAD i saveznici su pokrenuli " Rat protiv terora " (*War on Terror*); vojno je napadnut Irak i Afganistan, a islamski terorizam se zapravo razbuktao - broj terorističkih napada se višestruko povećao u islamskim zemljama i preuzeo primat u svijetu.<sup>34</sup> Pitanje je također je li taj rat uopće pomogao; neki stručnjaci osporavaju politiku Georga Busha Mlađeg i ističu kako je Al- Qaida dobila točno što je htjela, a to je slika u svijetu SAD-a koji napada i ratuje protiv islamskog svijeta kao novi križari.<sup>35</sup> Neke islamističke terorističke organizacije relevantne za ovaj rad su:

**Islamska grupa** (ar. *Gama'at al Islamiya*) - egipatska Islamska grupa je islamistička, militantna i teroristička organizacija, najveća u arapskom svijetu osnovana 1973.g., kojoj je primarni cilj rušenje sekularnog poretka u Egiptu. Njen duhovni vođa i utjecajna osoba je bio zloglasni slijepi šaik Omar Abdul Rahman koji je proglasio *fatwu* za eliminaciju egipatskog predsjednika Anwara Sadata 1980.g., što su Islamska grupa i *Islamski džihad* i učinili 1981.g. Kasnije je Grupa pokušala i atentat na predsjednika Hosnija Mubaraka. Teroristički akti ove organizacije su brojni, te treba izdvojiti masakr u hramu Luxor u Egiptu 1997.g. kad je ubijeno 58 turista. 1999.g. vodstvo Islamske grupe je donijelo odluku o prekidu nasilnog djelovanja, što je pokušao spriječiti Ayman

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31 Bilandžić, Mirko. "Islamske oružane organizacije i islamizam na temelju Bliskog istoka ", str. 310

32 Isto, str. 314

33 Isto, str. 210

34 <https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism> Pristup 2.6.2019.

35 <https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism> Pristup 2.6.2019.

Zawahiri, egipatski ideolog Al-Qaide i sadašnji emir te organizacije. Ipak, teroristički napadi su se nastavili, kao onaj 2005.g. u ljetovalištu Sharm al-Sheikhu.<sup>36</sup> Ova organizacija je poduzela i jedini teroristički napad na tlu Republike Hrvatske, u Rijeci 1995.g.<sup>37</sup> Ista je bila veoma aktivna tijekom rata u Bosni i Hercegovini.<sup>38</sup>

**Hamas** - akronim arapskog naziva *Harakat al Mukawama al Islamiya* (Islamski Pokret Otpora) je islamistička fundamentalistička palestinska organizacija čiji je cilj brisanje Države Izrael s lica zemlje i uspostava islamističke države u Palestini. Osnovana 1987.g. od strane šeika Ahmeda Yassina, svoj početak ima u organizaciji Mudžama utemeljenoj 1978.g. od strane istog šeika u Izraelu. Yassin je bio pripadnik utjecajnog Muslimanskog bratstva i Hamas je nastavio održavati veze s tom organizacijom. Ideologija Hamasa je bliska Bratstvu i terorističkoj grupi Islamski džihad-obe su sudjelovale u ubojstvu egipatskog predsjednika Anwara Sadata. Hamas je u trajnom ratu s Izraelom, a potporu mu pružaju brojne muslimanske države poput Jordana, Sirije, Libanona, Sudana ali i Irana premda su sunitska grupa.<sup>39</sup>

**Al- Qaida** - je globalna, džihadistička, fundamentalistička teroristička organizacija bazirana na salafističkoj ideologiji koja ima za cilj povratak izvornim postulatima islama i uvođenje šerijatskog prava po cijelom svijetu. Salafizam označava pokret koji teži stvaranju idealne, čiste islamske zajednice po uzoru na *salafe* (prijatelje) Muhameda. Prema nekim procjenama<sup>40</sup>, oko milijun muslimana salafističkog usmjerenja je spremno za uporabu nasilja. Meta Al-Qaide su zapadne države (SAD, Velika Britanija i druge), zatim muslimanske države koje su saveznici Zapada te druge muslimanske organizacije koje su im prijateljni ili su sekularnog uvjerenja.<sup>41</sup> Al-Qaida se može još uvijek smatrati ozbiljnom

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36 Anderson, Sean K.- Sloan, Stephen. *Historical Dictionary of Terrorism*, str. 301-303; Bilandžić, Mirko. " Islamske organizacije i islamizam na primjeru Bliskog istoka ", str. 321-323

37 Kohlmann, Evan. *Al- Qa'idin džihad u Europi: Afganistansko-bosanska mreža*, str. 190-191

38 Mlivočić, Ivica. *Al Qaida se kalila u Bosni i Hercegovini*, str. 211

39 Anderson, Sean K.- Sloan, Stephen. *Historical Dictionary of Terrorism*, str. 227- 237; Bilandžić, Mirko. " Islamske organizacije i islamizam na primjeru Bliskog istoka ", str. 319

40 Bilandžić, Mirko. *Sjeme zla*, str. 198

41 Bilandžić, Mirko. *Sjeme zla*, str. 198; Anderson, Sean K.- Sloan, Stephen. *Historical Dictionary of Terrorism*, str. 557

prijetnjom Zapadu, pa time i Bosni i Hercegovini, posredno i susjedu Republici Hrvatskoj i Hrvatima u BiH, iz nekoliko razloga koji se najviše tiču njena konačna cilja i strategije.

Al- Qaida se rodila u ratu u Afganistanu. Već je spomenuto kako je Palestinac iz Jordana, Abdullah Azzam, član Muslimanskog bratstva, osnovao uslužni ured MAK (*Maktab al Khidamat*) u Peshawaru u Pakistanu za propagandu, prikupljanje sredstava i novačenje svetih ratnika. " Bazu " je preuzeo bogati Saudijac Osama bin Laden 1988.g., a Azzam je potom brzo ubijen. Poznato je kako je američka CIA podupirala mnoge mudžahedinske grupe preko pakistanske službe ISI, iako nisu pronađeni nijedni direktni dokazi između CIA-e i MAK-a. Al- Qaida je primala pomoć i od drugih obavještajnih službi i država; tako su iranski MOIS i Hezbollah sudjelovao u treningu boraca Al-Qaide u Sudanu, kampovima Hezbollaha u Libanonu i Iranu.<sup>42</sup>

Ciljevi Al-Qaide su definirani još tijekom devedesetih godina prošlog stoljeća te su strategijski opisani u dokumentu Plan/Strategija 2020. Al- Qaida se nada, i radi na tome, da do 2020.g. dostigne svoj glavni cilj; uspostavu globalnog islamističkog kalifata preko sedam faza koje jedna drugu nadopunjuju.<sup>43</sup> Ciljevi srednjeg vremenskog dometa su radikalizacija islamskog društva diljem svijeta, borba protiv sekularnih muslimanskih država, uništenje Izraela i SAD-a. Praktični ciljevi obuhvaćaju i posjedovanje i razvijanje oružja za masovno uništenje te daljni razvitak u upotrebi eksploziva i zapadnjačke tehnologije koju koriste za napade.<sup>44</sup> Ono što je posebno zabrinjavajuće po Republiku Hrvatsku i Bosnu i Hercegovinu je činjenica da Al- Qaida ima posebne planove na Balkanu. Naime, nakon što je u ratu 1990-ih sudjelovala na strani Bošnjaka/Muslimana u BiH i razvila svoju terorističku mrežu, vodstvo Al-Qaide je poslije rata počelo iskorištavati domaće muslimane kao svoje teroriste poglavito zbog toga što su postali tzv. bijela Al- Qaida; izgledom mladi Europljani plave kose i svijetle boje očiju. Zbog toga ih je dosta teže identificirati i sprječiti u njihovim naumima. Vođa organizacije, dr. Ayman Zawahiri, je 2013.g. predstavio i plan " Balkan

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42 Anderson, Sean K.- Sloan, Stephen. *Historical Dictionary of Terrorism*, str. 557, 558, 564; Bilandžić, Mirko. " Al- Qaida: nastanak, struktura i strategija ", *Polemos* 11 (1), str. 34-36

43 Bilandžić, Mirko. " Al- Qaida: nastanak, struktura i strategija ", str. 41

44 Anderson, Sean K.- Sloan, Stephen. *Historical Dictionary of Terrorism*, str. 559

2020. ", gdje potvrđuje Balkanski poluotok kao jedan od centara islamskog terorizma i njihovog djelovanja.<sup>45</sup>

Organizacijski, Al- Qaida je hijerarhijski ustrojena; njome upravlja emir i vijeće savjetnika. Ima vojno i političko krilo te tijela zadužena za vojna i politička pitanja, planiranje operacija, obavještajna te sigurnosna djelovanja, tijela za logistiku i financiranje.<sup>46</sup> Na vrhu hijerarhije je emir, danas Ayman Zawahiri. On ima svog zamjenika te tajnika. U zapovijednom vijeću postoje odjeli za političku djelatnost, vjerska pitanja, administraciju i financiranje te poseban odjel za medijsku djelatnost i propagandu. Pitanje je djeluje li ova organizacija kao strogo hijerarhijska prema svojim mrežama i filijalama diljem svijeta, ili služi kao krovna organizacija koja umrežuje sve te organizacije.<sup>47</sup> Ono što treba zaključiti u vezi BiH i Republike Hrvatske je činjenica da je Al- Qaida teroristička organizacija koja se u ratu ubacila u BiH i razvila svoju mrežu te je nastojala, i vjerovatno će dalje nastojati, iskoristiti to područje za svoje strateške ciljeve - islamizaciju Balkana i prodor prema Europi i SAD-u.<sup>48</sup>

## ***Islamizam i islamistički terorizam u Bosni i Hercegovini***

### **Pojava islamizma u BiH do raspada Jugoslavije i rata**

U socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji SR Bosna i Hercegovina je bila jedna od 6 republika, a Muslimani su 1971.g. postali jedna od priznatih nacija, iako je njihova religioznost bila dosta površna i više sekularne prirode.<sup>49</sup> Sigurnosne i obavještajne službe u SFRJ, SDB/SDS (zvana i UDB-a) uz vanjsku obavještajnu službu SID (Služba za istraživanje i dokumentaciju pri Sekretarijatu inostranih poslova) kao i vojne službe (Vojna obavještajna služba pri II.upravi Generalštaba JNA te UB-Uprava Bezbednosti JNA u sastavu SSNO-a), su bile zadužene za zaštitu komunističkog poretka i vlasti SKJ te

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45 Gibas- Krzak, Danuta. " Terrorism in the Balkans. Genesis- types- prognoses ", *Internal Security Review* 19/18, str. 326

46 Bilandžić, Mirko. " Al- Qaida; nastanak, struktura i strategija ", str. 37

47 Gunaratna, Rohan- Oreg, Aviv. " Al Qaeda's Organizational Structure and its Evolution ", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 33 (12), str. 1045, 1054-1056

48 Kohlmann, Evan. *Al- Qa'idin džihad u Europi: Afganistansko-bosanska mreža*, str. 37

49 Gibas- Krzak, Danuta. " Terrorism in the Balkans. Genesis- types- prognoses ", str. 323

predsjednika Tita u zemlji od svih neprijatelja; raznih vrsta nacionalizma, vjerskih pokreta, vanjskih i unutarnjih protivnika.<sup>50</sup> Tako su i SDB BiH i SID sudjelovale u otkrivanju islamističkih prijetnji iznutra i van države koji su prijeli tadašnjoj vlasti. Tijekom 1960-ih i pogotovo 1970-ih politički islam je diljem svijeta ojačao; 1969.g. osnovana je i međunarodna politička organizacija islamskih zemalja, *Organization of Islamic Cooperation* (OIC). Na trećoj konferenciji ove organizacije 1981.g., fokus se je prebacio na muslimanske manjine diljem svijeta, a na sastanku u Kairu 1982.g. odlučeno je da se jača politički islam u Jugoslaviji kao put za jačanje muslimanskih zajednica diljem Balkana.<sup>51</sup>

I sama komunistička Jugoslavija je sudjelovala u stvaranju terorističke prijetnje; naime, u Obavještajno-bezbednosnom školskom centru (OBŠC), nazvanim tako 1975.g. sa središtem u Pančevu, održavana je obuka budućih obavještajaca, sigurnosnih stručnjaka, vojnih policajaca ali i terorista, pripadnika terorističkih grupa - među svima njima bilo je dosta Arapa, kao i brata Sadama Huseina.<sup>52</sup> Između 1960.g. i 1986.g. kroz taj je centar obuku prošlo preko 800 stranih državljana iz 10 zemalja, među njima i oni iz PLO-a (eng. *Palestine Liberation Organisation*). Sve je to bilo vrlo unosno budući da je SFRJ, tj. njene tvrtke, zarađivala godišnje oko 713 milijuna dolara prodavajući oružje raznim stranim skupinama i državama.<sup>53</sup>

Za razumijevanje pojave političkog islama, dolazak stranih mudžahedina u BiH tijekom rata 1992.-1995.g., kao i pojave islamskog terorizma nakon rata, teško je dovoljno naglasiti koliko je važna uloga Alije Izetbegovića.<sup>54</sup> Rođen u Bosanskom Šamcu 1925.g., 1946.g. jugoslavenske su ga vlasti uhitile i osudile na tri godine zatvora budući da je bio pripadnik organizacije *Mladi muslimani* koja je nastala po uzoru na Muslimansko bratstvo Hasana al-Banne. Još kao

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50 Žunec, Ozren.- Domišljanović, Darko. *Obavještajno-sigurnosne službe Republike Hrvatske*. Zagreb: Jesenski i Turk, 2000., str. 33-41; Akrap, Gordan. " Mač i štiti u rukama Partije- represivni sustav u funkciji oblikovanja javnog znanja ", *National Security and the Future* 4 (11), 2011., str. 205 i dalje

51 Lučić, Ivo. " Bosna and Herzegovina and Terrorism ", *National Security and the Future* 3-4 (2), 2001., str. 121- 122

52 Starešina, Višnja. *Hrvati pod KOS-ovim krilom*. Zagreb: Avid Media- Hrvatsko katoličko sveučilište, 2017., str. 209- 210; Lučić, Ivo. " Bosna and Herzegovina and Terrorism ", str. 114

53 Lučić, Ivo. " Bosna and Herzegovina and Terrorism ", str. 115

54 <http://www.enciklopedija.hr/natuknica.aspx?id=28280>

mladić, dakle, postao je zadojen islamističkom ideologijom te je te svoje ideje predočio u tekst dokumenta *Islamske deklaracije* koju je napisao 1969.g., a objavio 1970.g. U njemu iznosi svoj program islamizacije bošnjačkih Muslimana i muslimanskih naroda. U ožujku 1983.g., djelatnici SDS-a Sekretarijata unutarnjih poslova SR BiH su upali u stan Alije Izetbegovića te ga uhitili zbog širenja islamskog fundamentalizma; s njime su i neke druge osobe uhićene i osuđene, a Alija je dobio 14 godina zatvora iako je izašao krajem 1988.g.<sup>55</sup> Optužnica je imala svoj temelj na spomenutom tekstu *Islamska deklaracija* u kojoj Izetbegović donosi svoje viđenje ustrojstva islamskog društva. U njemu tvrdi kako onaj narod koji je prihvatio islam može živjeti i boriti se samo za taj ideal. Nije puno držao do nacionalizama smatrajući islam nadnacionalnim, djelotvornijim pokretom te je na izricanju presude kazao kako se je uvijek smatrao borcem za islam.<sup>56</sup>

Postojalo je tijekom 1980-ih još nekoliko slučajeva islamističkog fundamentalizma u SR BiH te su još neki ljudi osuđeni. Ipak, ključna je bila uloga Alije Izetbegovića. Nakon promjene vlasti, potvrđeni su kontakti između Mladih muslimana, skupine kojoj je Izetbegović pripadao, i Muslimanskog bratstva, organizacije koja je, kako je rečeno, veoma utjecala na razvoj islamističkih organizacija.<sup>57</sup>

Nakon što je izišao iz zatvora 1988.g., Izetbegović je osnovao prvu muslimansku stranku; SDA- *Stranka demokratske akcije* 26.svibnja 1990.g. u Sarajevu. Održao je i govor na utemeljiteljskoj skupštini SDA koji je započeo islamskim pozdravom iz Kur' ana; *Bismillahir-rahmanir-rahim* (U ime Allaha, Svemilosnog, Samilosnog), pozdravom koji stoji na početku svake sure (osim jedne) u Kur'anu.<sup>58</sup> U lipnju 1991.g., Savjet za nacionalnu obranu SDA je osnovao oružanu formaciju *Patriotsku ligu* čija je zadaća bila braniti cjelovitost BiH, ali i zaštita muslimanskog naroda. Glavni utemeljitelj i operativac Patriotske lige, koja će poslije izrasti u *Armiju BiH*, je bio bivši oficir JNA Sefer Halilović koji je iskoristio svoja vojna i obavještajna znanja u formiranju jedne

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55 Tuđman, Miroslav. *Druga strana Rubikona: Politička strategija Alije Izetbegovića*. Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, 2017., str. 13-15; Lučić, Ivo. "Bosna and Herzegovina and Terrorism", str. 122

56 Lučić, Ivica. *Uzroci rata: Bosna i Hercegovina od 1980. do 1992.godine*. Zagreb: Despot Infinitus, 2013., str. 136- 138

57 Isto, str. 140

58 Tuđman, Miroslav. *Druga strana Rubikona: Politička strategija Alije Izetbegovića*, str. 26-27

takve strukture. Činjenica je da je Patriotska liga bila zapravo stranačka vojska SDA.<sup>59</sup> Vrijedi spomenuti i to da je prije prelaska na stranu Bošnjaka/Muslimana, Sefer Halilović bio dugogodišnji suradnik KOS-a, vrbovan još 1975.g. kao potporučnik JNA, te je uhodio i izvještavao za vrijeme višestranačkih izbora u Hrvatskoj pripreme HDZ-a i formiranje Hrvatske Vojske.<sup>60</sup>

Alija Izetbegović je kao vođa SDA i predstavnik Muslimana u BiH počeo, nakon pobjede na izborima, provoditi ono što je kao mlad pisao u *Islamskoj deklaraciji*. Nakon raspada SFRJ i proglašenja nezavisnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, mnoge islamske zemlje su ju počele priznavati (Turska, Libija, Iran) i počele joj pomagati na razne načine. Takva potpora islamskih zemalja je samo potvrdilo Izetbegoviću ono u što je vjerovao, a to je *ummet*; težnja i nastojanje za ujedinjenjem svih muslimana u jednu zajednicu.<sup>61</sup> Alija Izetbegović je svoje islamističke ideje, povezane još od mladosti sa Muslimanskim bratstvom preko organizacije Mladi muslimani, provodio kao predsjednik BiH i član predsjedništva kroz cijelo desetljeće (1990.-2000.g.). Preko njegovog saveznika Harisa Silajdžića i sina Bakira Izetbegovića, danas bošnjačkog člana Predsjedništva, njegove ideje dalje žive.<sup>62</sup> Vrijedna je spomena i činjenica da su i druge osobe u SFRJ bile uhićene i osuđene zbog islamskog fundamentalizma i muslimanskog nacionalizma, a postojala je i muslimanska politička emigracija.<sup>63</sup>

Što se tiče ovog odlomka, može se zaključiti kako je klica islamizma, političkog islama, i islamističkog terorizma koji je niknuo u ratu u BiH 1992.-95.g. te se nastavio i poslije rata, nastala dosta ranije i to preko grupe Mladi muslimani koja se inspirirala organizacijom Muslimanskog bratstvo. Ključnu je ulogu tu imao Alija Izetbegović, član te organizacije, kao i autor političkog programa *Islamska deklaracija* kojom vidi islam kao spoj duhovnog i materijalnog, spoj političkog i vjerskog. Takva razmišljanja su dovela do islamističke politike i dolaska mudžahedina, "svetih ratnika" a u biti islamističkih

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<sup>59</sup> Isto, str. 125, 127

<sup>60</sup> Starešina, Višna. Hrvati pod KOS-ovim krilom, str. 29

<sup>61</sup> Tuđman, Miroslav. Druga strana Rubikona: Politička strategija Alije Izetbegovića, str. 385

<sup>62</sup> Lebl, Leslie. Islamism and Security in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2014., str. 6- 7

<sup>63</sup> Lučić, Ivica. Uzroci rata: Bosna i Hercegovina od 1980. do 1992.godine, str. 135-140; 160

terorista iz raznih zemalja. S njima su došle i razne obavještajne službe te terorističke organizacije.

## **Uloga islamističkih terorističkih organizacija i mudžahedina u ratu u BiH**

Pojava stranih muslimanskih ratnika, mudžahedina, i islamističkih terorističkih organizacija u ratu u BiH 1992.-95.g. se ne može promatrati bez da se dovede u kontekst već spomenutog buđenja islamizma u muslimanskom svijetu. Istaknuto je kako su dva najvažnija događaja bila 1979.g.; Islamska revolucija u Iranu ajatolaha Homeinija te upad SSSR-a u Afganistanu i posljedični nastanak baze stranih ratnika, mudžahedina, koji su se borili na strani svoje muslimanske braće. Rečeno je i kako je Organizacija islamske suradnje (OIC- *Organisation of Islamic Cooperation*) prebacila 1982.g. svoj fokus, na konferenciji u Kairu, na muslimanske manjine na Balkanu, u prvom redu na Jugoslaviju.<sup>64</sup> Prvi mudžahedini, "sveti ratnici", su došli u BiH u veljači 1992.g., sa ciljem da pomognu u borbi da islam postane društveni i politički poredak i tako pomognu svojoj braći po vjeri. Čini se da su iranski mudžahedini i pripadnici šiijtskog Hezbollaha iz Libanona bili među prvima koji su dospjeli u Bosnu te su zbog svog vojnog iskustva sudjelovali u obuci vojnika, vojnih policajaca i obavještajaca u Armiji BiH kao i u kampu Pogorelici kraj Fojnice.<sup>65</sup> Jasno je da je jedan takav međunarodni odjek za džihad u Bosni bio i posljedica djelovanja muslimanskih političara, kao što su stavovi Alije Izetbegovića. To je i priznao reis Islamske zajednice BiH Mustafa Cerić 1999.g., rekavši kako su pozvali mudžahedine u Bosnu.<sup>66</sup>

Prvi islamistički borci koji su dospjeli u džihad u BiH su bili iskusni arapsko-afganistanski ratnici, prekaljeni u protusovjetskom ratu u Afganistanu. Jedan je od njih bio Abdelrahman al- Dosari, zvan i Abu Abdel Aziz " Barbaros ", veteran afganistanskog rata i sudionik džihadističkog djelovanja u Africi, Kašmiru i Filipinima. On je 1992.g. došao sa 4 iskusna borca u Bosnu i Hercegovinu te je malo kasnije vodstvo pristiglih mudžahedina njega imenovalo za prvog emira (vrhovnog zapovjednika) islamističkih Arapa pristiglih u

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<sup>64</sup> Lučić, Ivo. " Bosna and Herzegovina and Terrorism ", str. 122

<sup>65</sup> Tuđman, Miroslav. *Druga strana Rubikona: Politička strategija Alije Izetbegovića*, str. 386

<sup>66</sup> Isto, str. 387



Bosnu i Hercegovinu.<sup>67</sup> Tako je Abu Aziz organizirao dolazak stranih islamskih boraca, pretežno već ratnih veterana, dok je prijam, dolazak i raspored mudžahedina u Bosni i Hercegovini 1992.g. odrađivao general Fikret Muslimović Fićo. Fikret Muslimović je bio dugogodišnji oficir KOS-a JNA, pukovnik i kontraobavještajac te se istaknuo kao čovjek koji se borio protiv islamizma; odjednom okrenuvši kaput, postao je veza mudžahedina, Armije BiH i Alije Izetbegovića.<sup>68</sup>

Strani islamistički borci, mudžahedini, su dolazili kao strani državljani kao aktivisti dobrotvornih ustanova, novinari ili preko diplomatsko-obavještajnih veza. Osim što su bili ratnici koji su sudjelovali u ratu u BiH, bili su i nositelji obavještajne djelatnosti za razne države, pretežno iz one iz koje bi stizali. U prvim borbama su sudjelovali mudžahedini iz raznih zemalja i islamističkih terorističkih grupa, kao što su Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamska grupa (*Al-Gama'at al-Islamiya*), Islamski džihad iz Jemena, GIA (*Groupe Islamique Armee*) iz Alžira.<sup>69</sup>

U rat u BiH se uključila i Al Qaida. Njeni ciljevi, osim pomaganja svojoj muslimanskoj braći, su zapravo bili drukčiji; cilj je bio stvoriti sigurnu bazu za djelovanje u Europi i time što više svojim terorizmom zahvatiti Zapadnu Europu i na kraju, SAD. S geopolitičkog gledišta, Bosna i Hercegovina je zemlja duboko u Europi i predstavlja sjajnu osnovu za islamske terorističke organizacije da što dublje prodru na Zapad. Abu Abdel Aziz je potvrdio kako mu je sam Osama bin Laden rekao da vidi Bosnu prvenstveno kao polaznu točku na napad na SAD.<sup>70</sup>

Vrhovni vjerski i politički ideolog svih stranih muslimanskih boraca u BiH je za vrijeme rata bio ratoborni egipatski šaik imena Anwar Shabaan. Taj je egipatski klerik, obrazovan čovjek (s završena dva fakulteta), bio veteran rata u Afganistanu, no 1991.g. se je preselio u Italiju i u Milanu osnovao Islamski kulturni centar čiji je bio vođa. Koristio je taj centar za novačenje mladih Arapa i muslimana diljem Europe te ih je na stotine slao u terorističke organizacije, među njima i Al Qaidu. Centar je postao žarište terorističkih grupa kao što

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67 Kohlmann, Evan. *Al Qa' idin džihad u Europi: Afganistansko-bosanska mreža*, str. 32-35

68 Mlivočić, Ivica. *Al Qaida se kalila u Bosni i Hercegovini*, str. 120  
69 Isti, str. 118, 121, 139

70 Kohlmann, Evan. *Al Qa' idin džihad u Europi: Afganistansko-bosanska mreža*, str. 36; Mlivočić, Ivica. *Al Qaida se kalila u Bosni i Hercegovini*, str. 109

su Islamska grupa i GIA. Shabaan je tri godine bio politički, djelom i finansijski, pokrovitelj islamističkih aktivnosti u BiH. Utemeljivši tvrtku-paravan u Italiji, financirao je obuku i oružje za mudžahedine u Bosni i Hercegovini. 1992.g. Shabaan i Abu Aziz " Barbaros " su utemeljili logore za džihad (obuku) u srednjoj Bosni, u mjestima Mehurići i Zenici. Također je Anwar bio i glavni ideolog odreda " El Mudžahid ".<sup>71</sup>

Neslavno je završio kada je smrtno stradao 1995., u konvoju koji se od Zenice kretao prema frontu u Zavidovićima. Na drugom kontrolnom punktu HVO-a na ulazu u Žepče, vozila su zaustavljena te je izbio sukob. Vojnici HVO-a su smrtno ranili Shabaana i još četvoricu njegovih suputnika. Kod Shabaana i ostalih su nađene identifikacijske kartice zaposlenih osoba Agencije za pomoć trećem svijetu (eng. TWRA - *Third World Relief Agency*), humanitarne organizacije koja je služila kao paravan Al Qai' idi i Saudijcima za slanje novca i oružja islamistima u Bosni i Hercegovini.<sup>72</sup>

Odred "Mudžahid" je bio sastavljen od stranih boraca mudžahedina koji su postali službeni dio Armije BiH, u sastavu 3.korpusa. Povjerljivom odlukom koju je donio zapovjednik Štaba Vrhovne komande Armije BiH, general Rasim Delić, 13.kolovoza 1993.g. je osnovao ovu postrojbu koja se odlikovala hrabrošću ali još više okrutnošću u ratu. Simbol joj je bio crna zastava s otvorenim Kur' anom te dva kalašnjikova, a imala je svoje obavještajno-logističke predstavnike u Zagrebu i Splitu.<sup>73</sup> Njihov emir, zapovjednik odreda, Abu el Ma' ali je 1995.g. izjavio kako su se došli boriti za širenje islama u svijetu, a tada je procijenjeno da u njegovoj postrojbi ima oko 2000 boraca.<sup>74</sup> Broj islamističkih " svetih ratnika " nije nikad točno utvrđen. Spominju se brojeve do 2000 do 3000 ljudi za odred " El Mudžahid ", zatim informacija el Ma' alija kako u Bosni ima 5000-6000 pravih mudžahedina, kao i procjena Tihomira Blaškića o 3000-4000 stranih

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71 Tuđman, Miroslav. Druga strana Rubikona: Politička strategija Alije Izetbegovića, str. 394; Kohlmann, Evan. Al Qa' idin džihad u Europi: Afganistansko- bosanska mreža, str. 38-41, 43; Mlivončić, Ivica. Al Qaida se kalila u Bosni i Hercegovini, str. 140

72 Kohlmann, Evan. Al Qa' idin džihad u Europi: Afganistansko-bosanska mreža, str. 215-216

73 Tuđman, Miroslav. Druga strana Rubikona: Politička strategija Alije Izetbegovića, str. 394; Mlivončić, Ivica. Al Qaida se kalila u Bosni i Hercegovini, str. 151- 152

74 Lučić, Ivo. " Bosna and Herzegovina and Terrorism ", str. 127

islamističkih boraca.<sup>75</sup> Za zaključak bi se mogla uzeti nekakva srednja ocjena ovih brojki i reći kako je bilo minimalno 3 do 5 tisuća stranih islamističkih boraca.

Put kojim je stizala pomoć muslimana u Bosni i Hercegovini u vidu ljudstva, logistike i oružja je vrlo zanimljiv. Najvećim dijelom su bile uključene Saudijska Arabija i pogotovo Islamska Republika Iran, s kojom su Alija i Bakir Izetbegović uspostavili posebne veze.<sup>76</sup> Preko tzv. "hrvatske rute" stizali su mudžahedini i oružje u BiH skrivajući se iza različitih islamskih organizacija te ustanova. Oružje je većinom kupovao Iran, svojim ili financijama Saudijske Arabije, zatim je bilo prebačeno iranskim zrakoplovima u Zagreb. Nakon toga je tako pristigao materijal stizao na Brač, gdje bi konvojima i helikopterima išao za Bosnu.<sup>77</sup> Sjedinjene Američke Države su znale za ove akcije, a bila je uključena i obavještajna služba Pentagona (*Department of Defense*).<sup>78</sup> Zanimljivo je da je grad Split bio važno logističko središte za Armiju BiH i mudžahedine. U Splitu je bio veliki prihvatni centar za muslimanske izbjeglice iz BiH, a iz Zagreba Hasan Čengić je upućivao islamističke teroriste u Split gdje su dočekani od strane splitske islamske zajednice. Neki od najpoznatijih terorista su bili Al Afgani, pripadnik Al Qai'de, koji je toliko dugo operativno djelovao u Splitu da je dobio nadimak Abu Dujam. Kroz Split je prošlo i oko 150 pripadnika Al Qai'de, a 1993. tu je bio i Muhamed Zawahiri, brat sadašnjeg emira Aymana Zawahirija.<sup>79</sup>

**Al Qai'da** je bila jedna od terorističkih islamističkih organizacija koje su djelovale u BiH tijekom rata, no njena aktivnost se nastavila i nakon 1995.g. Tu prvenstveno treba uzeti u obzir temeljni cilj i polaznu točku s kojom je Osama bin Laden uopće krenuo u Bosnu i Hercegovinu, a to je njen geopolitički položaj. Al Qai'da je zamijetila kako je Bosna i Hercegovina u sjajnom geografskom položaju za njene potrebe; muslimani u Bosni i Hercegovini predstavljaju mogućnost da se dođe do zemlje na krajnjem zapadu Balkana i vrlo blizu srca Europe. Na taj način Al Qai'da želi doći svojim

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<sup>75</sup> Tuđman, Miroslav. Druga strana Rubikona: Politička strategija Alije Izetbegovića, str. 392; Mlivočić, Ivica. Al Qaida se kalila u Bosni i Hercegovini, str. 127

<sup>76</sup> Lebl, Leslie. Islamism and Security in Bosnia-Herzegovina, str. 16-20

<sup>77</sup> Mlivočić, Ivica. Al Qaida se kalila u Bosni i Hercegovini, str. 247

<sup>78</sup> Vanjska obavještajna služba Pentagona tj. Ministarstva obrane SAD-a je DIA ( Defense Intelligence Agency ); <http://www.dia.mil/>

<sup>79</sup> Mlivočić, Ivica. Al Qaida se kalila u Bosni i Hercegovini, str. 249

terorističkim metodama do Beča, Pariza i dalje do SAD-a, što je zapravo glavni cilj ove organizacije. Bin Laden je želio stvoriti osnovu, bazu, u Europi za djelovanje protiv Amerikanaca.<sup>80</sup> Također, spomenut je plan ove organizacije koju je iznio njen emir Ayman Zawahiri 2013.g., koja stavlja Balkanski poluotok (plan se i zove Balkan 2020.) u središte strategije Al Qai'de kojom se želi na tom području pojačati islamistički terorizam i iskoristiti tzv.bijelu Al Qai'du- njihove teroriste i suradnike podrijetlom Europljane a time i teže prepoznatljive od strane struktura vlasti.<sup>81</sup>

Da je Al Qai'da imala ozbiljne i dugotrajne namjere u Bosni i Hercegovini te vidjela tu zemlju kao tranzitnu točku prema daljnoj islamizaciji Europe i širenju terorizma, pokazuje i činjenica, osim spomenutog plana Balkan 2020., da je i tokom rata u BiH a dijelom i poslije ova organizacija slala svoje visoke časnike i organizatore da djeluju sukladno svojim ciljevima. Tako je u proljeće 1992.g. Anwar Shabaan došao u srednju Bosnu iz Milana da bi se u jesen iste godine sastao sa izaslanikom bin Ladena Jamalom al-Fadlom i zapovjednicima Arapa u BiH, šekom Abu Abdelom Azizom ("Barbaros ") i Abu Zubairom al- Madanijem, visokim časnikom Al Qai'de koji je bio i bin Ladenov rođak.<sup>82</sup> Dogovoreno je da će Al Qai'da utemeljiti logore za obuku u BiH, sklopiti odnose s agencijama za pomoć u BiH te zasnovati tvrtke kao paravan da financiraju djelatnosti Al Qai'de.<sup>83</sup> Nakon rata, Al Qai'da je itekako ostala u BiH. Neki njihovi članovi su se infiltrirali i vjenčali se domaćim djevojkama dobivši tako državljanstvo. Godine 2001. 5 mudžahedina je uhićeno u BiH, a George Robertson, glavni tajnik NATO-a, je izjavio kako barem jedan od njih ima potvrđene veze s Al Qai'dom. Također, iste je godine objavljen članak u talijanskim medijima o uhićenju i izručenju u Egipat Hasana Masuda El Sharifa Saada, jednog od ključnih bin Ladenovih ljudi na Balkanu i uopće Europi. Isti

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80 Kohlmann, Evan. Al Qa' idin džihad u Europi: Afganistansko-bosanska mreža, str. 37; Mlivočić, Ivica. Al Qaida se kalila u Bosni i Hercegovini, str. 307

81 Gibas- Krzak, Danuta. " Terrorism in the Balkans. Genesis- types- prognoses ", str. 326

82 Kohlmann, Evan. Al Qa' idin džihad u Europi: Afganistansko-bosanska mreža, str. 35; Mlivočić, Ivica. Al Qaida se kalila u Bosni i Hercegovini, str. 314

83 Kohlmann, Evan. Al Qa' idin džihad u Europi: Afganistansko-bosanska mreža, str. 36

je bio jedan od organizatora terorističkog napada u Rijeci u RH 1995.g.<sup>84</sup>

Dalo bi se nabrojati još nekoliko ozbiljnih incidenata iz BiH povezanih s Al Qai'dom. Tako je u Hrvatskoj 2005.g. otkrivena urota kojom se željelo izvršiti teroristički napad na pogreb pape Ivana Pavla II., a koja je započela u islamističkom uporištu Gornjoj Maoči u Bosni i Hercegovini. Godine 2006. grupa Bošnjaka i Makedonaca povezanih s Al Qai'dom je uhićena u sjevernoj Italiji nakon što su prokrijumčarili oko 1800 komada oružja u Italiju iz Istanbula. Ured visokog predstavnika (*Office of the High Representative*) međunarodne zajednice u Sarajevu je 2008.g. otkrio dokaze kako je istaknuti bošnjački političar Hasan Čengić dijelom financirao napade 11.rujna.<sup>85</sup>

Al Qai'di je Bosna i Hercegovina bila važna iz više razloga. Najvažniji je, dakako, spomenuti geopolitički položaj. Tijekom rata u Bosni i Hercegovini, cijelo vrijeme su operativci Al Qai'de stvarali svoje mreže suradnika i podatke dobivene svojim obavještajnim radom i onih od mudžahedina su prvo dostavljali svom vođi i centru svoje organizacije, a ne Armiji BiH kojoj su bili formalno podređeni. Nakon rata, dvije činjenice su postale veoma bitne i međusobno se isprepletale. Oko 900 mudžahedina je dobili bosanskohercegovačko državljanstvo, na stotine su ostale u BiH. Time je stvorena baza s kojom je Al Qai'da mogla dalje djelovati u BiH, a pogotovo prema Zapadu jer je glavni cilj bio da se ti pripadnici Al Qai'de prebace na tlo Europske Unije, u Veliku Britaniju i na kraju, u SAD. Posebno je opasno što ti islamisti više ne izgledaju kao gorštački borci iz Afganistana; oni su se europeizirali, školovali, potpuno se uklopili u sustav Zapada i time postali " spavači " - ljudi koji su vjerni Al Qai'di, ali ih se vrlo teško može identificirati. Ni na koji način oni na sebe ne privlače pozornost pričama, stavovima već rade nadzor, istražuju i špijuniraju te ih takav pristup čini izrazito opasnim.<sup>86</sup>

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84 Lučić, Ivo. " Bosna and Herzegovina and Terrorism ", str. 136-138

85 Lebl, Leslie. Islamism and Security in Bosnia-Herzegovina, str. 9-10

86 Višnar, Fran. " Pogovor " u: Al Qa' idin džihad u Europi: Afganistansko- bosanska mreža, str. 290, 293-298

## Uloga nevladinih dobrotvornih društava u ratu u BiH i financiranju terorističkih organizacija

Model financiranja kakav je djelomično uspostavila Al Qai'da tijekom rata u Afganistanu prebačen je u Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Bogate nevladine humanitarne organizacije iz Arapskog zaljeva su nabavljale oružje, smještaj i putovnice članovima Al Qai'de i drugim islamistima u Afganistanu skrivajući se pod krinkom pomoći izbjeglicama. Izvješće američke Središnje obavještajne agencije (CIA) iz 1996.g. govori kako je otprilike trećina svih islamskih nevladinih organizacija na Balkanu pomagala djelovanju islamističkog terorizma, financirajući i podupirući organizacije kao Islamska grupa (*Gama' at al-Islamiyya*), palestinski Hamas i Hezbollah. Tako su islamske nevladine dobrotvorne organizacije prevozile oružje i streljivo umjesto lijekova i druge robe.<sup>87</sup>

Podloga po kojoj su islamske humanitarne organizacije radile pomažući radikalne islamiste i teroriste u BiH je nastala po modelu izgrađenom u Afganistanu. Humanitarci su većinom financirali i potpomagali na razne načine talibane kao i mrežu Al Qai'de, a sve je to preneseno u Bosnu i Hercegovinu tijekom rata. Tako te humanitarne službe postaju logistička središta preko kojih terorističke organizacije ali i neke islamske zemlje naoružavaju, financiraju i vojno obučavaju mudžahedine i teroriste.<sup>88</sup> Treba spomenuti one najbitnije među koje spadaju:

**TWRA** (*Third World Relief Agency*)- Agencija za pomoć Trećem svijetu, kako se službeno zove, možda je bila i najaktivnija i najopasnija "humanitarna" islamska organizacija koja je krijumčarila oružje i pomagala islamiste u BiH. Osnovana je 1987.g. u Beču od strane Mohammeda Fatiha el Hassanina, s uredima u Moskvi, Sarajevu, Budimpešti i Istanbulu. Temeljni cilj je bio širenje islama u zemljama bivšeg socijalističkog bloka, a u ratu u BiH se istaknula krijumčarenjem oružja i financiranjem džihadista i islamističkih grupa. Ovu agenciju je osnovao i vodio spomenuti Fatih el Hassanein, rodnom Sudanac rođenom blizu Kartuma. Fatih je izgradio i iskoristio veze s važnim bošnjačkim političarima, Alijom Izetbegovićem, Omerom

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<sup>87</sup> Kohlmann, Evan. Al Qa' idin džihad u Europi: Afganistansko-bosanska mreža, str. 55-57

<sup>88</sup> Mlivočić, Ivica. Al Qaida se kalila u Bosni i Hercegovini, str. 221; Kohlmann, Evan. Al Qa' idin džihad u Europi: Afganistansko-bosanska mreža, str. 55

Behmenom i drugim. Sudan je tada služio kao jedna od glavnih tranzitnih točaka gdje je išao ilegalni prijevoz oružja za Armiju BiH. Njegov brat, Sukarno, je bio član Nacionalnog islamskog fronta u Sudanu (NIF - *National Islamic Front*) te je prikupljao novac i za Muslimansko bratstvo te uspostavio veze sa bin Ladenom.<sup>89</sup> Zanimljivo je da je sve to bio i osobni kružok povjerljivih Izetbegovićevih islamista; tako su Hasan Čengić i Omer Behmen osuđeni s Alijom 1983.g. od strane jugoslavenskih vlasti zbog islamizma. Kasnije je Hasan Čengić bio u odboru direktora TWRA kada je krijumčarila novac za oružje u BiH, dobrim dijelom novcem Iranaca. S druge strane, aktivan u SDA i kao ambasador u Iranu je djelovao Omer Behman.<sup>90</sup>

Izvešće CIA-e iz 1995.g. potvrđuje vezu radikalnih islamista i nevladinih udruga, gdje se posebno ističe uloga TWRA. Također, govori se i o povezanosti sudanskog veleposlanstva u Zagrebu koje je preuzeo diplomat iz NIF-a 1994.g., te preusmjerio aktivnosti Agencije za naoružavanje i logističku podršku bošnjačkoj vojsci.<sup>91</sup> Također treba spomenuti kako je TWRA doista bila globalna i internacionalna; tako je jedan američki musliman svjedočio kako je u SAD švercao novac dobiven od TWRA kojim se financirala vojna obuka arapskih mudžahedina u SAD-u, a koji su trebali biti upućeni u Bosni i Hercegovini. Ipak, ovoj organizaciji je došao kraj kada je austrijska antiteroristička policijska jedinica upala u njihov ured u Beču. Nađeni su dokumenti koji potvrđuju kako je organizacija barem polovicu od 350 milijuna prikupljenih dolara potrošila na financiranje naoružavanja Armije BiH i džihadista u BiH. Fatih Hassanein je primio odlikovanje 1996.g. od Izetbegovića za svoj "humanitarni" rad, a uspio je i preko Turske pobjeći u Sudan.<sup>92</sup>

**BIF** (*Benevolence International Foundation*) - Međunarodna zaklada dobre volje, kako se službeno zvala, je bila još jedna islamska deklarativno humanitarna organizacija, a ustvari paravan raznih skupina za financiranje svjetskog džihada.

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<sup>89</sup> Kohlmann, Evan. Al Qa' idin džihad u Europi: Afganistansko-bosanska mreža, str. 69-71; Mlivončić, Ivica. Al Qaida se kalila u Bosni i Hercegovini, str. 221

<sup>90</sup> Lebl, Leslie. Islamism and Security in Bosnia-Herzegovina, str. 23

<sup>91</sup> Central Intelligence Agency ( 1995 ). *Intelligence Report. DCI Counterterrorist Center*. Preuzeto s: <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1995-11-22A.pdf>

<sup>92</sup> Kohlmann, Evan. Al Qa' idin džihad u Europi: Afganistansko-bosanska mreža, str. 69-71; Mlivončić, Ivica. Al Qaida se kalila u Bosni i Hercegovini, str. 235- 236

Glavnu ulogu u ovoj organizaciji je igrala Saudijska Arabija, čiji je državljanin bio i osnivač BIF-a, Adel Batterjee (1987.g.). Zapravo, BIF je odraz spoja političkog i religijskog radikalizma i interesa Saudijske Arabije, budući da su naftom bogati Saudijci od 1970-ih financirali ustanove koje su se borile za "islamsku stvar" diljem svijeta.<sup>93</sup> BIF je osnovan 1992.g. i registriran u Illinoisu, SAD, kao neprofitna humanitarna organizacija koja je imala svoje uredе u Pakistanu, Bosni, Čečeniji i Kini. Vrlo brzo je čelništvo BIF-a preuzeo Sirijac Enaam Arnaout (albanskog podrijetla), osoba vrlo bliska Osami bin Ladenu. Prethodnik BIF-a je bio Islamski odbor dobre volje (ar. *Lajnar al-Birr al-Islamiah*) osnovan 1987.g., i to sa svrhom financiranja džihadista u Afganistanu.<sup>94</sup>

Enaam Arnaout je kao direktor BIF-a u Zagrebu 1992.g. osnovao ured, zatim u Zenici pa u Sarajevu. U Bosni i Hercegovini osniva centre za vjersku i vojnu poduku u Tešnju i pokraj Zenice, a instruktore je davalo zloglasno Muslimansko bratstvo. Arnaout se je vrlo brzo povezao sa čelnim ljudima SDA i njihove obavještajne službe, AID-a (Agencija za istraživanje i dokumentaciju). Posebno dobar odnos je imao sa Nedžadom Ugljenom (poslije šefom te službe i ubijenom 1996.g. u čudnim okolnostima). Nakon zabrane BIF-a, nova organizacija, Bosanska idealna futura, je nastavila operirati na istim načelima a njen direktor je postao jedan pripadnik AID-a, Munib Zahiragić, istaknuti pripadnik radikalnog islama i čovjek koji je zaštitio osumnjičene mudžahedine za ubojstvo doministra MUP-a, Hrvata Joze Leutara, 1999.g.<sup>95</sup>

BIF je označen kao paravan za Al- Qai'du od službenih američkih vlasti, a njihov direktor Arnaout je 2003.g. počeo služiti desetogodišnju kaznu za financiranje terorizma.<sup>96</sup> Godinu dana ranije, policija BiH je obavila premetačine u uredima BIF-a, među njima i glavni ured u Sarajevu. Nađeno je vatreno oružje, vojni priručnici, materijali za izradu lažnih putovnica i, ono najbitnije, korespondencija između Osame bin Ladena i vodstva BIF-a, pogotovo Enaama Arnaouta. Tako je zaključeno kao je BIF od 1990-ih korišten od Al-Qai'de i bin Ladena za prenošenje novca na bankovne račune

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<sup>93</sup> Mlivočić, Ivica. Al Qaida se kalila u Bosni i Hercegovini, str. 227  
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[https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aa\\_sanctions\\_list/summaries/entity/benevolence-international-foundation](https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aa_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/benevolence-international-foundation)

<sup>95</sup> Mlivočić, Ivica. Al Qaida se kalila u Bosni i Hercegovini, str. 229-232

<sup>96</sup> <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/18/us/national-briefing-midwest-illinois-new-sentence-for-charity-director.html>



te zatim financiranje terorista pod krinkom humanitarne organizacije.<sup>97</sup>

**IIRO** (eng. *International Islamic Relief Organisation*, ar. *Hay'at al- Igatha al-Islamiya al-Alamiyya*)- Međunarodna islamska humanitarna organizacija, u BiH je postala poznata i pod iskrivljenim nazivom Igasa ili Igasse. Utemeljena 1978.g. sa sjedištem u Jeddahu u Saudijskoj Arabiji, služila je kao financijsko krilo velike Islamske svjetske lige (MWL - *Muslim World League*). Bila je prva muslimanska "humanitarna" organizacija u BiH, a zapravo je služila kao kanal kojim su išli novac, ljudstvo i oružje na Balkan u borbi za "islamsku stvar". Među ubijenim mudžahedinima nađene su identifikacijske kartice ove organizacije. IIRO je kao ogranak svjetske organizacije operativno djelovao u mnogim područjima i povezivao " svete ratnike ". Tako je indijska obavještajna služba izvijestila kako je IIRO u Pakistanu financirao logor za obuku mudžahedina koji su poslije išli na bojišta u Bosni i Hercegovini, ali i Čečeniji i Kašmiru. " Igassa " je najviše radila na logistici, financiranju oružja i streljiva za islamističke teroriste u cijeloj regiji. Imala je svoje ispostave Zagrebu, Splitu, Sarajevu, Zenici i Beču. Jedan od važnijih individua je bio i čelnik MWL-a u pakistanskom Peshawaru<sup>98</sup>, islamist Wael Hamza Jaladain, prijatelj i saveznik Osame bin Ladena. Sjedinjene Države su njega imenovale kao čovjeka koji je najviše pomagao bin Ladenu da seli novac i ljude na Balkan.<sup>99</sup>

## Pojava terorističkih akata i prijetnji nakon rata

U ljeto 1997.g. počinje krvavi niz terorističkih napada preostalih islamističkih boraca, mudžahedina, na Hrvate u Srednjoj Bosni, prvo u travničkom području s time da se kasnije proširilo sve do Mostara. U tom je gradu u rujnu iste godine eksplodirala autobomba, a istragom i bošnjačke i hrvatske policije utvrđeno je da su počinitelji tog zločina pripadnici jedinice " El Mudžahedin " koji su prebacili nekoliko kilograma TNT-a, protutenkovskih mina i ostalog eksploziva

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<sup>97</sup> Kohlmann, Evan. *Al Qa' idin džihad u Europi: Afganistansko-bosanska mreža*, str. 60-61

<sup>98</sup> 11.8.1988. u ovom pakistanskom gradu sastala se grupa ljudi koja će iznjedrili terorističku Al-Qai'du; <https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/many-happy-returns-of-al-qaeda/>

<sup>99</sup> Kohlmann, Evan. *Al Qa' idin džihad u Europi: Afganistansko-bosanska mreža*, str. 64-67; Mlivončić, Ivica. *Al Qaida se kalila u Bosni i Hercegovini*, str. 226-227

iz Zenice u Mostar. Te se je godine dogodilo 35 terorističkih akata, a žrtve su preko 90% bili Hrvati. Sljedeće godine, broj terorističkih napada se popeo na 132, a opet su većinu žrtava činili Hrvati. U mjesecu travnju 1997.g., otkriven je eksploziv ispod mosta nad Miljackom na putu gdje je trebao prolaziti papa Ivan Pavao II., u svom posjetu BiH.<sup>100</sup>

U spomenutom napadu u Mostaru autobombom, teško je ozljeđeno troje a lakše oko 40 ljudi, s tim da je oštećen velik broj stanova i auta. Bošnjački političari, pogotovo Haris Silajdžić, su često optuživali Hrvate da su sami krivi za taj napad, iako je istraga pokazala da su počinitelji Ahmed Zuhair i Ali Ahmed Ali Hamad. U Travniku su 1998.g. ubijena dvojica hrvatskih policajaca, prvo Perica Bilić a zatim Ante Valjan. U istom gradu sljedeće godine, podmetnuta je bomba pod automobil Hrvata policajca Vlade Stoljana. Policijski očevid je neprofesionalno napravljen, kao i u nekim drugim slučajevima. Vrhunac ovih terorističkih pohoda bivših islamističkih ratnika je bio atentat na Jozu Leutara, zamjenika ministra Ministarstva Unutarnjih Poslova Federacije BiH, čovjeka koji je stalno upozoravao na trajave istrage ovih zločina i sramotne presude. Ujutro 16.ožujka 1999.g., u Sarajevu je eksplodirala bomba podmetnuta pod auto spomenutog zamjenika ministra, pri čemu su u autu još dvojica Hrvata bili ozljeđeni, a Jozo Leutar je preminuo. Nakon tog čina terorizma, odmah se je pokrenula politička mašinerija bošnjačkih dužnosnika, koja je, skupa sa sudskim vlastima, inzistirala da su Leutara ubili Hrvati kriminalci. To izvrtnje teza je čak završilo sa podizanjem optužnice protiv šestorice Hrvata za taj zločin. Obrana je donosila dokaze kako su počinitelji bili isti oni islamisti koji su minirali most na Miljacki za vrijeme papina posjeta.<sup>101</sup>

Što se tiče prijetnji u vrlo bliskoj prošlosti i danas, treba istaknuti da se islamistička opasnost može ugrubo podijeliti u tri kategorije; to su islamisti vezani uz globalno utjecajno **Muslimansko Bratstvo**, zatim teroristi koji mogu biti domaći, povezani s **Al Qai'dom**, kao i vehabije koje je u BiH donijela i nastavlja financirati Saudijska Arabija. Budući da je o svemu manje - više bilo riječi u ovom radu, treba samo još spomenuti da je uz Muslimansko Bratstvo posebice povezan Mustafa

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100 Lučić, Ivo. " Bosna and Herzegovina and Terrorism ", str. 129-132; Mlivončić, Ivica. *Al Qaida se kalila u Bosni i Hercegovini*, str. 191-192

101 Isto, str. 130- 135; Isto, str. 194- 197

Cerić, bivši veliki muftija Sarajeva, kao i Bakir Izetbegović baštineći ideje svoga oca Alije.<sup>102</sup>

Među incidentima povezanih sa islamizmom u BiH, treba istaknuti kako je tada 23-godišnji radikalni islamist Mevludin Jašarević, srbijanski građanin iz pretežno muslimanskog Novog Pazara, napao kalašnjikovom Veleposlanstvo SAD-a u Sarajevu 2011.g., ranivši pritom jednog policajca. Direktor OSA-e (*Obavještajno-sigurnosne agencije*) Almir Džuvo je tada priopćio javnosti kako je Jašarević posjećivao zajednicu radikalnih vehabija u sjevernom dijelu Bosni i Hercegovine.<sup>103</sup>

Nedavno je (u prosincu 2019.g.) deportirana grupa od 25 državljana BiH iz kampova u Siriji, od kojih su sedmorica bili borci zloglasne Islamske Države (*ISIL*). Ti su ljudi dovedeni pred sud i sudit će im se za terorizam. Računa se da je bilo oko 260 državljana BiH u kampovima u Siriji.<sup>104</sup>

Zaključno, treba istaknuti kako je prisutnost islamističkog terorizma itekako živa u Bosni i Hercegovini, a islamizam kao politička ideologija pothranjuje ovu nasilnu borbu za "islamsku stvar". Uzroci i grupe su višestruki, složeni i treba ih razlikovati. S jedne strane postoje ostatci mudžahedina iz rata iz 1990-ih uklopljeni u Bošnjake, zatim individualce teroriste (takozvani vukovi-samotnjaci), nakon toga organizirane terorističke grupe poput Al Qai'de i vehabije. Vehabije se mogu promatrati i kao most između terorističkih grupa i neke organizirane sekte unutar islama, budući da to jest priznata sekta ali sadrži u svojim redovima i teroriste. S druge strane, postoji i državni islamizam vladajuće bošnjačke stranke SDA, zatim utjecaj Muslimanskog Bratstva i značajan utjecaj drugih islamskih država, prvenstveno Irana, Saudijske Arabije i Turske.

## **Utjecaj muslimanskih država u BiH**

### **Iranska veza**

Najjači utjecaj u raznim područjima funkcioniranja BiH i danas ima Islamska Republika Iran, kao što ga je imala i tijekom rata

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102 Leslie, Lebl. *Islamism and Security in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, str. 5- 12

103 <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bosnia-usa-embassy/gunman-attacks-u-s-embassy-in-bosnia-idUSTRE79R66F20111028>

104 <https://www.euronews.com/2019/12/19/islamic-state-fighters-and-their-families-return-to-bosnia>

1992.-1995.g. Prisutnost Irana u BiH je složeno pitanje, budući da je Iran međunarodno priznata država te održava diplomatske, gospodarske i druge veze s BiH, no tijekom rata a i kasnije državna politika Irana je išla ka poticanju razvijanja islamizma, a time i terorističkih grupa. Iran za sve to ima svoje osobne interese, a BiH je prilika za širenje utjecaja Islamske Republike na Balkan i Europu. Tu treba uzeti u obzir i promotriti političko-obavještajni sustav i tradiciju djelovanja iranskih obavještajnih službi. Taj sustav se temelji na čvrsto centraliziranom modelu korištenja relevantnih podataka od strane iranskog predsjednika, vrhovnog vjerskog vođe-ajatolaha i ostalih donositelja odluka. (Među njima treba istaknuti veoma moćno i utjecno **Vijeće čuvara** (perz. *Šura-ye Negahban*). To političko tijelo se sastoji od 12 članova koji imaju određene izvršnu i legislativnu moć. Sastavljeno od šestorice pravnika i šestorice teologa, Vijeće ima pravo preispitivati parlamentarne odluke, interpretirati ustav te odobriti izbor predsjednika i članova parlamenta).<sup>105</sup> Model se sastoji od civilnih i vojnih obavještajnih i sigurnosnih službi - Vojne tajne službe kopnene vojske, zrakoplovstva i mornarice se bave obavještajnim i protuobavještajnim djelovanjem u inozemstvu i zemlji, i to prikupljanjem, obradom analizom i prosudbom informacija. Kako to često biva, vojni atašei ugrađeni u diplomatska predstavništva također rade za te službe.<sup>106</sup> **Iranski stožer za tajne operacije** (eng. *Joint Committee for Special Operations*), osnovan od vođe islamske revolucije ajatolaha Khomeinija 1989.g., jest civilno obavještajno i sigurnosno tijelo koje prikuplja informacije o visoko razvijenoj vojnoj tehnologiji u inozemstvu i o djelovanju Iranaca van zemlje. Tijekom rata u BiH, i ovo tijelo je bilo prisutno povezujući se s bošnjačkom Agencijom za istraživanje i dokumentaciju te političkim dužnosnicima želeći saznati više o tehnologiji mirovnih snaga; sve skupa bilo ih je između 100 i 200.<sup>107</sup> Glavna obavještajna služba Irana je **MOIS** (*Ministry Of Intelligence and Security*), zvana i **VEVAK** (*Vezerat-e Ettela'at va Amniat-e Keshvar*), krovna agencija od 1984.g., koju je također organizirao ajatolah Khomeini. Osim nadziranja domaćeg stanja i opozicije, VEVAK se infiltrira u diplomatska i gospodarska predstavništva u inozemstvu, u banke, među studente, razne stručnjake kao i u *Iran Air*,

<sup>105</sup> <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/guardian-council>

<sup>106</sup> Vidušić, Emil. *Vodič kroz tajne službe*. Split: Naklada Bošković, 2004., str. 87-88; o atašesima ubačenim u diplomatsku službu vidjeti: Vukadinović, Radovan. *Politika i diplomacija*. Zagreb: Otvoreno Sveučilište, 1984.

<sup>107</sup> Isto, str. 88-89; <https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/jcso.htm>

nacionalnu zrakoplovnu kompaniju. Služba odgovara izravno ajatolahu te se osim prikupljanja, analize i obrade informacija bavi i vođenjem operacija iz iranskih veleposlanstava, konzulata i islamskih centara u inozemstvu.<sup>108</sup> Paralelno s ovim službama, poseban status ima već spomenuta Islamska Revolucionarna Garda **IRGC** i njihova obavještajna komponenta **Obavještajna uprava Revolucionarne Garde** (eng. *Intelligence Organisation of Revolutionary Guards Corps*). Specijalne snage **Quds** unutar Revolucionarne Garde su također zadužene za skupljanje obavještajnih podataka, kao i za operacije u inozemstvu.<sup>109</sup> Što se tiče Irana, islamistički terorizam, obavještajno i tajno djelovanje je sve povezano u jednu cjelinu- drugim riječima radi se o državno sponzoriranom terorizmu po čemu je Iran (a pogotovo Revolucionarna Garda) poprilično poznat (američki *State Department* je označio Iran kao državu koja podupire terorizam još 1984.); financirao je i sponzorirao razne islamističke skupine, među kojima se posebno ističe potpora libanonskom Hezbollahu.<sup>110</sup>

Iran ima svoje interese i cijelu obavještajno-terorističku mrežu po cijelom Balkanskom poluotoku, koristeći i pripadnike Hezbollaha za svoje operacije dajući im putovnice. U njihovim očima, Balkan je dobra logistička platforma za regrutiranje i financiranje terorističkih aktivnosti, a geopolitički predstavlja most prema Srednjoj i Zapadnoj Europi. Jedna od zemalja gdje iranske obavještajne službe (skupa s diplomatskom) imaju svoje ispostave je Bugarska (i to čak tri - Sofija, Plovdiv i Varna). Treba spomenuti kako je i Mevlid Jašarević, čovjek koji je izvršio teroristički čin prema veleposlanstvu SAD-a u Sarajevu, imao veze sa radikalima u Gornjoj Maoči i sa iranskim obavještajcima i diplomatima koji su sami pohodili taj vehabijski centar.<sup>111</sup>

Za ovu temu, a i dugoročno za stabilnost Republike Hrvatske, BiH i Balkanskog poluotoka, bitno je istaknuti također kako je Iran sustavno podržavao, financirao i potpomagao islamske teroriste u Bosni i Hercegovini tijekom i nakon rata, i to

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108 <https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/vevak.htm> ; Vidušić, Emil. *Vodič kroz tajne službe*. Split: Naklada Bošković, 2004., str. 89-90

109 Wege, Carl Anthony. " Iran's Intelligence Establishment ", str. 66  
110 <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239410.htm>

111 Avramov, Kiril. " Under the Radar: Iran's Stealth Presence on the Balkans ", *The Globe Post* 2018;  
<https://theglobepost.com/2018/12/10/iran-stealth-presence-balkans/>

većinom preko klana Izetbegović - prvo Alije a zatim (i danas) preko njegovog sina Bakira, vođe SDA i bošnjačke politike.

Iranske službe **MOIS** (zvana i **VEVAK**) specijalne snage **Quds** Iranske Revolucionarne Garde su itekako prisutne i aktivne na prostoru cijelog Balkana, i to, jasno, s namjerom širenja iranskog utjecaja. Te aktivnosti su olakšane zbog činjenice da postoje zemlje kao BiH u koju su već obavještajno, finansijski i diplomatski penetrirali, a s druge strane mnogo zemalja na Balkanu imaju problema sa provođenjem zakona što olakšava provođenje zamišljenih operacija. Osim u Bosni i Hercegovini, Iranci imaju centre u Bugarskoj, a djeluju i na Kosovu.<sup>112</sup> Balkanski poluotok je na značajnom geopolitičkom području zbog blizine Središnjoj i Zapadnoj Europi kao i Bliskom Istoku i Kavkazu. Zbog toga Islamska Republika Iran vidi BiH u koju je već prodrla zahvaljujući vezama iz rata 1992.-1995.g., kao područje iz kojeg će širiti svoj interes prema Europi i dalje.<sup>113</sup> **VEVAK** operira svugdje gdje Iran ima svoj interes, a među njima su Bliski Istok, Srednja Azija, Afrika, Europa, Južna Amerika. Što se tiče Europe, jedno američko izvješće ističe kako su zemlje u kojima Iranci obavještajno djeluju Austrija, Azerbejdžan, Gruzija, Francuska, Velika Britanija, Njemačka, Turska i Hrvatska, kao i da pružaju finansijsku, materijalnu i tehničku pomoć islamskim radikalima diljem svijeta.<sup>114</sup> Budući da je jedan od najvažnijih centara iranskih službi Beč<sup>115</sup>, može se zaključiti kako su Balkan i BiH jedna čvrsta uporišna točka ali i tranzitno područje za širenje iranskog utjecaja i islamskog terorizma prema Središnjoj i Zapadnoj Europi. Taj put vodi i preko Republike Hrvatske.

Ideološki i realpolitički, suradnja SDA Alije Izetbegovića i Irana je bila realnost koja se i ostvarila. Izetbegovićeva *Islamska deklaracija* koju je napisao u mladosti ima slične ideološko-vjerske osnove kao Islamska revolucija u Iranu 1979.g.; za ajatolaha Homeinija i za Aliju Izetbegovića islam je više od vjere, islam je i društveno-politički poredak te u tome nije važna nacija već ta vjera. Ta činjenica, kombinirana sa iranskim prodiranjem prema Zapadu i njihovoj objektivnoj moći, dovelo je do toga da je Iran imao važnu ulogu u

112 <https://www.jpost.com/International/Report-warns-of-Hezbollah-Iran-threats-in-Balkans-309596>

113 Hide, Enri. " Islamic Extremism in the Balkans as a Geopolitical Instrument ", *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* 5 (6), 2014., str. 378

114 <https://fas.org/irp/world/iran/mois-loc.pdf>

115 <https://fas.org/irp/world/iran/mois-loc.pdf>

diplomatskom, financijskom i vojnom pogledu glede pomoći Bošnjaka i naoružavanju i obuke Armije BiH. U svibnju 1991. Alija Izetbegović i njegovi suradnici posjećuju Iran. Godinu poslije u Bosnu i Hercegovinu preko Hrvatske pristižu mnogi "sveti ratnici", među njima i teroristi iz Hezbollaha - šijske organizacije koju Iran naoružava, obučava i podupire. Tijekom rata 1992.-1995.g., Iran je poslao u BiH i vojnike, instruktore i obavještajce svoje elitne Revolucionarne Garde (*IRGC*), s time da su isti sudjelovali u borbama u Armiji BiH, a par stotina njihovih obavještajaca, kao i obavještajaca *VEVAK*-a u obuci vojnika Armije BiH.<sup>116</sup> Kako je običaj iranske obavještajne službe, koriste se diplomatsko-konzularnim predstavništvima kao i islamskim centrima i humanitarnim organizacijama za svoj obavještajni i teroristički rad.<sup>117</sup> Tako je bilo i u Bosni i Hercegovini, s tim da je islamske humanitarne organizacije kontrolirao i koordinirao u svrhu Irana njihov diplomatski predstavnik u Zagrebu, Mohamed Dževad Azajes.<sup>118</sup> Iranski vojnici u BiH su najvećim dijelom djelovali kao instruktori i savjetnici. Skupa s financijskom i logističkom pomoći koju je Islamska Republika davala Bošnjacima, treba još istaknuti i par stotinjak Bošnjaka obučanih u Iranu koji su, uz vojnu i obavještajnu obuku, prolazili i onu ideološko-religijsku. Što se tiče financijsko-logističke podrške, prvo je 1994.g. ministar vanjskih poslova Irana Ali Akbar Velayati utemeljio iransko veleposlanstvo u Sarajevu koje je vodio iskusni obavještajac Mohamed Taherian. Ministar Velayati je ponudio Izetbegovićevoj vladi prodaju oružja putem Hrvatske, što se dijelom i odvijalo; tako je iste godine iranski Boeing 747 kroz Hrvatsku prokrijumčario 60 tona naoružanja Bošnjacima- sve uz znanje i odobrenje SAD-a.<sup>119</sup> Uz to, treba spomenuti i kako je Teheran obučavao neke Bošnjake borbi i terorizmu; ljude koji su kasnije postali pripadnici specijalne postrojbe Armije BiH zvani Ševe, kojima je zapovijedao jedan od pripadnika bošnjačke tajne službe AID-a, Nedžad Ugljen. Put ih je vodio od Splita preko Frankfurta do Teherana, gdje su tri mjeseca bili obučavani u uporabi oružanih napada na vozilima i eksploziva.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> Mlivočić, Ivica. Al Qaida se kalila u Bosni i Hercegovini, str. 288-290

<sup>117</sup> <https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/vevak.htm>

<sup>118</sup> Mlivočić, Ivica. Al Qaida se kalila u Bosni i Hercegovini, str. 291

<sup>119</sup> [https://www.academia.edu/21163179/Iran\\_in\\_the\\_Balkans](https://www.academia.edu/21163179/Iran_in_the_Balkans) ; Mlivočić, Ivica. Al Qaida se kalila u Bosni i Hercegovini, str. 289-290

<sup>120</sup> [https://www.academia.edu/21163179/Iran\\_in\\_the\\_Balkans](https://www.academia.edu/21163179/Iran_in_the_Balkans)

Veliki je skandal izbio godinu nakon rata, 2.veljače 1996.g. Tog su dana jedinice NATO-a IFOR (*Implementation Force*) otkrile kako su Iranci vodili obuku u obavještajnom, vojnom i terorističkom centru skupa s Bošnjacima u Pogorelici, mjestu blizu Fojnice. Tu su iranski vojni i civilni obavještajci i instruktori obučavali Bošnjake za osiguravanje i izvedbu komunikacija, sabotazi, pravljenju eksploziva, atentatima, crnoj propagandi itd. Nađene su veće količine streljiva i oružja, minskih, eksplozivnih i kamuflažnih sredstava kao i laboratorij. Službena vlada u Sarajevu je, na čelu sa Alijem Izetbegovićem i Bakirom Alispahićem, tada ministrom unutrašnjih poslova (MUP), tvrdila kako je to bio legitimni antiteroristički kamp. Taj "antiteroristički" kamp je pak vodio već spomenuti Nedžad Ugljen, zapovjednik zloglasne specijalne postrojbe Ševe. Američki State Department nije povjerovao u ta objašnjenja te su zahtijevali i ishodili ostavku Bakira Alispahića i Hasana Čengića, glavnog logističara Armije BiH i vezista s Iranom.<sup>121</sup>

Ono što je zabrinjavajuće je da Iran nikako nije odustao od svoje ispostave za prodor dalje u Središnju i Zapadnu Europu. Godine 2012. istraživačke novine su otkrile kako je gotovo 200 iranskih "poslovnih ljudi" dobilo vize za dolazak u BiH. Daljnje istraživanje je pokazalo da je riječ dijelom o agentima **VEVAK**-a iz njihove bečke centrale, a drugi dio od obavještajaca snaga *Quds* iz Islamske Revolucionarne Garde (**IRGC**). Dvije godine kasnije je visoko pozicionirani obavještajac **VEVAK**-a stacioniran u Beču dva puta posjetio Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Godinu prije, 2013., političko-diplomatski skandal je izbio u BiH. Ministar sigurnosti, Fahrudin Radončić, je zatražio izbacivanje dvojice iranskih diplomata. Dvojica diplomata, Hamzeh Dolabi Ahmad i Jadidi Sohrab, drugi i treći tajnik iranskog veleposlanstva u Sarajevu, su u biti vrh **VEVAK**-a i koordinirali njihove aktivnosti. Ta su dvojica, skupa s kulturnim atašoom, viđeni kako nekoliko puta ulaze u diplomatskom vozilu u selo Gornja Maoča. To je naselje itekako poznato budući da je sjedište vehabijske<sup>122</sup> zajednice, čiji je jedan vođa Nusret Imamović

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121 <https://www.balkanpost.com/article/583/potential-terrorism-balkans-part-5-us-government-accusations-pogorelica-case> ;  
[https://www.academia.edu/21163179/Iran\\_in\\_the\\_Balkans](https://www.academia.edu/21163179/Iran_in_the_Balkans) ;  
 Mlivončić, Ivica. *Al Qaida se kalila u Bosni i Hercegovini*, str. 299-301

122 *Vehabizam* je radikalna, puritanska forma sunitskog islama koja nastoji izbaciti sve strane i druge utjecaje u islamu te se vratiti na postavke islama kakvog je provodio Prorok Muhamed u 7.st. Ime im dolazi od vođe Muhameda bin Abd al Wahhaba, učenjaka iz 18.st. Poglavitno su



bio povezan s islamističkom grupom *Al-Nusra*,<sup>123</sup> a drugi, Bilal Bosnić, je bio član zloglasne Islamske Države (ISIL).<sup>124</sup>

Za zaključiti je da Islamska Republika Iran ima itekako interesa nastaviti održavati svoj utjecaj i još ga više jačati u Bosni i Hercegovini, pogotovo dok Bošnjake vodi Bakir Izetbegović s čijim su ocem Iranci uspostavili poseban odnos. Iran ima strateške interese za prodor preko Bosne i Hercegovine u Središnju i Zapadnu Europu, a također i u financiranju islamističkih i terorističkih organizacija u Bosni i Hercegovini - sve u svrhu ostvarivanja sve većeg svog utjecaja na Balkanu i šire.

## Ostale islamske države

**Saudijska Arabija**; o djelatnosti kraljevine Saudijske Arabije, veoma bogate zemlje pod vlašću autokratske dinastije Saud, već je bilo govora. Treba samo ponovno istaknuti kako je Saudijska Arabija prednjačila u davanju financijske i logističke podrške mudžahedinima u BiH tijekom rata te da je uložila veoma visoka sredstva u istu državu. U dijelu o islamskim dobrotvornim a ustvari obavještajno-logističkim društvima, u tekstu je već rečeno o djelovanju istih; o njihovu naoružavanju Armije BiH i stranih islamističkih terorista i pružanju logističke podrške. Najveći dio njih je osnovala i financirala Saudijska Arabija. Tako je **Igassa** osnovana 1978.g. u Jeddahu u Saudijskoj Arabiji; ta organizacija je postala glavni kanal za slanje novca, ljudi i oružja mudžahedinima u BiH, sa uredima u Zagrebu, Splitu, Sarajevu i Zenici. Spomenuti **BIF**-Međunarodna zaklada dobre volje, kao jedna od najmoćnijih islamskih organizacija, je također osnovana od strane bogatog Saudijsca Adela Batterjeea, koji je imao i veze s saudijskom kraljevskom obitelji i vladom. Najveće dobrotvorno društvo u Saudijskoj Arabiji je **Al Haramain**

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Saudijski (njihove elite i kraljevska obitelj) povezani s ovim pokretom koji se koristi za radikalizaciju i u terorističke svrhe; <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21695.pdf>

<sup>123</sup> *Al Nusra* je sunitska ekstremistička islamistička grupa bazirana u Siriji, te je u biti teroristička organizacija nastala iz Al Qai'dine organizacije u Iraku; dio ih je postao Al Nusra te se zakleo na vjernost novom emiru Al Qai'de, Aymanu Zawahiriju, a dio ih je pod vodstvom Abu Bakra Al-Baghdadija, postao zloglasni ISIL (*Islamska Država*); <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-nusra-front-al-qaedas-affiliate-syria>

<sup>124</sup> [https://www.academia.edu/21163179/Iran\\_in\\_the\\_Balkans](https://www.academia.edu/21163179/Iran_in_the_Balkans) ; <https://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/clanak/bih-protjerala-dvojicu-iranskih-diplomata-20130515/print>

**Islamic Foundation** sa sjedištem u Rijadu; uredi u Zagrebu i Sarajevu su otvoreni 1992.g. i 1994.g. Ono je osiguravalo logističku potporu ali i vjersku i vojnu izobrazbu mudžahedinima tijekom rata te je uspostavilo veze sa egipatskom terorističkom skupinom *Gama'at Al Islamiyya*. Ipak, najvažnija organizacija je bila **Visoki saudijski komitet za pomoć Bosni i Hercegovini**, koju je osnovala direktno država Saudijska Arabija i njen kralj s kojom su unijeli preko 600 milijuna USD u Bosnu i Hercegovinu, većinom za financiranje mudžahedina ali i terorista; nakon 11.rujna snage NATO-a su u uredima ove organizacije našli materijale za terorističke napade i špijunažu.<sup>125</sup>

Nakon rata, Saudijski su nastavili širiti svoj utjecaj i ideologiju, većinom ideologiju vehabizma kao tradicionalno snažne islamske fundamentalističke orijentacije u toj državi. Vehabizam ostaje realna opasnost budući da se isti ne libe ni nasilja, dakle islamskog terorizma u ostvarivanju svog cilja. Prosječno, oko 4000 ljudi se skuplja jednom tjedno u džamiji kralja Fahda u Sarajevu koju je financirao osobno saudijski kralj sa 30 milijuna USD. Vehabizam je paralelna struja nasuprot službenoj islamskoj zajednici u Bosni i Hercegovini, i njihove skupine i dalje financiraju Saudijski, kao što i određene mlade muslimane iz Bosne i Hercegovine obrazuju u Saudijskoj Arabiji te šalju svoje operativce u BiH koji se lako stope u bošnjačko društvo.<sup>126</sup>

Saudijska Kraljevina zadržava ideološko-radikalni pristup u svojoj pomoći muslimanima u Bosni i Hercegovini i bošnjačkim političarima; u samom ratu, Saudijski su potrošili par milijuna eura za " islamsku stvar " u BiH, od mobiliziranja islamističkih boraca do operacija ilegalne trgovine oružjem. Međutim, velika pomoć je došla i u financiranju izgradnje i rekonstrukcije džamije i medrasa (islamskih škola)- sa ciljem širenja vezabizma, s kojim Saudijski imaju povijesne veze.<sup>127</sup>

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125 Mlivočić, Ivica. *Al Qaida se kalila u Bosni i Hercegovini*, str. 226-238; Lučić, Ivo. " Bosna and Herzegovina and Terrorism ", str. 121, 127 *passim*.

126 Lebl, Leslie. *Islamism and Security in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, str. 12-15

127 U 18.st., Muhammad Ibn Abd-Al-Wahhab, radikalni konzervativni musliman s Arapskog Poluotoka, je započeo posebnu sektu i vjerski pokret unutar islama nazvan po njemu vehabizam. Ne ulazeći u doktrinarne postavke, dovoljno je reći kako je Wahhab našao sjajnog saveznika u obitelji Saud koja je baš tada preuzela vlast u Arabiji. Vehabizam ostaje službena sekta Kraljevine Saudijske Arabije;

Sa spomenutim saudijskim humanitarnim radom ali i financiranjem terorista, škola i raznih objekata, izgrađena je paralelna mreža vehabijske zajednice koja se smatra jednim od razloga širenja konzervativne forme islama na Balkanu, a ta je činjenica opet jedan od razloga odlaska oko 800-900 boraca s tog područja u redove ISIL-a. Kosovo i BiH su dvije zemlje koje su, po glavi stanovnika, doprinijele s najviše boraca.<sup>128</sup>

**Republika Turska** je zemlja koja je pomagala i nastavlja pomagati Muslimane u Bosni i Hercegovini, kao i jačanje samog islama kao religije i ideologije. Ona ima možda i najjače poveznice sa Muslimanima u BiH, budući da je islam od Turaka Osmanlija i potekao u Bosni. Kratko rečeno, kraljevinu Bosnu je 1463.g. pokorio sultan Osmanlijskog Carstva Mehmed II. Kao krajna pokrajina svog Carstva, Turci su u njoj naseljavali muslimane i vršili preobraćenja na islam lokalnog stanovništva u Bosni i Hercegovini. Tijekom pada iste države tijekom 19.st., pojavili su se novi igrači; Rusija, Habsburško Carstvo, kao i novonastale balkanske države - Srbija, Grčka, Rumunjska, Bugarska koje su se borile, pobijedile i protjerale Turke i dobar dio ostalih muslimana na Balkanu (često ih i ubijajući). Ipak, u Bosni i Hercegovini je ostao značajan broj Muslimana, s time da ih danas ima oko 50% cijelog stanovništva BiH.<sup>129</sup>

Nakon raspada Jugoslavije, većinom sekularni Muslimani su obnovili svoje povijesne veze sa Turskom preko svojih političkih, vjerskih i akademskih krugova sa ciljem izgradnje etnoreligijskog identiteta Bošnjaka, koji bi bio različit od Hrvata i Srba. Većinom se djelovanje Turske osjeća, sada i prije, preko koncepta "meke moći" (*soft power*)<sup>130</sup> što bi podrazumijevalo ulaganje značajnih financijskih sredstava preko kulturnih udruga i diplomatskih veza, sa ciljem vezivanja Muslimana u Bosni i Hercegovini uz Tursku i time

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[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/614582/EPRS\\_ATA\(2017\)614582\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/614582/EPRS_ATA(2017)614582_EN.pdf)

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[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/614582/EPRS\\_ATA\(2017\)614582\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/614582/EPRS_ATA(2017)614582_EN.pdf)

129 Piqueres, Sofia Lopez. *Turkey in Bosna and Herzegovina: by fits and starts*. Warszawa: College of Europe, Department of European Interdisciplinary Studies, 2014, str. 4, 9-11

130 *Soft power* bi bila sposobnost, moć neke države da ostvari svoje ciljeve u drugim državama bez uporabe sile ili prisile; većinom se odnosi na financijska, kulturna, obrazovna i diplomatska djelovanja; <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2004-05-01/soft-power-means-success-world-politics>

širenje utjecaja iste na Balkanu. Turska *Agencija za Suradnju i Koordinaciju TIKA* je pružala financijsku pomoć islamu i muslimanima u BiH još od rata, a posebno se aktivirala od 2002. g. To je vladina agencija, jedno vrijeme odgovorna izravno turskom premijeru. Nakon što je vladajući AKP preuzeo vlast spomenute godine, aktivnost u Bosni i Hercegovini se pojačala. Samo u 2012.godini ova organizacija je uložila oko 16 milijuna eura u BiH, s time da je većina otišla na obnavljanje arhitekture iz otomanskog vremena. Zatim je otvoren Turski kulturni centar u Bosni i Hercegovini u sklopu turskog Veleposlanstva. Također, nakon što je predsjednik i neosporni vladar Turske Recep Erdogan ustanovio fondaciju *Yunuse Emre*, ista je osnovala i *Yunus Emre Institut - Turski kulturni centar* u Sarajevu koji je otvorio osobno ministar vanjskih poslova Mehmet Davutoglu. Sve to pokazuje značajan interes Turske i novog "sultana" Erdogana za Bosnu i Hercegovinu.<sup>131</sup>

Postoje i dva značajna obrazovna centra s kojima Turska širi svoj utjecaj na BiH a time i na Balkanu. Prvi je *Internacionalni Univerzitet u Sarajevu*, kojeg je osnovao turski poslovni čovjek s dobrim vezama sa Erdoganom. Ono pohađa oko tisuću i pol studenata, predavanja se vrše na engleskom jeziku i služi razmjeni turskih i bosanskih, ali i drugih studenata. Drugi je *Međunarodni Univerzitet Burch* koji ima veze sa Fethullahom Gullenom, turskim vjerskim autoritetom i čovjekom koji vodi cijelu međunarodnu obrazovnu mrežu iz SAD-a (Pennsylvania).<sup>132</sup>

### **Zaključak - moguće mjere Republike Hrvatske protiv islamističkog terorizma**

Republika Hrvatska je srednjoeuropska, podunavska, mediteranska ali i zemlja na jugoistoku Europe. S površinom od 56 538 km<sup>2</sup> i oko 4 milijuna stanovnika, spada u manje zemlje Europske Unije. RH je demokratska država s parlamentarnim sustavom; taj parlament je Sabor a ujedno je i nositelj zakonodavne vlasti, dok je premijer predsjednik vlade RH. Predsjednik RH, kao i Sabor, sudjeluju u

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131 Mujadžević, Dino. " Turkey's Role in Bosna and Herzegovina ", *Euxenios- Governance and Culture in the Black Sea Region*, 23, str. 25- 29

132 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/02/bosnia-turkey-ottoman-influence-balkans-sarajevo>

upravljanju sustavom nacionalne sigurnosti.<sup>133</sup> Njen temeljni zakon je Ustav RH.<sup>134</sup> Obavještajne službe RH su prošle dug put od 1991. pa do reorganizacije i novog Zakona o sigurnosno-obavještajnom sustavu Republike Hrvatske, donesenog 2006.<sup>135</sup> Tijekom 90-ih godina, postojalo je par sigurnosnih i obavještajnih službi kao što su bile *UNS - Ured za nacionalnu sigurnost*, čija je zadaća bila koordinacija svih hrvatskih obavještajnih službi, a unutar UNS-a je spadao i *HIS - Hrvatska izvještajna služba* kao vanjska civilna obavještajna služba. *SZUP - Služba za zaštitu ustavnog poretka* je bila ustrojena u okviru Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova, *S/S - Sigurnosno izvještajna služba* je bila vojna sigurnosna služba čija je zadaća bila protuobavještajna zaštita vojnog vrha, vojno-redarstvenih operacija i postrojbi. Reformom iz 2002., napravljena je reorganizacija pa su tako nastale *OA - Obavještajna agencija* i *POA - Protuobavještajna agencija*, s tim da je za vojno obavještajno djelovanje i protuobavještajni rad u sektoru MORH-a i HV-a bila zadužena *VSA - Vojna sigurnosna agencija*.<sup>136</sup> Kada je donesen spomenuti ZSOS (Zakon o sigurnosno-obavještajnom sustavu) 2006., taj sustav je organiziran da mu okosnicu čine dvije službe: *SOA - Sigurnosno-obavještajna agencija* i *VSOA - Vojna sigurnosno-obavještajna agencija*. U sustavu postoji i *VNS - Vijeće za nacionalnu sigurnost* koje djeluje kao središnje političko-savjetodavno tijelo koje ocjenjuje ugroze nacionalne sigurnosti i politiku zaštite iste. Savjet za koordinaciju sig.-ob. agencija operativno usklađuje rad svih službi. Za tehničko-komunikacijska pitanja su zaduženi *Zavod za sigurnost informacijskih sustava*, kao i *Operativno-tehnički centar za nadzor telekomunikacija*.<sup>137</sup>

Republika Hrvatska se nalazi u relativno nepovoljnom geopolitičkom okruženju budući da joj se u neposrednom okruženju nalaze neka krizna žarišta (u prvom redu veoma

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133 The World Factbook, CIA; <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/hr.html>

134 *Narodne novine* 56/90, 135/97

135 *Narodne novine* 79/06

136 Tatalović, Siniša- Grizold, Anton- Cvrtila, Vlatko. *Suvremene sigurnosne politike*. Zagreb: Golden marketing- Tehnička knjiga, 2008., str. 318- 20

137 Zakon o sigurnosno-obavještajnom sustavu RH, *Narodne novine* 79/06; Badžim, Joško. "Sigurnosno-obavještajne službe u demokratskom društvu- u povodu reforme sigurnosno-obavještajnog sustava u Republici Hrvatskoj", *Hrvatska javna uprava* 8 (4), str. 1018-1019

podijeljena Bosna i Hercegovina i Kosovo), kao i Republika Srbija koja je bivši agresor na RH i čiji čelnici često nastavljaju velikosrpsku retoriku. Također, cijela jugoistočna Europa (Balkanski poluotok) je područje sigurnosnih rizika. U BiH su dugo djelovale međunarodne mirovne snage, a Balkanski poluotok je također područje gdje je zabilježena veća aktivnost raznih islamističkih skupina koje su dijelom i financirane od arapskih država.<sup>138</sup> Kao sredozemna, srednjoeuropska i podunavska zemlja, RH ima važno geopolitmetno značenje u razvoju europskih komunikacija, no zbog ratova i područja napetosti, Hrvatska nije u potpunosti iskoristila svoj položaj; uz to, sam oblik države je dovodi u nepovoljan položaj u vojnom i sigurnosnom smislu. Ipak, u europskim integracijskim procesima, ti nedostaci se mogu nadvladati.<sup>139</sup>

U RH u slučaju kriminalnog djela terorizma, u istragu se uključuje državni odvjetnik kao koordinator i on radi sa svim agencijama - policijom, obavještajnom službom. U prevenciji terorističkih akata i otkrivanju pojedinaca i skupina, RH bi se mogla ugledati na državu s kojom je nedavno ostvarila strateško partnerstvo - Državu Izrael. Izrael ima dugu povijest borbi protiv islamskog terorizma koja praktički seže od samog nastanka Izraela kao samostalne države. Tijekom desetljeća, Izrael je razvio protuterorističku strategiju u kojima glavnu ulogu imaju njihove obavještajne službe: **Mossad** (Institut za obavještajni rad i specijalne zadatke)<sup>140</sup>, **Shin Bet** (Opća sigurnosna služba)<sup>141</sup> te **Aman** (Vojnoobavještajna služba)<sup>142</sup>. Ključna organizacija je **Aman** (*Agaf ha-Mod'in*), obavještajna služba Izraelskih Oružanih Snaga (*IDF - Israeli Defence Forces*). U službi u kojoj radi oko sedam tisuća ljudi, prikupljaju se i analiziraju informacije prikupljene pomoću ELINT-a (*Electronic Intelligence*) i COMINT-a (*Communications Intelligence*) uz pomoć posebne antiterorističke jedinice *Sayeret Mat'kala*. *Aman* dnevno

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138 Žunec, Ozren.- Domišljanović, Darko. *Obavještajno-sigurnosne službe Republike Hrvatske*, str. 188; Gibas- Krzak, Danuta. " Terrorism in the Balkans. Genesis- types- prognoses ", str. 328 i d.

139 Lozančić, Marinko. " Sigurnosni izazovi za Republiku Hrvatsku u euroatlantskom geostrategijskom kontekstu " u: *Sigurnost i obrana Republike Hrvatske u euroatlantskom kontekstu* (ur. Smerić, Tomislav i Sabol, Gabrijela). Zagreb: Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, 2009., str. 41-42, sl.2.

140 [www.mossad.gov.il](http://www.mossad.gov.il)

141 <https://www.shabak.gov.il/english/>

142 <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/israel/aman.htm>

izvješćuje glavni vojni stožer, ministarstvo obrane, predsjednika vlade i članove vlade o prikupljenim i analiziranim podacima, te daje godišnju procjenu premijeru i vladi o opasnostima terorizma.<sup>143</sup> Prvi i osnovni element na kojem se bazira izraelska protuteroristička strategija je prikupljanje i analiza obavještajnih podataka. Osim razvijenih visokotehnoloških špijunskih uređaja i povremenih racija među Palestincima, velika se pozornost usmjerava prema podacima s terena koje se dobiva putem ubačenih agenata ili vrbovanih Palestinaca. Pokazalo se da je HUMINT (*Human Intelligence*)<sup>144</sup> najpouzdaniji tip obavještajnih podataka.<sup>145</sup> Iskustvo potvrđuje da se terorizam ne može učinkovito i trajno suzbiti ako se ne koriste povjerljive obavijesti koje mogu dovesti do predviđanja i anticipiranja prijetnje, neutraliziranja njenih tvorca i sudskog suzbijanja terorističkog napada. Radi toga ubacivanje ljudskih potencijala među terorističke organizacije mora i dalje biti (uz svu složenost i opasnost takvih akcija) jedan od prioriteta sigurnosnih i obavještajnih službi.<sup>146</sup> S time računajući, RH bi također trebala znati kako se postaviti prema potencijalnim terorističkim islamističkim prijetnjama, pogotovo uzevši u obzir sve bolju suradnju s Državom Izrael<sup>147</sup> gdje je i izraelski predsjednik spomenuo Hrvatsku kao " snažnog saveznika u EU, NATO-u i multilateralim organizacijama ".<sup>148</sup>

Islamistički je terorizam, kako je rečeno, postao transnacionalna i transgranična ugroza demokratskom svijetu a njegov glavni ideološki obrazac je vjerski fanatizam koji dovodi i do samoubilačkih terorističkih djelovanja. Ljudski resursi u borbi protiv terorizma se mogu koristiti na više polja,

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143 Collona Vilasi, Antonella. " The Israeli Intelligence Community ", *Sociology Mind* 8, 2018, str. 121; Vidušić, Emil. *Vodič kroz tajne službe*. Split: Naklada Bošković, 2004., str. 34-36

144 HUMINT se definira kao obavještajna aktivnost s osloncem na ljudske izvore; agente, informatore, doušnike, konfidente, klasične špijune i druge; Vidušić, Emil. *Vodič kroz tajne službe*. Split: Naklada Bošković, 2004., str. 20

145 Tatalović, Siniša- Grizold, Anton- Cvrtila, Vlatko. *Suvremene sigurnosne politike: Države i nacionalna sigurnost početkom 21.stoljeća*. Zagreb: Golden marketing- Tehnička knjiga, 2008.,str. 330- 332

146 Gayraud, Jean-Francois.- Senat, David. *Terorizam*. Zagreb: Jesenski i Turk, 2008., str. 68-69

147 <https://vijesti.hrt.hr/540979/ugovor-hrvatske-i-izraela-na-podrucju-javne-sigurnosti>

148 <https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/izraelski-predsjednik-u-jeruzalemu-primio-grabar-kitarovic-hvala-vam-sto-se-suprotstavljate-mrznji-prema-izraelu/9177821/>

ali u dva glavna smjera a to su prevencija terorizma i operativna borba protiv istog. Naime, preventivno djelovanje dugoročno ide u smjeru edukacije, ublažavanju fanatizma od odgoja pojedinca i sprječavanje indoktrinacije - za taj je proces potrebna suradnja psihologa, sociologa ali i vjerskih autoriteta. Prevencija terorističkih akata terorističkih organizacija ide u smjeru pravodobnog i preciznog obavještajnog rada - procesa koji je apsolutno nužan jer se obavještajnim radom mogu otkriti materijalne, financijske i infrastrukturne značajke terorističkih skupina, a onda ih se i ublažiti i sprječiti. Operativna borba je već gašenje požara - s time se bave visoko uvježbane i specijalizirane vojne i policijske snage.<sup>149</sup>

Uloga RH može i mora biti u stabiliziranju odnosa u jugoistočnoj Europi i efektivnoj antiterorističkoj borbi koja se mora ostvarivati temeljena na znanju - to podrazumijeva poboljšanje razmjena obavještajnih informacija kao i stvaranje zajedničkih baza podataka o terorističkim organizacijama i njihovim članovima. Na koncu, eliminiranje svakog, pa i islamističkog terorizma uspijeva jedino ako se eliminiraju socijalni uvjeti koji su doveli do istog te ako se uspostavi pravodobna razmjena informacija na nacionalnoj, regionalnoj i globalnoj razini.<sup>150</sup> Tu pogotovo dolazi u obzir strateško partnerstvo i dobra suradnja s Državom Izrael koja ima posebno razrađene antiterorističke strategije.

Republika Hrvatska je u svojoj Strategiji nacionalne sigurnosti donesenoj 2017.g.<sup>151</sup> definirala sigurnost i teritorijalni integritet i cjelovitost kao jednu od temeljnih sastavnica nacionalnih interesa i posvetila dio istog dokumenta o terorizmu kojeg imenuje stalnom nacionalnom i međunarodnom prijetnjom za područje Europe, pogotovo iz teritorija sjeverne Afrike, Bliskog Istoka i Kavkaza. Također je naglašeno kako su se tisuće Europljana pridružile terorističkim skupinama u Iraku i Siriji (posebice ISIL-u) i po povratku predstavljaju dugoročni rizik.

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149 Matika, Dario Ogorec, Marinko. " Ljudski resursi u borbi protiv terorizma " u: *Ljudski resursi u suzbijanju terorizma* (ur.Antoliš, Krunoslav). Zagreb: Znanstveno-stručni skup 7.-8.rujna 2006., 2007., str. 55-59

150 Knezović, Sandro. " Ljudski resursi u suzbijanju terorizma-potencijalna uloga RH " u: *Ljudski resursi u suzbijanju terorizma* (ur.Antoliš, Krunoslav). Zagreb: Znanstveno-stručni skup 7.-8.rujna 2006., 2007., str. 96-99

151 *Narodne novine* 73/2017



Nacionalna strategija za prevenciju terorizma, dokument donesen 2015.g. od Vlade RH<sup>152</sup> definira borbu protiv terorizma kroz prevenciju i suzbijanje i ponovno ističe područje jugoistočne Europe kao dio prema kojem se RH mora okrenuti na dva načina; kroz suradnju policijskih i obavještajnih institucija s drugim državama te kroz stabilizaciju regije, sprječavajući tako krizne situacije na Balkanu i izbjegavajući moguću radikalizaciju, pogotovo mladih ljudi.

Prema sadašnjem Zakonu o sigurnosno-obavještajnom sustavu RH<sup>153</sup>, sigurnosno-obavještajne agencije SOA i VSOA imaju obvezu i mogućnost raznih djelovanja protiv terorizma. Objema agencijama je definirano prikupljanje i daljna obrada podataka (za vojnu službu stoji da prikuplja podatke na teritoriju RH), kao i suradnja s drugim obavještajnim agencijama. Vrlo je bitno da je člankom 29. određeno kako obavještajne agencije mogu koristiti tajne suradnike, što je značajno kada se usporedi sa iskustvom Izraela<sup>154</sup> u vrijednosti HUMINT-a.<sup>155</sup> Također se člankom 33. određuje i mogućnost mjera tajnog prikupljanja podataka raznim sredstvima i metodama. Člankom 59. se i zakonski određuje moguća suradnja s stranim obavještajnim i sigurnosnim službama u vidu razmjene podataka i ostalih poslova. Tako je legalno utvrđena mogućnost suradnje i razmjene podataka i edukacije djelatnika među sigurnosnim i obavještajnim službama - ključne sastavnice u suzbijanju terorističkih islamističkih skupina.

Što se tiče mogućnosti iskorištavanja ljudskih izvora u prikupljanju obavještajnih podataka vezanih uz opasnost islamističkog terorizma, RH i njene institucije trebaju imati na umu da se među potencijalnim *ad hoc* ljudskim izvorima

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<sup>152</sup> Narodne novine 108/15

<sup>153</sup> Narodne novine 79/06

<sup>154</sup> No ne samo Izraela; jedna od najuspješnijih i profesionalnijih obavještajnih službi u suzbijanju islamističkog terorizma jest jordanski GID ( eng. General Intelligence Directorate ) koja je samo jedne godine sprječila preko 90 aktivnosti terorista; <http://www.jordantimes.com/opinion/fares-braizat/unknown-knights-counterterrorism-conviction>

<sup>155</sup> Jedan od najboljih primjera o vrijednosti ljudskih izvora obavještajnih podataka u suzbijanju terorizma jest slučaj Palestinca Mosaba Hassana Yousefa, sina jednog od vođa Hamasa na Zapadnoj obali, koji je godinama radio za izraelski Shin Bet ( Shabak ) te je svojim djelovanjem sprječio na desetke napada, terorističkih čina i atentata na izraelske dužnosnike; <https://www.haaretz.com/1.5051790>

nalaze ratne i političke izbjeglice, prebjezi i azilanti i određeni stručnjaci iz područja koji mogu biti relevantni za obavještajnu službu. S pojavom islamskog terorizma i njihovih ćelija, značaj ljudskih izvora je porastao; terorističke organizacije se same služe tehničkim sredstvima, imaju i protuobavještajnu komponentu a ključne i vitalne informacije se prenose na neposredan način između zatvorenog kruga ljudi. U takvoj situaciji važnost HUMINT-a ili ljudskih izvora je teško opisiva.<sup>156</sup>

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# INTRODUCTION

Within the current international order, there are four instruments and sources of national state power: public diplomacy, information, the military, and the economy. Information has become the main weapon and the media an open battlefield. Operations of influence, public diplomacy, and strategic communication represent “soft power” that is more lethal than military force.

Joseph Nye (1990) defined “soft power” as having the “capability of attaining what one wants through attractiveness rather than force or money”. This theory brought him to the position of president of the National Intelligence Council (1993-1994.) and U.S. Assistant Minister of Defense for International Security Affairs (1994-1995.)

Countries that during the 1990s developed the doctrines of information warfare, provided the necessary infrastructure for conducting information warfare, adopted national information strategies, and subordinated and coordinated the activities of their state, military, non-governmental and economic activities to



these strategies, dominate and rule the world today.

The U.S. Department of Defense published in 2000 the “Joint Vision 2020” document, in which the establishment of “full-spectrum information domination” was announced.

Public diplomacy, public relations, and psychological operations occupied leading roles in the information operations aimed at this “full spectrum domination”. Public diplomacy legalized the use of “soft power” (information, media, public relations agencies, and non-governmental organizations, polling agencies, exchanges of experts, and so forth) in order to influence the public views and opinions in foreign countries which oppose the national goals and interests of these countries. The goal of public diplomacy was to “seduce” these foreign publics and politicians into behaving and making decisions to their own disadvantage.

With the development of ICT technologies and digitalization of the global information space, a new international information order with still undefined rules was established. However, it is obvious that in the global information sphere, a division between domestic and foreign publics is impossible to maintain, and as a result, the influence exerted on the domestic public has returned like a boomerang to those who through public diplomacy sought to shape public opinion in foreign countries.

American policies have been burdened for many years now by the influence of foreign powers on the domestic public. American intelligence agents state that “Russia, China, and Iran will try to influence election results in the United States”;

Trump claimed that “China will do all it can to ensure I lose the elections”, and the Senate that “a Senate investigation has confirmed Russian meddling in the American elections” (2020).

These media headlines are only an indication of the possible threats to the American public from foreign information influences. Meanwhile, the globalization of the information space has affected all world superpowers, the European Union, and other states equally through its sophisticated information attacks and clashes in the media.

In the 1990s, Croatia was unable to fight, diplomatically or militarily, for its independence and sovereignty without freeing the media and information space from the disinformation and falsifications that prevented its entry into the international order. On the political and diplomatic level, one of the most serious charges was that Croatians were a fascist and genocidal nation. The stigma that in Jasenovac (1941-1945) from 700,000 to more than a million people (Serbs, Jews, Roma, and others) were killed had held Croatia in a subservient position in the former Yugoslavia. And this was the international justification used for the Great-Serbian policies of aggression against Croatia: “President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, accused Croatia of trying to renew a ‘policy of genocide’ that he said it had pursued during World War II “(Hague, September 8, 1991).

Historian Franjo Tudjman, in his “Wastelands of Historical Reality”, exposed the falsifications regarding the number of Jasenovac victims. The book was banned for many years from publication in the former Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, a few months before the fall of the

Berlin Wall, a promotion of “Wastelands of Historical Reality” was to have been held. But it never was. The formation of the Croatian Democratic Union intervened, also held under the threat of prohibition. These two overlapping events (June 1989) are rife with symbolism: the establishment of a program for an independent and sovereign Croatian state was possible only when a public deconstruction of the genocidal myth about the Croatian nation had begun. These black legends had deprived Croatsians of their right to national freedom, legends on account of which Croatsians had paid a high price for the right to their own state.<sup>1</sup>

Julienne Basic’s text, “Wastelands of Political Correctness” (Vjesnik, 1997) presents the fate of “Wastelands of Historical Reality” and dissects the thorny path to the deconstruction of the Jasenovac myth. This deconstruction and the recognition of Croatia are two sides of the same process. As long as Yugoslavia was a recognized member of the international order, it would not have been possible, or “politically correct”, to call into question the Jasenovac myth. Thirty years after the fall of Yugoslavia, proponents of Great-Serbian politics remain vocal, albeit isolated, guardians of the politically

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<sup>1</sup> “Wastelands of Historical Reality” was subjected to rejection, falsification, negation, and degradation from those who had supported the Communist order and justified Great-Serbian hegemony and aggression against Croatia. It is significant that “Wastelands of Historical Reality” had already had four re-printings prior to Croatia’s international recognition. After international recognition, the book was translated into English, German, Czech, Slovak, Bulgarian, Chinese, and Hungarian.

correct myth of the genocidal character of the Croatian nation.

Communist ideology, with its falsifications and myths, was an instrument used to maintain Croatia in subservience in the former Yugoslavia. But Croatia was from its very inception also subjected to pressure from public diplomacy.

It is well known that numerous non-governmental organizations and media established in the 1990s were engaged by foreign sponsors to change the government, in order to impose strategic goals in Croatia against Croatia's will. The promotor of the "Open Society", multimillionaire George Soros, saw Croatia as part of a free trade zone in the Western Balkans which would have a single currency and customs union. An opponent of the recognition of Croatia, Soros financed non-government organizations and media in Croatia and promised them a blank check in 1990 for the destruction of the HDZ government.

In 2020, the American public condemned attempts of foreign meddling in their presidential elections. Twenty years earlier, American policies had openly and directly influenced the results of parliamentary elections in Croatia. The manner in which American public diplomacy organized resistance and the goals it promoted in Croatia are outlined in the Report on the National Endowment for Democracy, September 1999.) A report was prepared for the Croatian Parliamentary Committee on domestic policy and national security.

It is clear from the report that members of the IRI, USAID, and American Embassy had planned

their support for the opposition not only up until the parliamentary elections, but for four months during the post-election period. The program included the forming of coalitions and their activities; shaping messages and strategies for party campaigns; assistance and consultations during pre-election campaigns and in the post-election period; organizing youth political parties with the goal of greater participation by the young in elections, and so forth. The program was not available to all parliamentary parties, but only to the coalition of opposition parties headed by reform Communists.

There are several reasons, after more than two decades, for publishing these two documents, *Wasteland of Political Correctness*, and *Report on the National Endowment for Democracy*. First, to remind us that the abuse of „soft power“ endangers the fate and freedom of not only individuals but entire nations; second, to point out that foreign intervention and manipulation in the parliamentary elections of democratic countries is unacceptable; and third, that information in the global sphere is a weapon, and that the entire world has become a battlefield upon which both small and large countries are threatened.

In the twenty-first century, geopolitical tensions and conflicts between the largest global states, the United States, China, and Russia, take place and are resolved within information and cyber domains. Defining the rules for the use of information as a weapon and controlling behavior in the cyber domain will play a crucial role in thoroughly reshaping overall international relations, reconstructing the existing international order and establishing new ones. Rules involving misuse of information are literally

non-existent (especially on social networks) and barely exist in cyberspace. Information space and cyberspace do not exist in a vacuum, they are not empty space, so it is necessary to adopt international rules of conduct - in the interest of peace and stability of the international order.

# WASTELAND OF POLITICAL CORRECTNESS<sup>1</sup>

Julienne Basic\*

## ***The Plague of Political Correctness***

The German poet Novalis once said that "philosophy is really homesickness; it is the urge to be at home everywhere."

As far as the past few decades are concerned, Novalis is right. In the world of academia and intellectual research, two contradictory philosophies purport to provide the best and most appropriate home for the myriad contradictions of existence: political correctness, which attempts to identify truth in feeling, and deconstruction, which seeks it in objectivity.

The phenomenon of "political correctness" now so popular in the West, and especially in the United States, is based upon linguistic euphemism, the cloaking of evil, misfortune and unpleasant topics in terms designed to spare one's feelings. People do not fail in endeavors, they "underachieve". People are not fat, but "gravitationally challenged" and a corpse is not a corpse but a "non-living person". There is a mortal fear, as Robert Hughes points out in his bestseller "Culture of Complaint", that the "concrete will give offense."

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<sup>1</sup> From Croatian daily political newspaper, "Vjesnik", February 6, 1997

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Facts cannot be unadorned, but must be clothed in layers of description which dilute reality. As a result, entire lines of intellectual research and areas of designation have been declared off limits. "The emphasis is on the subjective: how we feel about things, rather than what we think or can know", says Hughes. Goethe long ago identified the dangers of this turning inward: "Epochs which are regressive, and in the process of dissolution, are always subjective, whereas the trend in all progressive epochs is objective".

Which brings us logically to the subject of Dr. Tudjman's book, **"Horrors of War: Historical Reality and Philosophy"**, which has appeared in five Croatian and one German printing, and has just come out in its first, extensively revised English edition. President Tudjman had the great misfortune of having turned his objective attention to the "offensive concrete" when he first began *Horrors of War* in the 1980s, which focused on the manipulations of history and victims of the Second World War. Feelings were hurt, euphemisms which he could have employed were not. Why had he written "genocidal policy" when he could have written "infelicitous activities resulting in the non-living status of a large number of individuals"? Or "distortion of facts" instead of "perhaps inadvertent or unintentional rendering of data"? Because he delved into areas which challenged accepted propaganda or endangered conventional wisdom in related areas, he found himself and his work continually attacked not by scholars but by guardians of political correctness.

Those who have followed this project for a number of years recall well the chronology of disinformation and attacks connected to this book - the Serbian mistranslations of key excerpts taken out of context, which were then distributed through Yugoslav Embassies to unsuspecting media and politicians; the intentional and careless repetition of errors of fact, even after they had been officially repudiated; the charges that President Tudjman was a revisionist and had minimized the number of victims and Croatian responsibility for them; the criticism for having included testimony by prisoners about Jewish cooperation with their persecutors in Jasenovac; and the misattribution of quotes intended to discredit President Tudjman. One such glaring example concerns the phrase "Judeo-Nazi", a formulation by the late left-wing Israeli professor and theologian, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, who used it to express his opposition - and that of many other leftist Jewish intellectuals, i.e. Professor Amos



Funkenstein, Yehiam Weitz, Israeli historian Yigal Elam, Israeli academic Dr. Ilana Hamerman, linguist and social critic, Noam Chomsky - to Israeli treatment of Palestinians. President Tudjman was labeled a racist and anti-Semite for daring to analyze this treatment when he wrote the book in the 1980's, and then for quoting Leibowitz. Meanwhile, Leibowitz and other leftists were also labeled racists and anti-Semites by the Israeli right wing, whom Leibowitz and company had likewise criticized as racists.. One might be forgiven for being confused. In the end, however, as repugnant as the term "Judeo-Nazi" may be to most Jews and non-Jews alike, Leibowitz' reputation in Israel appears not to have suffered too greatly. He was awarded in 1993 the prestigious Israel Prize for intellectual achievement by Yitzhak Rabin's Minister of Culture, Shulamit Aloni. As Hillel Halkin writes in the conservative Jewish monthly, "Commentary", there "was nothing wrong in calling Jews Nazis, it would seem, as long as they were the right Jews."

So while President Tudjman was pilloried in the press as an anti-Semite and revisionist by those who had never read the book, others, both Jewish and non-Jewish who had read the book or who had investigated the charges, and who based their evaluations not on "political correctness" but upon scholarship and research, were of a different view. Thomas Cushman, in "Genocide After Emotion: The Postemotional Balkan War", writes about the distortions concerning Horrors of War and the unfair collective representation of the "Croatian-as-Nazi":

*Tudjman's body-counting, which was meant to counter Serbian use of past genocide as propaganda to ground their own genocide, was recast by many as Holocaust revisionism. Notwithstanding the difficulty of shaking such a label in the present-day world, the accusation of revisionism could, within the context of the collective representation of "Croatian-as Nazi", be seen as further evidence of a Croatian affinity for Nazism and anti-Semitism.*

Regarding charges that President Tudjman was a revisionist and has sought to minimize Croatian guilt during the Second World War:

*Croatian historian and current President Franjo Tudjman, who has often been accused of whitewashing Croatian responsibility for genocide,*

*has accurately described (in **Horrors of War**) the policy of the Ustasha dictatorship toward the Serbs in Croatia in the following terms: 'it is a historical fact that the Ustasha regime of the Independent State of Croatia, in carrying out its plans of reducing the "enemy Serbian Orthodox population in Croatian lands", committed a great genocidal crime against the Serbs, and a proportionally even greater one against the Gypsies and the Jews, in carrying out the Nazi racial policy.'*

Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, (Oxford, 1996)

Norman Stone of the Faculty of History at the University of Oxford, wrote in the Times Literary Supplement of June 11, 1993, about the distorted Yugoslav embassy translations and subsequent misrepresentations of the facts:

*In the early days of the crisis, Yugoslav embassies were issuing a dozen pages of quotations from the book...one Robert Kaplan picked it up and wrote what looked to be a very damaging article in the New Republic...he later admitted that he had not read the book, nor does he seem to know the language...there were elementary mistakes in the embassy translation...quotations from Tadjman were interspersed with dots...statements that Tadjman had quoted from anti-Semites were reproduced as if they were his own words...*

In another review, Jewish-American philosophy professor, Dennis Rohatyn, who read the unrevised text, writes that the book is "a masterpiece", an "important book, not least because he exposes false dichotomies, begged questions, and reification with the deftness of a logician." On the anti-Semitic allegations, Rohatyn says that Tadjman is "never anti-Semite but very pro-human. He's also compassionate and moving." Rohatyn wishes "truth were (as Tadjman suggests) all we needed to make peace." At any rate, he considers the text objective: "I don't find Tadjman to be pro-Arab, either. He displays remarkable balance (no matter what Israeli partisans claim) and he's neither a demagogue nor an apologist....he's clearly a thinker, a man who contemplates all the horror yet goes on living. In conclusion, Rohatyn makes a plea for an end to "political correctness",

which he considers "more sinister than anything Tudjman says."

In another review, a second Jewish-American professor writes that *Horrors of War* is an "unusual, thought-provoking, 'politically-incorrect' work, written by a "man for all seasons; and in advocating the scholar's values of accuracy and truth, he certainly appears to be head and shoulder above most political leaders today."

Even Croatian Jews weighed in with their comments. In the April 1996 "Jewish Currents", Dr. Srdjan Matic, former Vice President of the Jewish Community center in Zagreb, is quoted by the interviewer, Ira Leibowitz:

*Dr. Matic tells me he met with Franjo Tudjman, who is not an anti-Semite but a right of center nationalist..... Dr. Matic has read Tudjman's controversial book. Denying a widely reported view, Matic asserts that falsified translations circulated by one Serb public relations firm were used to claim that Tudjman denies the Holocaust and the number of Jews murdered in it.*

In a letter to the Times Literary Supplement, July 1993, Slavko Goldstein stated:

*Tudjman is not an anti-Semite, not a fascist, and not a warmonger.*

In two additional unpublished and informal reviews of the book by Jewish reviewers, *Horrors of War* is characterized as "a significant contribution to political and social history" and a "significant historical document", which "offers a new perspective on Croatian and Yugoslav history, using archival sources" and "emphasizes the importance of the scholars' goals of seeking accuracy and truthfulness when writing history, even though doing so may offend the powerful and/or the public." There were countless other such comments, both on and off the record, which support the same view. Nonetheless, the controversy and distortions continued, the double standard persisted. What was acceptable for others to research, evaluate, and deconstruct was apparently unacceptable for Croatia, and specifically for President Tudjman. Perhaps in acknowledgment of the fact that the manipulations and misunderstandings would continue, and that they were often independent of the facts, President Tudjman decided to make revisions of certain

portions of his text which could be misconstrued or which tended to create an inaccurate representation of the Jewish people or of the President's views toward them, in spite of the advice of many others, Jews and non-Jews, who felt the book was in no way anti-Semitic and should not be changed. It is this revision which will now be available from M. Evans and Company, an American independent publishing house founded in 1960 and based in New York. M. Evans and Company publishes twenty to thirty books a year, and included among their best selling titles are: Meeting at Potsdam by Charles L. Mee, Dungeon, Fire and Sword: The Knights Templar of the Crusades by John J. Robinson, and Ides of August: The Berlin Wall Crisis by Curtis Cate. The introduction was written by the Honorable Thomas Patrick Melady, former U.S. Ambassador to the Holy See and President Emeritus of Sacred Heart University, an independent university which especially values intellectual research, social responsibility and spiritual values.

Very much in accordance with these basic concepts of the university of which he was President, Melady emphasizes Dr. Tudjman's success in reconciling the intellectual and the human in his examination of the phenomena of aggression and violence throughout the sweep of history:

*Tudjman examines the record of wartime Yugoslavia, and traces the purposes and processes behind the creation of the Croatian 'black legend'. At the same time, the author does not lose sight of the fact that each statistic was a human life. Having experienced the horrors of the Second World War himself, and having lost several members of his own family in the fighting, Tudjman understands like few other scholars that the horror of the Holocaust cannot be reduced to a statistical exercise, but must be understood in terms of the individual lives ended out of hate and ignorance.*

Ambassador Melady also places "Horrors of War" into a wider context, characterizing it as "many things: a political memoir, intellectual tour d force, a political document of an important period in the country's history and a broad historical philosophical survey." He believes readers will have a "candid insight into the mind of one of the most important statesmen in contemporary Europe. 'Horrors of War' is a contribution to the efforts of all people of good will

to learn about the alienations of the past so that they will not be repeated."

It now to be hoped that the forces of deconstruction, and not "political correctness" will aid us in this process.

### ***Myth and reality in the decade of deconstruction***

In our consideration of the context in which President Tudjman's Horrors of War originated and the context in which it now finds itself, so many years later, we are aided by the decline of political correctness in academia and the rise of the forces of deconstruction. It is no longer fashionable to cloak but to expose the essence of things. Myths have been toppled, ideologies as well as reputations dismantled and discredited. What served before as history and incontrovertible fact has now in many instances been exposed as propaganda, opportunism, or simply shoddy research. What would have earlier been considered inappropriate and unacceptable avenues of research are now receiving extensive attention and even, in some cases, validation.

Much of this deconstruction has been occasioned by the fall of Communism and supported by previously closed Soviet archives. Perhaps the most controversial result of research into these archives is a 1995 Yale University Press publication "The Secret World of American Communism" by researchers Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov. Basing their conclusions upon the extensive, heretofore inaccessible documents, the authors show that "it is no longer possible to maintain that the Soviet Union did not fund the American (Communist) party, that the CPUSA did not maintain a covert apparatus, that the key leaders and cadres were innocent of connection with Soviet espionage operations." The Party was not comprised, as American Communists had always argued, of dissenters from capitalism or rebels in the democratic tradition, but was, rather "a conspiracy financed by a hostile foreign power that recruited members for clandestine work, developed an elaborate underground apparatus, and used that apparatus to collaborate with espionage services of that power." In other words, the charges were not a result of paranoia or extremist allegations, say the authors. There was in fact a secret Communist apparatus; this body did infiltrate government agencies; and many of these Communists did indeed spy for the Soviet Union, as their critics had alleged.

This particular deconstruction has had extensive repercussions in the United States, as it has forced a re-evaluation of not only the McCarthy investigations headed by the House Un-American Activities Committee in the 1950s, and the Alger Hiss and Rosenberg espionage cases, but of the American left in its totality.. Anthony Lake recently felt the influence of these disclosures when he was quizzed by the head of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Richard Shelby, on his views about the innocence or guilt of Hiss and the Rosenbergs. The question seems to have been whether Lake's former alleged leftist affiliations would prevent him from objectively analyzing intelligence data and whether he would have reached the same conclusion as Klehr, et al: that the archives dispel the misinformation that "concern about domestic Communism in the late 1940s and 1950s was without justification and constituted an authoritarian, anti-democratic attack on a movement whose only sin was to dissent from prevailing norms."

Another area which has been influenced by the fall of Communism and the opening of the Soviet archives is that of Holocaust research and research into the Second World War. Some of the recent publications on these subjects have certainly been a direct or indirect result of this contemporary trend toward deconstruction and research into hitherto "politically incorrect" topics.

How else to explain the emergence of Daniel Goldhagen's controversial book, "Hitler's Willing Executioners", in which he argues that Germans as a nation, and not as individuals, were anti-Semitic and enthusiastically cooperated with the Nazi regime in the eradication of the Jews? The notion of collective guilt has enjoyed virtually no support in the past (except, it could be argued, when applied to Croatia). One of the strongest attacks against the concept has come from critics of the US's forcible internment of native-born Americans of Japanese descent during the Second World War on grounds of questionable loyalty. Yet today, the collective guilt theory has been resurrected in Goldhagen's book, and subsequently used by the Czech constitutional court in a recent decision holding the German people "collectively responsible" for Nazi atrocities, and thereby rejecting Sudeten Germans' claims for compensation. Even the Nuremberg Tribunal explicitly rejected such a principle.

Another "politically incorrect" area of research: a work in progress by Yale graduate Byron Rigg on the approximately

100,000 Jewish soldiers who fought in Hitler's army and who were provided with Aryan identification papers, and thus saved, by, among others, Hitler himself and Goering.

Let us also consider the memoirs of one of the foremost and most respected Holocaust historians, Raul Hilberg, "The Politics of Memory", which chronicle the attacks against him, which began thirty five years ago for his book "The Destruction of the European Jews." In it, he had written about Jewish institutions in the Second World War which served as an extension of the German bureaucratic machine, and the active role of the Jews in their own destruction, a direction which "was the exact opposite of a signal that pulsed endlessly through the Jewish community," a signal which rejected any attempts to "portray Jews as less than heroic." As a result, he was "buried under an avalanche of condemnations" and attacked as "impious" and as a "defamer of the dead" by his critics for over thirty years. Only now has he written about these painful years.

A new study and subsequent re-evaluation of statistics on Auschwitz victims has also appeared, "Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp", edited by Michael Berenbaum, director of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum's research department. According to a review of the book, the figure of 3-4 million who had perished in the camp had been uncritically accepted in the past, but has now been shown to have probably been inaccurate, based as it was upon erroneous statements by war criminal Adolf Eichmann. Most experts now place the figure closer to 1.1 million, and the overall number of victims of the Holocaust at 5.1 - 5.9 million. In his review, Walter Lacqueur, prolific author himself and expert on international relations and the Holocaust, attempts to explain the discrepancy between such figures. "The truth," he writes, "was difficult to establish. There were enormous gaps in the source materials, and the Nazis did their best to obliterate the traces of their crimes." He further points out that "there were even greater discrepancies in every other known mass murder in history" and specifically mentions Serb victims in Croatia between 1941-44, for whom "estimates vary from none to 600,000". In conclusion, Lacqueur says that the "experts who have reinvestigated the number of Auschwitz victims should be commended. It is a terrible subject, and their work could not have been easy for them."

And especially not for President Tudjman, who turned his attention - far in advance of the currents of intellectual analysis and investigation currently in vogue - to related areas of research. In the new intellectual climate which produces and even supports investigations similar to those of Berenbaum, Goldhagen and Hilberg, it is to be expected that Horrors of War will finally receive the serious and objective attention it deserves. If not, one will be forced to conclude, as Orwell did, that "all animals are equal, but some are more equal than others."



# REPORT ON THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY

Prepared on September 1, 1999

## ***Abstract***

This report was prepared on the basis of public source material and presents a summary of the criticisms directed against the various forms of manipulation used by the U.S. organization **National Endowment for Democracy** through various other private, non-government or humanitarian organizations. Among them, emphasis is placed on four entities: **International Republican Institute** (IRI), **National Democratic Institute for International Affairs** (NDI), **American Center for International Labor** (connected with the International Labor Union AFL-CIO) and the **Center for International Private Enterprise** (CIPE).

NED was established after U.S. Senate hearings on illegal CIA activities in the 1970s. It was conceived as an organization which having declared itself a private foundation could thus openly finance those activities the CIA had previously used in its secret operations. This involved co-opting politicians, journalists, and other individuals from public life in order to create what were termed in earlier times „agents of influence“. Toppling or installing governments were typical NED activities. This goal was achieved through media campaigns, manipulation of elections, pressure applied on governments, and so forth. Based on examples in this text, Croatia was, from the time of its declaration of independence, a clear focus of such operations.

In the United States, there are many critics of these American policies. And the critics, regardless of political orientation, share the same complaints:

1. The policies are anti-democratic, imperialistic, and immoral, and conflict with basic democratic principles;
2. NED endangers the credibility of America's policies, as it uses its money to oppose various governments under the condition that they are not aligned with American interests. This can involve Communist as well as democratic governments, and even dictatorships.
3. The recipients of these funds are only „declared“ democrats, since they in essence serve as manipulators of public opinion or, in the case of Croatia, are those who enjoyed privileges or political power in Communist times and lost them when Croatia became independent.
4. Recipients of these funds are sometimes unaware of the source and have thus been attacked as traitors in their own countries.
5. The activities the NED employs in foreign countries would be illegal and prosecutable if they were performed by foreign organizations in the United States.
6. NED does overtly what the CIA formerly did covertly.

### ***The formation and goals of the NED***

According to its Statement of Principles and Objectives, the **National Endowment for Democracy (NED)** advocates the view that “democracy involves the right of the people freely to determine their own destiny. The exercise of this right, says the statement, requires a system that guarantees freedom of expression, belief and association, free and competitive elections, respect for the inalienable rights of individual and minorities, free communications media, and the rule of law. Emphasis is made that the NED is a “private, non-profit organization created to strengthen

democratic institutions around the world through nongovernmental efforts.”<sup>(1)</sup>

The grant program of the NED funds four different programs in the area of labor, business and political party development:

**1.The International Republican Institute (IRI)**

**2.The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI)**

**3.The American Center for International Labor** (which is connected to the international labor union organization AFL-CIO)

**4.The Center for International Private Enterprise** (which operates in conjunction with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce)

Additionally, the NED conducts activities which “strengthen cooperation between democratic intellectuals and practitioners”, publishing the Journal of Democracy, as well as numerous books and reports, and hosting a visiting fellows program which organizes “seminars and conferences on issues affecting the future of democracy”.<sup>(2)</sup>

Funding is made on a quarterly basis, the NED being “interested in nonpartisan programs seeking to strengthen democratic values among all sectors of the democratic political spectrum”. It further states that “democracy cannot be achieved through a single election and need not be based upon the model of the United States or any other particular country.”<sup>(3)</sup>

NED core institutes prepare regular reports on current issues and debates, as well as extensive pre-election polls. A recent report on the Republic of Croatia by one of the NED core institutes, the **National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI)**, provides an evaluation of the current political climate in Croatia, pointing out that there is “increasing opposition to the autocratic power of the HDZ” and that the NDI had “responded to signs that the political scene in Croatia was undergoing its first significant changes since declaring independence” by launching a program in 1994 to strengthen Croatian political parties. Along with funding from USAID, the NDI began “helping opposition leaders ... and rank and file members to institute changes”,

focusing on “platform development, voter targeting, strategic planning and membership development”.

In 1997 NDI began training seminars to develop “groups of organizers within major parties to train their peers in basics in party organization.” In 1998, the NDI shifted its focus from local party branches to “working with opposition parties at the national level.”

In late August of 1998, the NDI held a series of consultations in Croatia on “how to effect changes to the existing parliamentary election law” and “provided expert commentary on the initial draft of the coalition’s proposed law.” (4)

Another of the NED’s core institutes, the International Republican Institute, has been involved in conducting detailed polls of the Croatian public, including prognoses of results for the upcoming parliamentary elections. (5)

Since its inception, the NED has had its share of influential supporters as well as vocal critics. In a memorandum of the conservative Washington think tank, **The Heritage Foundation**, senior analyst James Phillips calls the NED a “valuable weapon in the international war of ideas...it advances American national interests by promoting the development of stable democracies friendly to the U.S. in strategically important parts of the world.” (6)

Phillips writes that “the NED has played an important role in providing aid to democratic movements in the former Soviet bloc, China, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Nicaragua, Vietnam, and elsewhere....”and has helped emerging democracies to build “a stable democratic system, representative political parties, a free-market economy, and a free press”...battling a “wide variety of anti-American dictatorships....embryonic democracies remain vulnerable not only to communists, but to military coups. fundamentalist politico-religious movements, and authoritarian parties.” (7)

Phillips argues that “the U.S. has a stake in the promotion of democracy and the rule of law. Western style democratic governments are least likely to threaten American interests....consolidating democracy in formerly hostile states...helps to enhance America’s long term security....and facilitate free market reforms that lead to international trade and investment opportunities.” Although the Cold War has ended, “the global war of ideas continues to

rage....American interests and ideals remain threatened by deeply entrenched Communist regimes, neocommunists, aggressive dictatorships, radical nationalists and Islamic fundamentalists...the U.S. cannot afford to surrender the ideological battlefield.” (8)

In one of the most recent opinion pieces on the NED, the editors call for continued support for the NED, citing its assistance throughout the years to opponents of dictatorships in, for example, China, Sudan, Serbia, Cuba, Myanmar, and hile.” (9)

Before enumerating the arguments of those who have criticized or called for a halt to funding for the NED, it is instructive to examine the origins of the NED and what provided the impetus for its inception.

### ***Senate investigations into the CIA***

In 1967, a series of catastrophic scandals erupted after a portion of the CIA’s covert funding network operations was exposed in a **Ramparts** magazine article.(Note: The Agency had apparently controlled and financed scores of foreign trade unions, student and youth organizations, and political institutes, passing the money to a real or bogus foundation, then to a U.S. private organization and from there to the foreign recipient.) These revelations of widespread illegalities resulted in an outcry from Congress and a call for extensive Senate investigations. The hearings began in the late 1970s, and were known as the *Church committee investigations*, after Senator Frank Church.) (10)

In January of 1976, the Pike committee released a report on its conclusions based upon the hearings, but by a vote of 246-124, Congress prevented it from being made available to the public. However, a bootlegged copy of the report was carried in the alternative newspaper, **the Village Voice**, in February of 1976, “The CIA Report the President Doesn’t Want You to Read”. In April of 1976, the Church committee released its six volume report. Both reports were highly critical of the CIA and led to reevaluations of its performance and mission and proposals for a new paradigm. Changes in the law governing CIA operations were also implemented, making Presidents accountable for CIA’s secret undertakings and requiring the CIA to report to Congress on its activities. (11)

Among the disclosures during the hearing was extensive evidence of massive co-opting and manipulation of journalists and propaganda operations, illegal drug testing, manipulation of foreign elections, even assassinations of foreign leaders and officials, coup attempts, etc. against Salvador Allende, Castro, Mossadegh and numerous others. In regard to media manipulation, domestic and foreign, the hearings showed that 29% of 40 covert CIA actions had gone for media and propaganda projects, which would have been equal in 1978 to approximately 265 million dollars and 2,000 personnel. The propaganda budget of the CIA was thus "as large as the combined budgets of Reuters, United Press International and the Associated Press." It was also revealed in the hearings that over 400 highly reputable journalists had operated as "CIA journalists"(12) Carl Bernstein, Washington Post reporter and Pulitzer Prize winning journalist - awarded for his expose of the Watergate cover-up - did a subsequent follow up on this topic in "Rolling Stone", showing that the CIA had very close ties with major media figures (i.e. Sulzberger of the NYT, Henry Luce of Time, William Paley of CBS) and organizations, such as the Washington Post, New York Times, Reuters, AP, Newsweek, and UPI . Bernstein claimed that, according to CIA documents, the most "valuable" of these associations had been with the NYT, Time and CBS during that period.(13) In order to salvage its reputation, the New York Times did its own study of the issue, reporting that over the 25 years prior to the hearings, the CIA "had owned or subsidized more than fifty newspapers, news services, radio stations, periodicals and other communications facilities, most of them overseas....another dozen foreign news organizations were infiltrated by paid CIA agents...and that nearly a dozen American publishing houses printed some of the more than 1,000 books that had been produced or subsidized by the CIA. In a 1976 interview, CIA chief Colby was directly asked if the CIA ever told its media agents what to write. He said "oh, sure, all the time." (14)

Several years after the hearings, President Reagan was persuaded by his then CIA chief, Casey, to allow him to revitalize operational and analytical sides of the CIA in the wake of the scandals. He also promised Reagan that the CIA would "avoid journalists", but, as many pointed out, the new policy had a provision that allowed the CIA to make exceptions when necessary.(15) Shortly thereafter, President Ronald Reagan called for greater efforts to promote world democracy, and the creation of the NED was

proposed. Its role was ostensibly to assist democratic movements in ways that were “beyond the reach of federal programs.” The founders of NED feared that traditional agencies such as USAID and USIA “faced legal and political restrictions that limited their activities”. A private aid agency, they felt, “would be able to operate more freely and escape the stigma attached to US foreign aid in many parts of the world”. Many analysts interpreted the move as an attempt to transfer the covert activities of the CIA to a new, overt agency, the NED. Indeed, according to Allen Weinstein, one of the drafters of the NED legislation, “a lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA.” (16)

### ***Critics of NED***

Critics of the NED and its activities agree. According to Philip Agee, the first CIA officer to expose its extensive illegal and covert operations, the CIA has regularly been used “to intervene in the domestic affairs of other countries and to support political forces considered friendly to U.S. interests, or to weaken and destroy those considered unfriendly or threatening”. Governments, he says, who were attacked by the U.S. were “left, nationalist, reform-minded, populist or simply uncooperative” where U.S. economic interests and access to foreign markets were concerned. Based upon his experiences with the Agency (1957-69), the common denominator was always an unwillingness to comply with U.S. dictates. (17)

Agee provides a chronology of events following the Church hearings, and prior to the establishment of the NED. Members of Congress had “proposed legislation to create an ‘open’, government-financed foundation to carry on financing the activities which had recently been revealed as CIA-connected. The idea was to make money available to foreign political parties, trade unions, student groups and other private organizations - not to eliminate secret CIA money but to provide an alternative, given the constant problem of ‘covering CIA money.’” In 1979, the idea resurfaced, and an institute was founded to study the “feasibility of government financing of the foreign activities of private U.S. organizations. Participants in the study included “right wing think tanks such as the **American Enterprise Institute** and the **Center for Strategic and international Studies.**” The study became known as the Democracy Program, based on a German model. By secret executive order, Reagan formed such a program within the USIA, in

which CIA director Casey participated, but the press leaked his involvement and the CIA role was “supposedly canceled.” (18)

The conclusion finally was reached that the NED would serve to replace the previous agencies whose credibility had been destroyed, and its creation was finally approved by Congress in 1983. At its head was John Richardson, Jr., former chief of Radio Free Europe, another agency purported to have been under the control of the CIA, according to intelligence experts. In regard to the NED program, CIA director Colby commented that “it is not necessary to turn to the covert approach....many of the programs conducted as covert operations can now be conducted quite openly, and....without controversy.” Colby’s wife became shortly thereafter a member of the NED board of directors. (19)

The NED began with an initial appropriation of 18.8 million dollars from the United States Congress. It was stipulated that the NED was simply a funding channel and could have no projects of its own. The U.S. government would have full access to all its files, papers and financial records. In practice, according to Agee, the U.S. State Department and other government agencies such as the CIA would “formulate and approve NED projects”, which would be channelled for the most part through the four core groups, NDI, IRI, CIPE and ACIL. The NED then, says Agee, was “simply a continuation of public funding for intervention in foreign countries, using new conduits, with the ‘private’ organizations serving as instruments of U.S. foreign policy.”

Beneficiaries included the whole spectrum: political parties, cooperatives, professional associations, information media, publications, programs, universities, trade unions, churches, women’s groups, youth groups, and students: “in short, all traditional CIA covert action targets.” (20)

Another highly decorated former CIA agent, Ralph McGehee, who served for 25 years in the agency and has testified in Congress and in court on CIA issues, has also written extensively about the typical pattern of U.S.: “democracy promoting activities”: the U.S. administration either influences or creates new human rights organizations which declare a non compliant country in violation of human rights. Propaganda discredits the transgressors. As soon as a government has been appropriately demonized, “diplomatic, political, propaganda, media operations and



economic measures are applied to force the target country to toe the line.” (21)

When the target nation lessens political restrictions, the NED, USIA, government backed non-governmental organizations, USAID, the World Bank, etc., begin overt or covert operations to modify or replace governing authority.” False evidence operations are also conducted, forging documents and placing them where they will be discovered and distributed, “glorifying demons and demonizing targets, even the most honorable”. McGehee reinforces Agee’s assertions about the NED as an alternative agency to the CIA, since the NED “subsidizes and influences elections, political parties, think tanks, academia, business groups, book publishers, media, labor, religious, women’s and youth groups...NED assumed this role from the CIA beginning in 1983 and uses many of the same institutions but operates more openly...it is in part a smoke screen for operations by other organizations.” Other non government organizations (NGOs) are also involved in CIA covert actions. McGehee refers to the book “Holy War, Holy Victory” by Kurt Lohbeck on CIA actions in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Lohbeck provides evidence that many NGOs that sprung up around CIA operations were so intertwined with CIA that it was impossible to separate them, and even provides names of some such organizations, especially the various European NGOs. McGehee also makes mention of the NED journal, Journal of Democracy, which subsidizes writers, some of which, “we may assume are on the U.S. NED payroll, or, to put it another way, agents of the U.S.” (22)

A recently released CIA memorandum on use of the media in the 60s and 70s under the Freedom of Information Act strengthens earlier assertions made by McGehee, Carl Bernstein and Philip Agee, in that the memorandum clearly states that the CIA had “relationships with reporters from every major wire service, newspaper, weekly and television network...in many instances, we have persuaded reporters to postpone, change, hold or even scrap stories.” The Agency also touted its “wide range of contacts with academics through recruiting, professional societies, contractual arrangements...the Public Affairs Office of the CIA was also “building a data base of information about Agency contacts with academia - conferences, seminars, scholars, recruiting officers...” (23)

A Russian counterintelligence report from early 1995, as though to confirm the CIA memorandum, found that American research centers, institutes and aid organizations were spying on Russia and working to undermine it...influencing the development of political and economic processes in Russia.” The report named the Soros Foundation and scores of other U.S. organizations which were engaging in subversive activity, including groups from Harvard, Columbia and Duke Universities and their involvement in the 1993 parliamentary elections. (24)

Former disillusioned CIA agents are by far not the only harsh critics of the activities and mission of the NED. The conservative, non-government funded think tank, the CATO Institute, enumerated its many objections to the organization back in 1993 in a long and detailed analysis, calling it a “foreign policy loose cannon”, which “harasses the duly elected government of friendly countries, interferes in foreign elections and fosters corruption of democratic movements”, all financed by American taxpayers.

CATO points out that the NED is not independent, as claimed in its policy statement, but is funded by the U.S. government, and that it was created, as Agee and others have written, to assist movements abroad which were “beyond the reach of established federal programs” such as USIA and USAID, who were “legally and politically restricted” from certain activities. The structure of the NED, according to CATO, is “based on the premise that government money, if filtered through enough layers of bureaucracy, becomes ‘private’ funding, a dangerous and illogical assumption.” CATO also criticizes the NED for “taking advantage of its alleged private status to influence foreign elections, an activity that is beyond the scope of AID and USIA and would otherwise only be possible through a CIA covert operation.” CATO makes the interesting point that such activities “would be illegal for foreign groups operating in the United States”. Another problem is that there is ambiguity about the grants that go through NED, as “even the recipients do not always know the precise source of their funding”, and could therefore be unwitting agents or conspirators. (25)

### ***NED manipulation of foreign elections***

The issue of election interference on the part of the NED has provoked the most criticism from its detractors. Central America was a major focus in the 1980s, shortly after the

creation of the NED. Panama was one of the first examples of political intervention by the NED. The U.S. supported candidate Barletta of the military-controlled Democratic Revolutionary Party, who was also a vice president of the World Bank and one-time student of former U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz. Barletta was opposed by Arnulfo Arias, a nationalist and populist. The U.S. feared his anti-military platform would bring instability to Panama, and that Arias would undermine U.S. efforts to overthrow the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and to defeat the rebels in El Salvador. During the election campaign, NED money was channeled through the AFL-CIO's Free Trade Union Institute to finance Panamanian unions supporting Barletta. Fraud in vote counting gave Barletta the election, even though a count by the U.S. embassy in Panama showed Arias had won by 4-8,000 votes. (26)

In Nicaragua, the NED, along with the CIA and other U.S. agencies, poured millions of dollars into defeating the Sandinista government in 1990, and financing the anti-Sandinista coalition. However, preparations began years prior to 1990 to ensure the desired U.S. outcome. As a result of the controversy that arose in 1984 when NED funds were used to ensure Barletta's victory in Panama, (see above), a law was passed in the U.S. Congress prohibiting the use of NED funds to "finance the campaigns of candidates for public office." However, it was not difficult to circumvent the law, and NED simply gave millions instead to the Nicaragua Opposition Union (UNO), which then dispersed funds to scores of other "democracy building" groups supporting this coalition. Although there were eight other opposition groups, NED money was given only to UNO. The newspaper La Prensa, which supported Violeta Chamorro, the opposition candidate, received NED financial aid as though it were non-partisan, and the NED spent over one million dollars on other anti-Sandinista media and political groups, many tied to the CIA. NED was closely supervised by Walter Raymond, Jr., a CIA propaganda specialist sent from **the National Security Agency** in 1982 by CIA chief Casey. The U.S. plan was to put into place a massive intervention through the CIA, NED, and AID with psychological, economic and political programs. The plan called for mobilizing three bodies: a political coalition to oppose the Sandinistas, a trade union coalition, and a mass civic organization. Sub-groups would focus on youth and students, women, religious organizations, etc. Media operations were central to the operation. (27)

The NED provided over 12.5 million dollars to finance the operation. Other NED money went to a variety of other organizations for programs in propaganda, training, etc. The NED sum would represent the equivalent of a 2 billion dollar foreign intervention in a U.S. election. In addition, the CIA is estimated to have spent 11 million dollars in the election. (28)

A 1990 article in the left-wing magazine, **The Nation**, pointed out, as had the CATO Institute, that “if the Nicaraguan government were to fund similar campaign activities in the United States, the recipients and conduits of that money would be subject to stiff civil and criminal penalties.” After the scourge of Watergate, Democratic Senator Lloyd Bentsen, in fact, introduced such an amendment to the Federal Election Campaign Act “eliminating political contributions from all foreign nationals”, saying that he did not think foreign nationals had “any business in our political campaigns.” Bentsen’s amendment passed in the Senate by 89 to 0 and passed into law in 1974. (29)

As for Nicaragua, the World Court ultimately ruled that the U.S. had waged an illegal war against Nicaragua and ordered 17 billion dollars in reparations to be paid, an order subsequently ignored by the U.S. (30)

NED also made efforts to ensure the defeat of Augusto Pinochet in Chile in the late 1980s, covered in a NYT story in June of 1988: “The administration enthusiastically backed a Congressional earmark of 1 million to the NED for projects relating to democracy building in Chile”; however, “the financial aid to opposition groups by the NED revived the frequent charges by Pinochet and his supporters that the opposition is dependent on financial assistance from foreign governments, political parties and foundations.” Other funds went “to two trade union groups” who opposed Pinochet, to an opposition newspaper, La Epoca, and to a “political and economic research institute to undertake a political poll.” An NED official said his organization “was not taking a position in the plebiscite”. Pinochet was subsequently arrested in London during a medical checkup and charged with crimes against humanity. (31)

There were also protests against “unfair interference favoring the political parties closest to Vaclav Havel” by the NED. At issue was \$400,000 given by the NED to two organizations which later “coalesced...to lead the revolution

against Communist rule.” Although NED president Carl Gershman said that the NED “did not side with one party or another”, the chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement disagreed, asking why the NED only “gave money to just one or two among 23” opposition parties. The Green Party chairman concurred, saying the American grant was “an injustice”. The NYT pointed out that although Gershman had stated that the NED goal was not to support campaigning, a U.S. government document said the purpose was “to prepare those two parties for the June 8 elections and consolidate their position as Czechoslovakia’s premier democratic movement.” (32)

Former Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky concurs that NED funding can, indeed, be partisan. In a 1991 **National Review** editorial, he wrote that when the “NED...singles out this or that magazine or Moscow newspaper to underwrite, it corrupts both the market and the independence of the press.” He also addressed the political corruption which results when certain politicians are subsidized by the NED and other non-governmental organizations, and emphasizes, as **The Nation** and others have, that “the congressional code of ethics would forbid members of the U.S. Congress from accepting foreign subsidies for political activities...apparently, what is unacceptable for an American is commendable for a Russian.” Russian money, he wrote, had gone to many elected officials to “encourage democratic activities.” (33)

In the 1980s and early 1990s, the NED was active in Haiti as well, trying to prevent the election of Aristide. Haitian newspapers were critical of the NED, which “like its covert cousin, the CIA, the very visible NED sees its mission as ‘planning, coordinating and implementing international political activities in support of U.S. policies and interests relative to national security’”, according to the 1985 NED annual report. To carry out this mandate, the “NED, or more specifically, its Republican tentacle, the International Republican Institute (IRI), has worked diligently to assemble...a hodgepodge of 26 ‘opposition’ groups”.(34) Jerry Brown, former California governor and U.S. Democratic Presidential candidate in 1980, also attacked NED activities in Haiti, where approximately 13 million dollars were spent on “so-called democracy building activities...in fact, the money was going to the very groups in Haiti that were known for manipulating elections and politics.” (35)

Aristide was nonetheless elected, after which the U.S. sharply increased funding for political activities, mainly through USAID. Huge notebooks containing allegations of human rights abuses under Aristide were prepared, “something it had not done under the previous rulers, Duvalierists and military men”, who, although dictatorial, had been cooperative with the United States. Noam Chomsky wrote that after Aristide had clearly told the U.S. that “it is monstrous to come down here and impose your will on another people” whom you do not understand and for whom you care nothing, adding that he could not “accept that Haiti should be whatever the U.S. wants it to be”, it was clear that Aristide had to go. (36)

In Bulgaria, the Socialist Party won the 1990 elections freely and fairly and assumed power. Shortly thereafter, the NED and other U.S. foreign policy structures began financing and advising opposition forces in the art of “creating chaos”, using strikes and protest actions which ultimately led to the resignation of the president, who was replaced by a member of the opposition. (37)

One of the most dubious interventions by the NED occurred in 1989 in Costa Rica, the only stable democracy in Central America. Because Nobel prize winner and President Oscar Arias opposed Reagan’s policy in Central America, he “incurred the wrath of NED activists...from 1986 to 1988, NED gave money to Arias’s political opposition, which was strongly supported by Panamanian dictator Noriega.” (38) In subsequent years, Noriega was no longer needed by the United States, and he was charged with drug smuggling and is now serving a life sentence in the United States.

Congressman Paul Kanjorski reacted in a Christian Science Monitor article from 1991, to the highly questionable activities of the NED around the world, saying that “American tax dollars are being used to aid in the overthrow of foreign governments....does that sound shocking? It should.”

Although the NED, in its policy statement, professes its goal to be to “encourage free and democratic institutions throughout the world”, Kanjorski alleges that “NED has provided money to the political party working to defeat Nobel Peace Prize winner Oscar Arias, president of Costa Rica” and has also funded groups in France, one of Europe’s oldest democracies, “who were opposed to the policies of Mitterrand and working for his defeat.” NED funnels its

money, he writes, to other groups and organizations, so that “it is very difficult to determine precisely where these funds are going and what activities they are promoting.” Kanjorski introduced legislation to eliminate funding for the NED and to repeal its legislation, but his efforts failed. (39)

According to the CATO report, the NED, a “Cold War relic”, was first funded in 1984 with 18 million at the height of the Cold War. By 1986, Gorbachev’s first year in power, funding was cut to 17.2 million, and the year after, to 15 million. However, the appropriations increased dramatically once the Soviet Union disintegrated: “in 1991, NED’s budget grew to 25 million, in 1992, to 27.5 million and in 1993, to 35 million.” (40) A recent editorial in the New York Times (July 21, 1999) spoke out against efforts to stop the funding of NED, as recommended by NED critic, Congressman Judd Gregg. “The Senate should defy him and vote to preserve an organization whose mission is more vital than ever.” (41)

### ***Double standard on election intervention***

Many of the opponents of NED have pointed out that, if similar operations were conducted by foreign groups in the United States, they would be illegal. The recent scandal concerning Chinese government contributions to the Democratic election campaigns can serve as an example.

In 1991, FBI officials and counterintelligence agents discovered Chinese efforts to interfere in American campaigns. Large sums of money had been illegally distributed in order to mask the source of contributions, the purpose being to “influence the U.S. position on a host of issues...” An uproar resulted, with calls to expel the Chinese diplomats to show clearly that “foreign political interference will not be tolerated.”(42)

At that time, a senior New York Times commentator, John Broder, observed dryly that the horror expressed was, at best, uninformed, as “the U.S. has long meddled in other nations’ internal affairs”, especially through the NED, which was “created fifteen years ago to do in the open what the CIA has done surreptitiously for decades, spends 30 million a year to support things like political parties, labor unions, dissident movements and the news media in dozens of countries, including China.” Unions were financed in France, Paraguay, the Philippines and Panama, political parties in Portugal, Costa Rica, Bolivia and Northern Ireland

were financed, and money was given to U.S. candidates in elections in Czechoslovakia and Nicaragua. And what's more, these are "the more benign efforts to intervene around the world. Since the end World War 2, the U.S. usually covertly through the CIA, has installed or toppled leaders on every continent....fomented coups, spread false rumors, bribed political figures and spent countless billions of dollars to sway public opinion." Peter Kornbluh of the National Security Archive believes that "if the Chinese tried to influence the election, the U.S. is only getting a taste of its own medicine....China has done little more than emulate a long pattern of U.S. manipulation, bribery and cover operations to influence the political trajectory of countless countries around the world." (43)

In an article by the press watchdog organization, Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, Norman Solomon asks why the U.S. efforts to sway the Russian presidential race in 1996 were good, but the Chinese efforts to influence U.S. congressional races were bad. Through the NED, for example, favored political forces overseas are assisted, including many members of the current Russian parliament (see Bukovsky above). Solomon says some relevant history is needed in light of the furor over Chinese donations., i.e.:

*U.S. intelligence operations financed activities in support of U.S. friendly candidates in Italy, Chile, Australia, El Salvador and Nicaragua, among others. In El Salvador, "the State Department and the CIA bought the election for Jose Duarte", according to Senator Jesse Helms.(44)*

## **Croatia and the NED**

Although the numerous analysts and experts who have investigated the NED appear unanimous in their view that it is impossible to trace the many activities of the NED in a given host country, there is a certain amount of public domain information available regarding funding and support to groups and or institutions, either by the NED or by other NGOs and organizations who work closely with the NED, such as the **Center for Foreign Journalists, Committee to Protect Journalists, Free Trade Union Institute, International Republican Institute, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs**, and the **Westminster Foundation for Democracy**.(45)



Already in 1992, the European office of the **Agency for International Development** (AID) distributed a “Recommendation of IRI on the strengthening of pro-democratic forces in the republics of the former Yugoslavia”. It is claimed in the recommendation that the elections in the Republic of Croatia in 1992 were “problematic” and that the “nationalistic leader Franjo Tudjman and his party, the HDZ, won the majority of parliamentary seats.” IRI recommended that an aid program for the opposition in Croatia be immediately established in order to hasten the formation of a coalition and to provide training and information in regard to election issues. Emphasis is placed in the program on the necessity for strengthening pro-democratic political parties and their mutual cooperation.

According to the most recently updated public information, some of the NED grantees in recent years in Croatia were:

- The Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (HHO), director Vjekoslav Vidovic
- The Erasmus Guild, director Vesna Pusic
- The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
- The Center for International Private Enterprise
- Anti-War Campaign for Croatia
- International Republican Institute
- STINA News Agency

Grants were given by the Westminster Foundation to:

- Croatian Labor Party
- Article 19
- Arkzin
- Charities Aid Foundation

On the NED board of directors are, among others, Morton Abramowitz, former U.S. intelligence official, former director of the Carnegie Endowment - which publishes the elite political affairs journal, **Foreign Policy** - and present board member of the European NGO, the International Crisis Group (ICG). Note: many of the ICG recommendations and

reports have subsequently been adopted by the international community (i.e. resolution of Brcko). Also on the board is Paula Dobriansky, member of the Council on Foreign Relations and former member of the law firm, Hunton and Williams, which is providing the defense of Blaskic, Kordic, etc. (46)

On the board of the IRI are, among others, U.S. Senator John McCain, current Presidential candidate, Lawrence Eagleburger (former U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia), Jeane Kirkpatrick, and Brent Scowcroft.

Janusz Bugajski, who is a regular contributor to "Nacional", was a senior research analyst for **Radio Free Europe**, has also worked for USAID, the NED (through the International Republican Institute), and the Free Trade Union Institute (AFL-CIO). Bugajski is a contributor, as is Vesna Pusic, to the NED journal, the **Journal of Democracy**, and he is also active in the Washington think tank, the "right wing **Center for Security and International Studies**", to which Agee referred in his article cited earlier in this report. (47)

**The Committee to Protect Journalists**, one of the groups closely linked to the NED, according to former US State Department official, William Blum, has regularly defended Croatian journalists such as Ivo Pukanic and Viktor Ivancic and organized actions to apply pressure on the Croatian government to discontinue lawsuits against them, and USIA, another organization close to the NED, has provided money to pay for legal costs of some journalists who have been sued in court. "**Nacional**" has also recently been assisted by USIA in creating and improving its web page on the Internet.

Election prognoses and polls predicting defeat for the ruling party - prepared by the NED core institute, the IRI - appear as major news items in the press, especially in opposition publications such as **Nacional, Globus, Jutarnji List, Feral Tribune** and **Novi List**. (see attachments)

Interestingly, some of the outspoken NED critics cited in this report have been used recently as expert commentators on various other subjects by the opposition press, i.e. Noam Chomsky and members of the CATO Institute.

According to the IRI program proposal for Croatia, the activities of IRI were to occur prior to the Croatian parliamentary elections as well and four months during the

post-election period, until June 2000 at the latest. USAID experts and the U.S. Embassy in Croatia have approved continuation of work in the following areas:

- a. Research and analysis of public opinion based on polling and work with “focus groups”;
- b. Offering assistance, consultations, and information-sharing during the election campaign, as well as in the post-election period, message shaping, and election campaign strategies;
- c. building coalitions and maintaining them by working together and using the knowledge gained from public opinion polls;
- d. Organizing the youth of political parties with the goal of greater participation of young people in elections.

In conclusion, one finds some common denominators in the various analyses and observations presented in this report:

1. Critics of the NED cover the entire political spectrum. Marxists, liberals, centrists, conservatives and right-wing institutes and organizations have objected on the same grounds to its activities, labeling them anti-democratic, imperialist and antithetical to basic democratic principles.
2. The NED has no particular political ideology other than using its resources against any government which opposes U.S. strategic interests, be it nationalist, Communist or other.
3. Recipients in Croatia of NED money usually represent themselves as liberals and democrats, but are in essence serving as conduits for partisan foreign government organizations manipulating democracy, which is in direct contradiction to liberal policies and activities.
4. Sometimes, recipients of NED money are unaware that the money has come from NED.
5. Activities undertaken in foreign countries by the NED would be illegal if undertaken, i.e. by foreigners in the United States.

6. A wide range of respected individuals in the U.S. media and government agree that the NED is a surrogate of the CIA and is carrying on overtly what were earlier covert CIA operations, i.e. manipulation of the media, elections, dirty tricks, etc.

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1. Statement of Principles and Objectives, 1984, National Endowment for Democracy, page 1-2.
  2. Ibid, page 2.
  3. Ibid, page 3.
  4. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs report on Activities in Central and Eastern Europe, December 1998.
  5. See attachments
  6. Phillips, James. The National Endowment for Democracy: a Prudent Investment in the Future. The Heritage Foundation, Executive memorandum No. 461, September 13, 1996.
  7. Ibid, page 1.
  8. Ibid, page 2.
  9. Editorial Comment, "A Vote for Democracy Abroad", New York Times, July 21, 1999.
  10. Agee, Philip. "Tracking Covert Actions into the Future", from Mission Impossible: The CIA's War on Democracy.
  11. Brandt, Daniel. "Journalism and the CIA: the Mighty Wurlitzer." Namebase Newslines, No. 17, April-June, 1997.
  12. Ibid, page 3-4.
  13. Bernstein, Carl. "CIA and the Media". Rolling Stone, October 20, 1977.
  14. Op cit. Brandt, page 6.
  15. Ibid. page 9.
  16. Blum, William. "The National Endowment for Democracy." Editorial. Note: William Blum left the U.S. State Department in 1967 because of opposition to the Vietnam War. He has since worked as a journalist in the U.S., Europe and South America. He has also published a book exposing CIA illegalities in Chile, "Killing Hope". Blum currently works as a researcher of the National Archives in Washington, D.C.

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  18. Ibid, page 5.
  19. Op. cit., Brandt, page 7.
  20. Op. cit., Agee, page 5.
  21. McGehee, Ralph. The CIA, Past, Present and Future. Part 2, page 1-2.
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  36. Chomsky, Noam. "The Tragedy of Haiti". Year 501, South End Press, 1993.
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  38. Op. cit., Conry, page 7.

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39. Kanjorski, Paul. "Group Cloaked in Secrecy Meddling in Foreign Affairs". Atlantic Journal and Constitution, May 24, 1991.
  40. Op. cit., Conry, page 12.
  41. Op. cit., NYT Editorial Comment.
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  45. Op. cit., Blum, page 2-3.
  46. Documents available on NED website
  47. Documents available on CSIS website.

